28 defendants S. D. Andrews and W. H. Whitcomb the possession of all the bonds secured by the mortgage or trust deed of the Oconto Water Company dated the 1st day of November, 1890, which were deposited with said clerk by said Andrews & Whitcomb; that such restoration by said clerk to said Andrews & Whitcomb is, and shall be, without adjudging the validity or invalidity of the said bonds in their hands or the issue of the same by said Oconto Water Company. "Fifth. That the legal title to the land upon which the pumping station and wells of the waterworks plant are located, which heretofore by deed dated the 31st day of January, A. D. 1894, was conveyed by the order of this court by the city of Oconto to the said defendant, Oconto Water Company, the description of which said land is more fully set out in said deed as follows, to wit: be, and the same is hereby, passed and transferred by virtue of the instruments of mortgage dated September 13, 1890, and March 13, 1891, executed by said defendant, Oconto Water Company, to said defendants, S. D. Andrews and W. H. Whitcomb, and of the sale in the proceedings to foreclose the same to the said defendant, Oconto City Water Supply Company, as the assignee and successor in interest of the said defendants, S. D. Andrews and W. H. Whitcomb, and that the said defendant, Oconto Water Company, and its receiver, Albert E. Smith, by separate instruments duly witnessed and acknowledged so as to entitle the same to record, execute and deliver conveyances thereof to the defendant Oconto City Water Supply Company, but without prejudice to any rights which said complainant or said R. D. Wood & Company may have under their said mechanics' lien decrees or otherwise to redeem from said instruments of mortgage or either of them, or from the sale nder the proceedings to foreclose the same." The 6th clause of that memorandum, which indicates the reasons by which the circuit court was led to the conclusion that in exe cuting the mandate of the circuit court of appeals it was unnecessary to insert in the final decree of the circuit court a positive inhibition against any further attempt on the part of the pipe works to enforce, as against Andrews & Whitcomb and the water supply company, its alleged mechanics' lien, if it possessed any, is as follows: "Sixth. The order of March 5, 1894, restraining the marshal from proceeding to sell under the mechanics' lien decree, was superseded by the 5th clause of the decree of July 17, 1895. There would seem to be no necessity for further order in respect thereto. If the contention of the complainant that the mechanics' lien decree took precedence of subsequent mortgages was not disposed of by the court of appeals, it should be placed in a position to be able to redeem from the sale under the mortgages to Andrews & Whitcomb. If that contention was disposed of by the court of appeals, a sale under the mechanics' lien decree can do no harm to Andrews & Whitcomb or their successor in interest, beyond possibly creating*a cloud upon their title. The court would not, however, permit this to be done if it was clear from the several opinions of the court of appeals that the contention in that respect had been determined. "I cannot spell out from the opinions of that court that the precise contention had been considered and determined, unless it must be held to have been so determined by the fact of the reversal of the decree of this court and the dismissal of the bill for want of equity as against Andrews & Whitcomb and their successor in interest." After the entry in the creditors' suit of the final decree of the circuit court, the pipe works directed the marshal to execute the order of sale contained in the decree of OcAlthough the decree rendered in favor of tober 3, 1892, in the mechanics' lien suit, the pipe works in* its mechanics' lien fore- On August 23, 1897, in said suit, sale was closure suit authorized a sale of the water- made to the pipe works of the waterworks works plant to enforce the lien found to ex-plant and all the right, title, and interest of ist, no sale had taken place up to the time the creditors' suit was decided by the circuit court, because of a restraining order preventing such sale. When, however, the circuit court entered its decree in favor of complainant in the creditors' suit, the 5th clause thereof was couched in the following language: "Fifth. The complainant and R. D. Wood" (an intervening creditor claiming under an alleged mechanics' lien decree) "are authorized to proceed to the enforcement and satisfaction of their respective liens in accordance with their several decrees." The right thus recognized was suspended by the appeal which was taken to the circuit court of appeals. When the mandate of the circuit court of appeals in the pipe works creditors' suit came to the circuit court, it would seem some difficulty arose as to the form of the decree, and in consequence the court filed a menorandum opinion which we find printed in the brief of counsel for the plaintiff in error. the Oconto Water Company in and to the premises upon which the same were located, together with the franchise of maintaining and operating said plant. A day or two afterwards the sale was confirmed by the circuit court, and a deed was executed and delivered by the marshal to the pipe works, who caused the same to be recorded. On December 28, 1897, the pipe works commenced the present action in a state court in Wisconsin, naming as sole defendant the Oconto City Water Supply Company. The complaint contained averments as to the incorporation of the defendant, the sale and delivery of pipe by the plaintiff to the Oconto Water Company, the decree of October 3, 1892, in the mechanics' lien suit, and the sale to and purchase by it in August, 1897, under such decree. The making by the water company to Andrews & Whitcomb of the alleged mortgages or pledges heretofore referred to was averred, as also the proceedings instituted next •281 •230 by Andrews & Whitcomb culminating in the foreclosure of said mortgages and the sale thereunder to Andrews & Whitcomb, and the taking possession by virtue of such sale of the plant and its transfer thereafter by Andrews & Whitcomb to the defendant, the water supply company. It was also alleged that Andrews & Whitcomb, prior to the making of the mortgages or pledges in question, had knowledge of the fact that plaintiff had furnished to the water company pipe as aforesaid for use in its plant, and that Andrews & Whitcomb, prior to the commencement of their foreclosure suit, knew that plaintiff had filed its claim for a mechanics' lien upon the plant of the water company, and had commenced proceedings for the enforcement of such lien. It was also averred that the water supply company, when it took possession of the plant, had knowledge or notice that the pipe furnished had not been paid for, and that proceedings were pending to enforce a mechanics' lien therefor. The specific averment was made that the title acquired by the pipe works under its mechanics' lien foreclosure proceeding was prior to any lien upon or title to said plant then or any time held or acquired by the water supply company. The prayer for relief, as amended, was as follows: ant set up the plea of res judicata arising from the decree of the circuit court of appeals in the creditors' suit. The case was tried by the court without a jury, special findings of fact were made respecting the judgment in the creditors' suit, the conclusions of law being embodied in the following decree: "It is adjudged that the plaintiff has not and never had any lien on the waterworks plant and property on which it claims such lien by its complaint in this action; that the defendant holds and owns said plant and property by claim and title paramount to and free and clear of any claim or lien of the plaintiff; that the plaintiff is not entitled to any relief demanded in the complaint, as amended or otherwise. "It is further adjudged that this action be, and the same is hereby, dismissed for want of equity, and that the defendant do have and recover of and from the plaintiff the sum of sixty-three and 92/100 dollars, its costs and disbursements in this action." On appeal the supreme court of Wisconsin affirmed the judgment of the trial court. 105 Wis. 48, 81 N. W. 125. A writ of error from this court was allowed by the Chief Justice of the supreme court of Wisconsin. It was therein recited that in this suit there "was drawn in question the va and privilege claimed by the said National Foundry & Pipe Works, Limited, under authority exercised under the United States, and decrees duly entered in the circuit court of the United States for the eastern district of Wisconsin," and that "the decision of the said supreme court of the state of Wisconsin was against the right and privilege specially set up by said National Foundry & Pipe Works, Limited, under said authority and decrees." Mr. George H. Noyes for plaintiff in error. Messrs. George G. Greene and Jerome R. North for defendant in error. "Wherefore said plaintiff demands judg-lidity and binding effect of a title, right, ment against said defendant for the value of said pipe and materials furnished to said Oconto Water Company and for the amount of its said lien against the property of said Oconto Water Company; that the possession and use of said plant be given to it, and that said defendant, its officers, servants, and agents, may be perpetually enjoined from occupying, possessing, or using the same and any of the pipe so furnished by said plaintiff and being a part of the water plant or system now operated by it; or that said defendant, its officers, servants, and agents, may be enjoined from occupying, possessing, or using said plant or any of the pipe so furnished by said plaintiff for said plant, unless within such reasonable time as said court may prescribe for that purpose Baid defendant shall pay to said plaintiff the amount due to it under its mechanics' lien decree, as hereinbefore set forth; and that said defendant be ordered and required to pay the amount of said plaintiff's judgment against said Oconto Water Company and against said defendant herein, in such manner as to this court shall seem just and pursuant with its equitable powers and in accordance with the practice in such cases; and said plaintiff prays for such other, further, or different relief as to the court shall seem just and proper, and for the costs of this action." In the answer filed on behalf of the water supply company, the averment of the complaint that the pipe works was the owner or holder of any right, title, or interest in or to the said waterworks plant, or any pipe constituting a part of said plant, was traversed. By leave of court an amendment was filed to the answer, in which the defend *Mr. Justice White, after making the foregoing statement, delivered the opinion of the court: In order to clearly present the simple issue arising on this record for decision, we have been obliged to make the foregoing lengthy statement of the facts which are involved in this unnecessarily protracted litigation. When the allegations of the complaint by which this action was commenced are ultimately resolved, all the rights which they assert are embraced within the following propositions: 1. A contention that the water supply company, by virtue of its acquisition from Andrews & Whitcomb, was a mere successor corporation of the original water company, and became bound for all its indebted ness, including, of course, the debt due the pipe works, and this irrespective of the existence of a mechanics' lien; 2. A claim that in virtue of the sale made in the mechanics' lien suit after the deci- | vested in the water company as a result of sion of the circuit court of appeals in the the decree in its favor in the mechanics' lien creditors' suit and the final entry and exe suit. cution of the mandate, the pipe works became the owner of the waterworks plant, entitled to the possession of the same, with a right, however, in the defendant, as a junior lienholder, to redeem by paying the indebtedness due the pipe works; and, 3. An assertion that if the pipe works had not become the owner of the waterworks plant in virtue of the sale made as just stated, that corporation, in any event, in virtue of its asserted mechanics' lien, had been vested with a paramount right as against the water supply company, which it was the duty of a court of equity to enforce by compelling payment by the defendant. As it is thus demonstrated that the determination whether the court below correctly applied the plea of res judicata necessitates our deciding whether due effect was given to the decree in the mechanics' lien suit, a Federal question is presented which it is our duty to determine. Jacobs v. Marks, 182 U. Š. 583, 587, 45 L. ed. 1241, 1244, 21, Sup. Ct. Rep. 865; Hancock Nat. Bank v. Farnum, 176 U. S. 640,*645, 44 L. ed. 619, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 506; Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. R. Co. v. Long Island Loan & T. Co. 172 U. S. 493, 507, 43 L. ed. 528, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 238, and cases cited. In order to correctly decide what was concluded by the decision of the circuit ourt of appeals in the creditors' suit and the final decree entered in such cause, it must be ascertained who were the parties presented for adjudication, and what was decided thereon. It is elementary that if from the decree in a cause there be uncertainty as to what was really decided, resort may be had to the pleadings and to the opinion of the court, in order to throw light upon the subject. Baker v. Cummings, 181 U. S. 117, 45 L. ed. 776, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 578; Last Chance Min. Co. v. Tyler Min. Co. 157 U. S. 684, 688, 39 L. ed. 859, 862, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 733. In effect, these questions were all concluded adversely to the plaintiff in error by the court below, the rights embraced in the first proposition were decided to be without mer-to that cause, what were the issues therein it because the facts disclosed the water supply company to be an independent corporation and not bound as a successor company for the indebtedness of the original water company. As this proposition does not involve a Federal question, we may not review it. Indeed the finality of the decision below on the subject is recognized by the plaintiff in error, since the assignment of error made in this court seeks to raise no question on such subject. All the rights asserted by the plaintiff in error which are embraced in the second and third propositions were decided adversely below, on the ground that they were not open to inquiry, because concluded by the presumption of the thing adjudged, arising from the final decree in the creditors' suit. And it is upon the asserted erroneous appli- | cation by the court below of the plea of res judicata that all the Federal questions urged must in effect depend. The proposition is that the court below denied due effect to a decree of the Federal court, by maintaining the plea of res judicata predicated on a decree of such court. This contention, apparently, is not that due effect was denied to the decrees of a Federal court, but that too great an effect was given. When, however, the proposition is stripped of the seeming confusion which arises from the form in which it is stated, it becomes clear that, ultimately considered, it really involves the assertion that the court below refused to give due effect to the decree of a Federal court. This is so because the proposition substantially is that the state court, in maintaining the plea of res judicata resulting from the decree in the creditors' suit, denied the rights which were vested in the pipe works by virtue of the decree in the mechanics' lien suit. The argument in substance is therefore that, as the rights under the mechanics' lien decree were not impaired or destroyed by the decree in the creditors' suit, the consequence of erroneously deciding that they were obliterated by the decree in the creditors' suit was to refuse to give due effect to the rights Conceding for the present that the face of the final decree in the creditors' suit leaves uncertain exactly what was concluded, we will resort to the means of elucidation just referred to, viz., the pleadings and opinions rendered, in order to ascertain who were the opposing parties, what were the issues joined between them, and the matters finally determined in the cause. So doing, it ap pears that the parties to the cause were the pipe works on the one side and Andrews & Whitcomb and the water supply company and others on the opposing side. It also ap pears that the following, among other controversies, were directly at issue in the cause: 1. Had the pipe works, as to Andrews & Whitcomb and their privies, a lien upon the plant and franchise of the waterworks, arising from the sale of the pipe, the recording of the claim for a lien, and the recognition of such lien in the decree of the circuit court of the United States in the mechanics' lien suit, and this although the plant and franchise had come into the possession of Andrews & Whitcomb under the sale in their mortgage foreclosure suit? 2. Was the mortgage referred to a valid instrument? and, 3. Was title vested in Andrews & Whitcomb to the waterworks plant and franchise by reason of the sale to them under the decree in the mortgage foreclosure suit? Between the parties we have named and upon the issues just stated it is free from doubt that it was decided that Andrews*&* Whitcomb were lawfully in possession in virtue of the sale made in the mortgage. •236 foreclosure, and that under the law of Wisconsin there was no lien in favor of the pipe works, as against Andrews & Whitcomb or their assigns, upon the franchise and plant in question, arising either from the law of that state, the recording of the alleged lien, or the decree rendered in the mechanics' lien suit. It hence results that every claim of a Federal right here asserted is without merit, and that the court below, in enforcing the principle of the thing adjudged, did not err, and of course did not refuse to give due effect to the mechanics' lien suit decree. | appellate court, and left that mandate to operate in its own language. At best, the reservation, when considered in connection with the other portions of the decree, can only have the effect of creating an uncertainty as to what was intended; and, this being the case, resort to the proper sources of information, to which we have already alluded, dispels the doubt, and leaves the matter free from difficulty. And this conclusion is equally made imperative by a consideration of the memorandum opinion of the circuit court-set out in our statement of the case-relating to the drawing of the proposed final decree. From that document it is made clear that the circuit court sim strue the opinions of the circuit court of appeals, and therefore deemed that it discharged its duty by obeying the mandate to dismiss the bill for want of equity, without adding any provision which might be construed as adding to or taking away from either of the parties to the record any right which had been established in virtue of the judginent of the circuit court of appeals. It is insisted, however, that although these conclusions may be inevitable from a consideration together of the pleadings, the opinions, and the final decree in the credit-ply declined, in drawing the decree, to conors' suit, the contrary result is impelled if merely the final decree entered by the circuit court upon the mandate of the circuit court of appeals is taken in view. The argument is that as the decree is unambiguous it is the law of the case, and resort cannot be had to other sources of information. In effect, the contention comes to this, that although it may be patent that the issues be tween the parties, as above stated, were determined, yet, as the decree entered by the circuit court failed to express such conclusion, the parties are bound by the decree as entered, as they did not avail themselves of a proper remedy, by mandamus or otherwise, to correct the frustration of the results of the decisions of the circuit court of appeals, which the argument necessarily assumes must have been brought about by the decree made by the circuit court. Another contention remaining to be considered is that, even though the court below correctly applied the principle of res judicata, it yet, in granting affirmative relief, declined to give due effect to the decree in the mechanics' lien suit. On this subject the argument is that although, as regards Andrews & Whitcomb and the water supply company, it be recognized that it had been conclusively determined that the pipe works had no mechanics' lien whatever, yet, as But the decree of the circuit court does such lien was finally decreed in the creditnot support the contention based upon it. ors' suit as against the water company, beThat decree in express terms dismissed the cause of the thing adjudged arising from the creditors' bill as to Andrews & Whitcomb decree in the mechanics' lien suit, therefore and the water supply company, for want of a right to redeem from the sale to Andrews equity, without any qualification or reserva- &* Whitcomb existed, and such right was tion whatever. It in express terms passed nullified by the broad grant of affirmative the legal title to the real estate upon which relief made in this cause by the court bewas located the pumping station and wells low. Whether the pleadings in the cause of the water company to the water supply justified a grant of affirmative relief, concompany, as the assignees of Andrews & sidered as a mere question of practice, preWhitcomb, such transfer of title being de sents no Federal question. The claim that clared to be made by virtue of the mortgage because by the thing adjudged it is indisto Andrews & Whitcomb and the sale to putable that the pipe works had a lien them in their mortgage foreclosure suit. It against the water company, it therefore folis true that in the clause making this trans-lows that there is still a right to redeem as fer it was declared that it was "without prejudice to any right which said plaintiff may have under their mechanics' lien decree or otherwise to redeem from said instruments of mortgage, or either of them, or from the sale under the proceedings to foreclose the same." But this was a mere reservation of the right to redeem, if any existed. It left the pipe works in the position where, if its right had not been foreclosed as the necessary consequence of the dismissal of the bill for want of equity, it would not be so foreclosed in consequence of the specific direction for the transfer of the legal title to the property. In other words, the circuit court, in complying with the positive directions of the circuit court of appeals, but refused to interpret specifically the scope and effect of the mandate of the against Andrews & Whitcomb and the water supply company, even although it was established by the effect of res judicata arising from the creditors' suit that the lien as to the parties named was inoperative and a nullity,-is but another form of asserting that the decree in the creditors' suit was not res judicata between the pipe works and Andrew's & Whitcomb and the water supply company. In conclusion we need only remark that the observations just made are equally applicable to the elaborate contention, in the brief of counsel, that as the mechanics' lien suit was pending in a Federal court when Andrews & Whitcomb instituted their foreclosure proceedings in the state court, the Federal court had exclusive jurisdiction of the res, and the state court was without nothing in the record to show that the at- ary 6, 1902. power in the premises. The validity of the title claimed by Andrews & Whitcomb to have resulted from the sale to them in the mortgage foreclosure suit having been an issue and decided in the creditors' suit, the contention now being noticed, and all other Argued April 19, 22, 1901. Decided Janugrounds supposed to establish the invalidity of such title, should have been presented in the creditors' suit, and such as were not must be deemed to have been waived, and were concluded and foreclosed by the judging a corporation of its franchise for its ment rendered in such issue. Dowell v. Ap- violation of the statutes restricting the plegate, 152 U. S. 327, 343, 38 L. ed. 463, 14 manufacture and sale of oleomargarine. Sup. Ct. Rep. 611. Affirmed. Affirmed. Error to state court-dismissal validity of state statute restricting manufacture and sale of oleomargarine-commerce clause due process of law-equal protection of the laws-Federal question. 1. A writ of error to review a judgment of a state court ousting a corporation from its franchise for violation of the statutes of the state relating to the manufacture and sale of oleomargarine will not be dismissed on the ground that adequate support for the judgment, irrespective of any substantial Federal question, is afforded by the finding of the state court that the corporation had violated a stat ute in refusing to furnish samples as therein required, where the judgment of the court was based upon the consideration given by it to all the asserted violations of the statutes jointly, which statutes were contended to be repugnant to the Constitution of the United States. tution is not violated by the provisions of the statutes of Ohio relating to the manufacture and sale of oleomargarine within the state by a corporation created by its laws. 2. The commerce clause of the Federal Consti 'N ERROR to the Supreme Court of the See same case below, 62 Ohio St. 350, 57 N. E. 62. The facts are stated in the opinion. Mr. Thomas Ewing Steele for plaintiff in error. Messrs. Edmond B. Dillon and John M. Sheets for defendant in error. Mr. Justice White delivered the opinion of the court: By a law of the state of Ohio, enacted in 1884, it was made the duty of every one manufacturing or exposing for sale any drug of the act to furnish, on demand, to the peror article of food included in the provisions son who should apply for and* tender the value of the same, a sufficient sample to enable an analysis to be made. This law is compiled in Bates's Annotated (Ohio) Statutes, § 4200-7. By the provisions of another statute enacted in 1886, and amended in 1887, it was made unlawful to sell or offer for sale or exchange any substance purporting, appearing, or represented to be butter or cheese, or having either the semblance of butter or cheese, not wholly made of pure milk or cream, salt, and harmless coloring matter, unless done under its true name; and it was exacted that each package should have distinctly marked upon it, in the manner pointed out in the statute, the true name of the article and its constituent ingredients. And it was further forbidden, in the markThe equal protection of the laws is not de-ing, to use any words or combination of nied an Ohio corporation engaged in the manufacture and sale of oleomargarine within the state of Ohio, by the statutes of that state forbidding the manufacture or sale of any oleomargarine which contains any coloring matter, although by the Ohio statutes harmless coloring matter may be used in butter. 4. An Ohio corporation engaged in the manufacture and sale of oleomargarine within the state of Ohio is not deprived of its property without due process of law by the statutes 8. of that state which forbid the manufacture or sale of any oleomargarine which contains any coloring matter, although by the Ohio statutes harmless coloring matter may be used in butter. words indicating that the article was either butter, cream, or dairy product. This statute is compiled in Bates's Annotated Statutes of Ohio, § 4200-30. In 1890 it was further provided that no person should manufacture within the state, or should offer for sale therein, whether manufactured therein or not, any substance made out of any animal or vegetable oil, not produced from unadulterated milk or cream from the same, in imitation or semblance of natural butter or cheese produced from butter, unadulterated milk or cream. The terms butter and cheese, as defined in the statutes, were declared to be articles manufactured exclusively from pure milk or cream, or both, with salt, and with or without any harmless coloring matter. It was provided, however, in this act, that nothing therein contained "shall be construed to prohibit the manufacture or sale of oleomargarine in a separate and distinct form and in such manner as will advise the |