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from the Colorado river, that being the eastern o of California, to the Pacific ocean. On July 6, 1886, Congress passed an act forfeiting the lands granted to the Atlantic & Pacific, so far as they were adjacent to and conterminous with the uncompleted portions of the road. 24 Stat. at L. 123, chap. 637. By this act the interest of the Atlantic & Pacific in public lands in the state of California was devested and restored to the United States. Un December 2, 1865, the Southern Pacific was incorporated under the laws of California, “for the purpose of constructing, owning, and maintaining a railroad from some point on the bay of San Francisco, in the state of California, and to pass through the counties of Santa Clara, Monterey, San Luis Obispo, Tulare, Los Angeles, and San Diego to the town of San Diego, in said state, thence eastward through the said county of San Diego to the eastern line of the state of California, there to connect with a contemplated railroad from said eastern line of the state of California to the Mississippi river.” l Section 18 of the act of 1866 reads as folows: “And be it further enacted, That the Southern Pacific Railroad, a company incorporated under the laws of the state of California, is hereby authorized to connect with the said Atlantic & Pacific Railroad, formed under this act, at such point, near the boundary line of the state of California, as they shall deem most suitable for a railroad 3 line to San Francisco, and shall have a uniB form gauge and rate of freight or fare with * said"road; and, in consideration thereof, to aid in its construction, shall have similar grants of land, subject to all the conditions and limitations herein provided, and shall be required to construct its road on the like regulations, as to time and manner, with the Atlantic & Pacific Railroad herein provided for.” On January 3, 1807, the Southern Pacific filed in the Interior Department a map of a route from San Francisco via Mojave to Needles, on the Colorado river. This line from Mojave to Needles is on the same general course and contiguous to that adopted by the Atlantic & Pacific. The Secretary of the Interior refused to accept or approve the map on the ground that this particular part of the line was not authorized by the charter of the Southern Pacific. On April 4, 1870, the legislature of California passed the following act: “Whereas, by the provisions of a certain act of Congress of the United States of America, entitled “An Act Granting Lands to Aid in the Construction of a Railroad and Telegraph Line from San Francisco to the Eastern Line of the State of California,’ approved July 27, 1866, certain, grants were made to, and certain rights, privileges, powers, and authority were vested in and conferred upon, the Southern Pacific Railroad Company, a corporation duly organized and existing under the laws of the state of California; therefore, to enable the said com
pany to more fully and completely comply with and perform the requirements, provisions, and conditions of the said act of Coness, and all other acts of Congress now in orce, or which may hereafter be enacted, the state of California hereby consents to said act; and the said company, its successors and assigns, are hereby authorized and empowered to change the line of its railroad so as to reach the eastern boundary line of the state of California by such route as the company shall determine to be the most practicable, and to file new and amendatory articles of association, and the right, power, and privileges hereby granted to, conferred upon, and vested in them, to construct, maintain, and operate, by steam or other power, the said railroad and telegraph line mentioned in said act of Congress, hereby confirming to and vesting in the said company, its successors and assigns, all the o rights, privileges, franchises, power, and 3 authority" conferred upon, granted to, or * vested in said company by the said acts of Congress and any act of Congress which may be hereafter enacted.” Cal. Stat. 1869, 1870, p. 883. And on June 28, 1870, Congress passed the following joint resolution (16 Stat. at L. 382): “Be it resolved by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of Amcrica in Congress assembled, That the Southern Pacific Railroad Company of California may construct its road and telegraph line, as near as may be, on the route indicated by the map filed by said company in the Department of the Interior on the 3d day of January, eighteen hundred and sixty-seven; and upon the construction of each section of said road, in the manner and within the time provided by law, and notice thereof being given by the company to the Secretary of the Interior, he shall direct an examination of each such section by commissioners to be appointed by the President, as provided in the act making a grant of land to said company, approved July twenty-seventh, eighteen hundred and sixty-six, and upon the report of the commissioners to the Secretary of the Interior that such section of said railroad and telegraph line has been constructed as required by law, it shall be the duty of the said Secretary of the Interior to cause patents to be issued to said company for the sections of land conterminous to each constructed section reported on as aforesaid, to the extent and amount granted to said company by the said act of July twenty-seventh, eighteen hundred and sixty-six, expressly saving and reserving all the rights of actual settlers, together with the other conditions and restrictions provided for in the 3d section of said act.” Along this general line the Southern Pacific constructed its road, as California said, in reference to the grant made to the Southern Pacific by § 18 of the act of Congress of July 27, 1866, that it “hereby consents to said act;” and as Congress, by its resolution, approved the route selected by the
Southern Pacific as a route authorized by that act, no one can question that the construction of the road was under such circumstances as entitle the company to the benefit of the grant made by said 18th section of § the act of isco. * “By the act of 1866 Congress made grants of land to two different companies, by the 3d section, to the Atlantic & Pacific, and by the 18th section, to the Southern Pacific. The settled rule of construction is that where by the same act, or by acts of the same date, grants of land are made to two separate companies, in so far as the limits of their §o conflict by crossing or lapping, each company takes an equal, undivided moiety of the lands within the conflict. Neither acquires, all by priority of location or priority of construction. St. Paul & S. C. R. Co. v. Winona & St. P. R. Co. 112 U. S. 720, 28 L. ed. 872, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 334; Sioua City & St. P. R. Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. 117 U. S. 406, 29 L. ed. 928, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 790; Donahue v. Lake Superior Ship Canal, R. & Iron Co. 155 U. S. 386, 39 L. ed. 194, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 115; Sioua City & St. P. R. Co. v. United States, 159 U. S. 349, 40 L. ed. 177, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 17. The question as to the two grants under this act of 1866 was presented to Mr. Justice Lamar, at that time Secretary of the Interior; and his ruling to the same effect appears in a letter of instructions to the acting Commissioner of the General Land Office on November 25, 1887. 6 Land Dec. 349. In that letter he said: “The Southern Pacific Company located its main line January 3, 1867, and by the terms of the grant its right immediately attached to every odd section of land not of the character excepted by the grant, and within the 10-mile limit, subject, however, to be devested to the extent of a half interest in every such odd section that might fall within the common limits of both roads, after the filing of the map of definite location by the Atlantic & Pacific Company. “The Atlantic & Pacific Company filed its map of definite location April 11, 1872, and April 16, 1874, showing that the primary or granted limits of said road overlapped and conflicted with the primary or granted limits of a portion of the Southern Pacific road. As to the lands falling within the granted limits of both roads, the filing of the map of definite location by the Atlantic & Pacific Company, showing such conflict, immediately devested the Southern Pacific Company of the right and title to a half interest in all such odd sections; and from that monent and by that act the two com* panies became entitled to equal, undivided E moieties in such sections, without regard * to"the priority of location of the line of the road or priority of construction; the right of each company relating back to the date of the grant. St. Paul & S. C. R. Co. v. Winona & St. P. R. Co. 112 U. S. 720, 28 L. ed. 872, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 334; Sioua City & St. P. R. Co. v. Chicago, M. & St. P. R.
Co. 117 U. S. 406, 29 L. ed. 928, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 790.” As against this, it is , contended that Congress could not have intended a road running from the western to the eastern border of California, parallel and contiguous to the Atlantic & Pacific road; that it must have intended a connection between the two roads on the western boundary or border of the state, especially in view of the fact that the charter of the Southern Pacific contemplated only a line along the western part of the state from San Francisco to San Diego. Whatever doubts there might be in respect to this matter are removed by the action taken by the Southern Pacific and the resolution of June 28, 1870. The railroad company assumed that it had a right under the act of 1866 to locate a line to the eastern boundary of California, and did locate such a line, and filed a map thereof with the Secretary of the Interior; and Congress, by the joint resolution of June 28 in effect accepted and approved that line, and declared that the railroad company might construct its road on the route indicated on that map. Neither is the date of this resolution the time at which the rights of the railroad company arose, as is contended by counsel. No new land grant was contemplated; no substitution of one grant for another, or of one line for another. The obvious purpose was to accept the line proffered by the road as the line intended by the act of 1866, and the grant made by the act of 1866 was recognized as rightfully to be used in aid of the construction of a road along the line suggested by the company. Neither is it material whether the line indicated on the map filed is to be taken as a line of general route or of definite location, for in fact the road was constructed along that line, “as near as may be,” in the language of the resolution, and the road has been accepted by the government. Neither does the fact that the line of road contemplated by the Southern Pacific's charter, at the time of the passage of the 1act of 1866, was along the western border of: the state, prevent” the operation of the * grant. It is well settled that Congress has power to grant to a corporation created by a state additional franchises—at least franchises of a similar nature. Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 700, 727, sub nom. Union P. R. Co. v. United States, 25 L. ed. 496, 504; Pacific Railroad Removal Cases, 115 U. S. 1, 15, sub nom. Union P. R. Co. v. Myers, 29 L. ed. 319, 324, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1113; Caifornia v. Central P. R. Co. 127 U. S. 1, 32 L. ed. 150, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 153, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1073; United States v. Stanford, 161 U. S. 412, 431, 40 L. ed. 751, 759, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 576; Central P. R. Co. v. California, 162 U. S. 91, 118, 123, 40 L. ed. 903, 912, 914, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 766. In California v. Central P. R. Co. 127 U. S. 1, 32 L. ed. 150, 2 Inters. Com. Rep. 153, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1073, this very grant was before the court; and Mr. Justice Bradley, on page 44, L. ed. p. 159, Inters. Com. Rep.
rious charters and grants, said: “An examination of the acts referred to in
these findings shows that Congress authorized the Southern Pacific Railroad Company to connect with the Atlantic & Pacific Railroad, at such point near the boundary line of the state of California as it should deem most suitable for a railroad line to San Francisco; and, to aid in the construction of such a railroad line, Congress declared that the company should have similar grants of land, and should be required to construct its road on the like regulations, as to time and manner, with the Atlantic & Pacific. Like powers were also given to the Southern Pacific Railroad Company to construct a line of railroad from Tehachapa pass, by way of Los Angeles, to the Texas Pacific road at the Colorado river (Fort Yuma). The Southern Pacific Company was not authorized by its original charter to extend its railroad to the Colorado river, as we already know by other cases brought before us, and as appears by the act of the state legislature passed April 4, 1870, which assumed to authorize the company to change the line of its railroad so as to reach the eastern boundary line of the state; thus duplicating the power given to it by the act of Gogo; See the state act quoted in 118 U. S. 399, 30 L. ed. 118, 6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1133. This state legislation was probably procured to remove all doubts with regard to the company's power to construct such roads. It is apparent, however, that the franchise to do so was fully conferred by Congress, and that franchise was accepted, and the roads have been constructed in con
go formity thereto.”
§ We are of the opinion, therefore, that Mr.
* Secretary Lamar"was right in his conclusion that both the grant to the Southern Pacific and that to the Atlantic & Pacific took effect; and being by the same act, so far as there was a conflict, the two companies took equal, undivided moieties of the land.
We pass, therefore, to a consideration of
the second question: Do prior decisions of this court control the determination of this case? United States v. Southern P. R. Co. 146 U. S. 570, 36 L. ed. 1091, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 152; United States v. Colton Marble & Lime Co. and United States v. Southern P. R. Co. 146 U.S. 615, 36 L. ed. 1104, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 163, and Southern P. R. Co. v. United States, 168 U. S. 1, 42 L. ed. 355, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 18, are referred to. Those cases were brought by the United States against the Southern Pacific to quiet title to certain lands (but not the lands in controversy here) along the line of the Atlantic & Pacific within the state of California. In the last of these three cases the principle of res judicata was invoked and held applicable; and the title of the government to the lands involved was sustained on the ground that the question in controversy had been finally determined in the prior suits. In the opinion filed there was much discussion in respect to res judicata; and it was said,
on page 48, L. ed. p. 376, Sup. Ct. Rep. p.
“The general principle announced in numerous cases is that a right, question, or fact distinctly put in issue, and directly determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, as a ground of recovery, cannot be disputed in a subsequent suit between the same parties or their privies; and even if the second suit is for a different cause of action, the right, question, or fact once so determined must, as between the same parties or their privies, be taken as conclusively established, so long as the judgment in the first suit remains unmodified.” See also New Orleans v. Citizens' Bank, 167 U. S. 371, 396, 42 L. ed. 202, 210, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 905, 913, in which the rule was thus stated: “The estoppel resulting from the thing adjudged does not depend upon whether there is the same demand in both cases, but exists, even although there be different demands, when the question upon which the recovery of the second demand depends has under identical circumstances and conditions been previously concluded by a judg-? ment between the parties or their privies.”: *It becomes, therefore, important to deter-> mine what was decided in the prior cases; and in order to a clear understanding these additional facts must be borne in mind: On March 3, 1871, Congress passed an act (16 Stat. at L. 573, chap. 122) to incorporate the Texas & Pacific Railroad Company, the 23d section of which reads: “That for the purpose of connecting the Texas Pacific Railroad with the city of San Francisco, the Southern Pacific Railroad Company of California is hereby authorized (subject to the laws of California) to construct a line of railroad from a point at or near Tehachapa pass, by way of Los Angeles, to the Texas Pacific Railroad, at or near the Colorado river, with the same rights, grants, and privileges, and subject to the same limitations, restrictions, and conditions as were granted to said Southern Pacific Railroad Company of California by the act of July, twenty-seven, eighteen hundred and sixty-six: Provided, however, That this section shall in no way affect or impair the rights, present or prospective, of the Atlantic & Pacific Railroad Company or any other railroad company.” On April 3, 1871, the Southern Pacific filed a map of , a route from Tehachapa pass southward by way of Los Angeles, to connect with the Texas & Pacific Railroad at the Colorado river, and subsequently constructed a road on such line. This line crossed that of the Atlantic & Pacific, the general course of the former being north and south, and of the latter east and west. The grants, therefore, to the Atlantic & Pacific by the act of July 27, 1866, and that to the Southern Pacific by the act of March 3, 1871, came in conflict at and near the place of intersection of their lines. The lands in controversy in those suits were lands within the granted limits of both companies at the place of conflict. It was so
distinctly stated in the opening of the opinion in the first case referred to: “The question to be considered is not as to the validity of the grant to the Southern Pacific Company, but only as to its extent. It may be conceded that the company took title to lands generally along its line, from Tehachapa pass to its junction with the Texas Pacific; and the contention of the government is here limited to those lands only which lie within"the granted limits of both the Atlantic & Pacific and the Southern Pacific Companies, at the crossing of their lines, as definitely located.” p. 592, L. ed. 1096, Sup. Ct. Rep. p. 155. Both grants were grants in praesenti, and when the maps of definite location were filed and approved, the grants took effect by relation as of the dates of the acts. Hence, if each company filed a map of definite location, the title of the Atlantic & Pacific, relating back to the year 1866, was anterior and superior to that of the Southern Pacific of date 1871; and all the lands within the conflict passed to the Atlantic & Pacific, rather than to the Southern Pacific. To avoid the effect of this conclusion,--a conclusion resting upon well-settled principles of public-land law, the Southern Pacific contended that no map of definite location was ever filed by the Atlantic & Pacific, or approved by the Secretary of the Interior; but after a full examination of the facts this court held otherwise, summing up its conclusions in these words: “Our conclusions therefore are that a valid and sufficient map of definite location of its route from the Colorado river to the Pacific ocean was filed by the Atlantic & Pacific Company, and approved by the Secretary of the Interior; that by such act the title to these lands passed, under the grant of 1866, to the Atlantic & Pacific Company, and remained held by it subject to a condition subsequent until the act of forfeiture of 1886; that by that act of forfeiture the title of the Atlantic & Pacific was retaken by the general government, and retaken for its own benefit and not that of the Southern Pacific Company; and that the latter company has no title of any kind to these lands.” p. 607, L. ed. p. 1101, Sup. Ct. Rep. . 160. p So, in the opinion in the last of the three cases, is this statement of the facts and question: “The principal contention of the United States is that the lands in dispute are in the same category in every respect with those in controversy in United States v. Southern P. R. Co. 146 U. S. 570, 36 L. ed. 1091, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 152, and United States v. Colton Marble do Lime Co. and United States v. Southern P. R. Co. 146 U. S. 615, 36 L. ed. 1104, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 163; and that, so far as the question of title is concerned, the judgments in those cases have conclusively determined, as"between the United States and the Southern Pacific Railroad Company and its privies, the essential facts upon which the government rests its present claim. “Stated in another form, the United
States insists that in the former cases the controlling matter in issue was, whether certain maps filed by the Atlantic & Pacific Railroad Company in 1872, and which were accepted by the Land Department as sufficiently designating that company's line of road under the act of Congress of July 27, 1866, chap. 278 (14 Stat. at L. 292), were valid maps of definite location; the United States contending in those cases that they were, and the šo Pacific Railroad Company contending that they were not maps of that character; that that issue was determined in favor of the United States; and that, as the lands now in dispute are within the limits of the line of road so designated, it is not open to the Southern Pacific Railroad Company, in this proceeding, to question the former determination that such maps sufficiently identified the lands granted to the Atlantic & Pacific Railroad Company by the act of 1866, and were therefore valid maps of definite location.” p. 25, L. ed. p. 368, Sup. Ct. Rep. p. 18. And again on page 29, L. ed. p. 370, Sup. Ct. Rep. p. 20, after a quotation of the 23d section of the act of March 3, 1871, is this declaration: “The Southern Pacific Railroad Company constructed the road thus contemplated, and claims that the lands here in dispute passed to it under the above act of 1871.” So also on page 46, L. ed. p. 376, Sup. Ct. Rep. p. 26: “The lands now in controversy are situated opposite to and are conterminous with the first, second, and fourth sections of the Southern Pacific Railroad, as constructed between 1873 and 1877, inclusive, and within the primary and indemnity limits of the grant to the Southern Pacific Railroad Company made by the 23d section of the Texas & Pacific act of March 3, 1871.” And on page 61, L. ed. p. 381, Sup. Ct. Rep. p. 32, the conclusion was summed up in these words: “For the reasons stated, we are of opinion that it must be taken in this case to have been conclusively adjudicated in the former cases, as between the United States and the ot SQuthern Pacific Railroad Company— 3 “1. That the maps filed by the Atlantic F & Pacific Railroad Company in 1872 were sufficient, as maps of definite location, to identify the lands granted to that company by the act of 1866; “2. That upon the acceptance of those maps by the Land Department the rights of that company in the lands so granted attached, by relation as of the date of the act of 1866; and “3. That in view of the conditions attached to the grant, and of the reservations of power in Congress contained in the act of 1866 such lands became, upon the passage of the forfeiture act of 1886, the property of the United States, and by force of that act were restored to the public domain without the Southern Pacific Railroad Company's having acquired any interest therein that affected the power of the United
States to forfeit, and restore them to the public domain. “These grounds being accepted as the basis of our decision, the law in the present case is clearly for the United States; for, as all the lands here in controversy are embraced by the maps of 1872, and therefore appertain to the line located by such maps, it must be, for the reasons stated in the former decision, that the United States is entitled, as between it and the Southern Pacific Railroad Company, to the relief given by the decree below.” Obviously the fact settled by the decisions in those cases was the filing by the Atlantic & Pacific of an approved map of definite location. Upon that the controversy hinged. Such a map having been filed, the title of the Atlantic & IPacific vested as of the date of the act of July 27, 1866; and inasmuch as the Southern Pacific claimed only by a grant of date March 3, 1871, it took no title. This which is apparent from the foregoing quotations is emphasized by the full discussions in the opinions, as well as by the allegations in the pleadings upon which the cases were tried. That fact, having been determined, must be taken in the present suit as not open to dispute. The Atlantic & Pacific did file a sufficient map of definite location of its line from the Colorado river to the Pacific ocean, and such map was approved by the Secretary of the Interior. Its to title, therefore, to the land, within the lim§ its of the grant in California, took effect as * of date July 27, 1866. No claim of right"or title arising only in 1871, and created by an act of that date, could affect its title. But it was not adjudged in those cases either that the Southern Pacific had no title to any real estate by virtue of the act of 1866, or that if there was any real estate to which it had any claim or right by virtue of that act, such claim was not of equal force with that of the Atlantic & Pacific. The general statement at the close of the quotation from 146 U. S. 607, 36 L. ed. 1101, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 160, “that the latter company has no title of any kind to these lands,” and the similar statement in s 3 of the quotation from 168 U. S. 61, 42 L. ed. 381, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 32, are to be taken as applicable only to the facts presented, and cannot be construed as announcing any determination as to matters and questions not appearing in the records. Of course the decrees that were rendered in those cases are conclusive of the title to the property involved in them, no matter what claims or rights either party may have had and failed to produce; but as to property which was not involved in those suits they are conclusive only as to the matters which were actually litigated and determined. “On principle, a point not in litigation in one action cannot be received as conclusively settled in any subsequent action upon a different cause, because it might have been determined in the first action.” Cromwell v. Sac County, 94 U. S. 351–356, 24 J. ed. 195–199. “The particular matter in controversy in the adverse suit was the triangular piece of ground,
which is not the matter of dispute in this action. The judgment in that case is therefore not conclusive in this as to matters which might have been decided, but only as to matters which were in fact decided.” Last Chance Min. Co. v. Tyler Min. Co. 157 U. S. 683–687, 39 L. ed. 859–861, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 733–735. The question here presented was not determined in the prior cases, and is whether the Southern Pacific acquired any title to lands other than those involved in those suits by virtue of the act of 1866; and that question, as we have seen, must be answered in the affirmative. Nor is this a mere technical difference between those cases and this. Counsel for the railroad company call the line from Mojave southward via Los Angeles, to connect with the Texas & Pacific, a “branch line,” and that castward from Mojave to Needles, to con- or nect with the Atlantic & Pacific, a “main: *line;” but by whatever name these two liness are called, they were built under the authority of two different statutes, the line from Mojave southward via Los Angeles under the authority of the act of Congress of March 3, 1871,–an act which in terms authorized the building of a road from a point at or near Tehachapa pass, which is in the vicinity of Mojave, southward by way of Los Angeles, to connect with the Texas & Pacific, and gave no authority to build a line eastward from Mojave to connect with the Atlantic and Pacific,+the line from Mojave eastward, under the act of 1866, which authorized the Southern Pacific to connect with the Atlantic & Pacific at or near the boundary of the state. The route which was selected by the company for this line was approved by Congress as authorized by the act of 1866. Hence the one line was built under the authority of the act of 1871, and the other under the authority of the act of 1866. Our conclusions therefore are that the United States, having become by the forfeiture act of July 6, 1886, repossessed of all the rights and interests of the Atlantic & Pacific in this grant within the limits of California, hold an equal, undivided moiety in all the odd-numbered sections which lie within the conflicting place limits of the grant to the Atlantic & Pacific and of that made to the Southern Pacific by the act of July 27, 1866; and that the Southern Pacific holds the other equal, undivided moiety therein. The United States and the Southern Pacific being, therefore, tenants in common of a large y of lands, a partition is necessary. It was suggested by Secretary Lamar, in the letter heretofore referred to, that the Southern Pacific take only eve other alternate odd-numbered section. % see no impropriety in such mode of partition, though, under the case as it stands, we can make no order to that effect. In whatever way partition may be made, equity requires that the lands which the Southern Pacific has assumed to sell, and which were excepted by the circuit court from the decree in favor of the United States, and in respect to which
they took their cross appeal, must be among