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court by a writ of error to the supreme in question, sufficiently appear in the fol. court of the state of Tennessee, involving lowing extracts from its opinion, a copy of the validity, under the Federal Constitution, which is found in the record: of an act of the legislature of Tennessee “Confessedly, the enactment now called in passed March 17, 1899, requiring the re question is in all respects a valid statute demption in cash of store orders or other and free from objection as such, except that evidences of indebtedness issued by employ- it is challenged as an arbitrary interferenca ers in payment of wages due to employees. with the right of contract, on account of

The caption and material portions of this which it is said that it is unconstitutional, act are as follows:

and not the law of the land' or 'due proc"An Act Requiring All Persons, Firms, Cor. ess of law.'

porations, and Companies Using Cou “The act does, undoubtedly, abridge or pons, Scrip, Punchouts, Store Orders or qualify the right of contract, in that it reOther Evidences of Indebtedness to Pay quires that certain obligations payable in Laborers and Employees for Labor, or the first instance in merchandise shall in Otherwise to Redeem the Same in Good certain contingencies be paid in money; yet and Lawful Money of the United States it is as certainly general in its terms, enin the Hands of Their Employees, La- bracing equally every employer and employee horers, or a Bona Fide Holder, and to who is or may be in like situation and cirProvide a Legal Remedy for Collection cumstances, and it is enforceable in the usuof Same in Favor of Said Laborers, Em- al modes established in the administration

ployees, and Such Bona Fide Holder. of government with respect to kindred mat* "Sec. 1. Be it enacted by the general as-ters. The exact and precise requirement is sembly of the state of Tennessee, That all that all employers, whether natural or artipersons, firms, corporations, and companies ficial persons, paying their employees in using coupons, scrip, punchouts, store or "coupons, scrip, punchouts, store orders, or ders, or other evidences of indebtedness to other evidences of indebtedness,' shall repay their or its laborers and employees, for deem the same at face value in money, if labor or otherwise, shall, if demanded, re- demanded by the employee or a bona fide deem the same in the hands of such laborer, holder on a regular pay day or at any time employee, or bona fide holder, in lawful not less than thirty days from issuance ($ money of the United States: Provided, The 1), and that, if payment be not so made same is presented and redemption demanded upon such demand, the owner may maintain of such person, firm, company, or corpora- a suit on such evidence of indebtedness, and tion using same as aforesaid, at a regular have a money recovery for the face value pay day of such person, firm, company, or thereof, in any court of competent jurisdicpresentedom and redemption demanded as those there is no prohibition against the isaforesaid by such laborers, employees, or suance of any of the obligations referred to, bona fide holders at any time not less than nor against payment in merchandise or oththirty days from the issuance or delivery of erwise according to their terms, but only a such coupon, scrip, punchout, store order, provision that they shall be paid in money or other evidence of indebtedness to such em at the election and upon a prescribed deployees, laborers, or bona fide holder. Such mand of the owner. In other words, the redemption to be at the face value of said effect of the act is to convert into cash obscrip, punchout, coupon, store order, or ligations such unpaid merchandise orders, other evidence of indebtedness: Provided, etc., as may be presented for money pay. further, Said face value shall be in cash the ment on a regular pay day or as much as same as its purchasing power in goods, thirty days after issuance. wares, and merchandise at the commissary, “Under the act the present defendant may company store, or other repository of such issue weekly orders for coal, as formerly, company, firm, person, or corporation afore and may pay them in that commodity when said.

desired by the holder, but instead of being "Sec. 2. Be it further enacted, That any able, as formerly, to compel the holder to employee, laborer, or bona fide holder re accept payment of such orders in coal, the ferred to in § 1 of this act, upon presenta- holder may, under the act, compel defendant tion and demand for redemption of such to pay them in money. In this way and scrip, coupon, punchout, store order, or to this extent the defendant's right of conother evidence of indebtedness aforesaid, and tract is affected. upon refusal of such person, firm, corpora “Under the act, as formerly, every emtion, or company to redeem the same in good ployee of the* defendant may receive the and lawful money of the United States, may whole or a part of his wages in coal orders, maintain in his, her, or their own name an and may collect the orders in coal, or transaction before any court of competent juris- for them to someone else for other merchan. diction against such person, firm, corpora- dise or for money. His condition is bettered tion, or company, using same as aforesaid, by the act, in that it naturally enables him for the recovery of the value of such cou- to get a better price for his coal orders than pon, scrip, punchout, store order, or other formerly, and thereby gives him more for evidence of indebtedness, as defined in g 1 his labor; and yet, although the defendant of this act."

may not in that transaction realize the ex. The views of the supreme court of Tennes. pected profit on the amount of coal called see, sustaining the validity of the enactment' for in the orders, it in no event pays moro

in dollars and cents for the labor than the derground mines, and fixing the period of contract price.

employment at eight hours per day, was in “The scope and purpose of the act are question. There, as here, it was contended thus indicated. The legislature evidently that the legislation deprived the employers deemed the laborer at some disadvantage un- and employees of the right to make conder existing laws and customs, and by this tracts in a lawful way and for lawful puract undertook to ameliorate his condition poses; that it was class legislation, and not in some measure by enabling him or his equal or uniform in its provisions; that it bona fide transferee, at his election and at deprived the parties of the equal protection a proper time, to demand and receive his of the laws, abridged the privileges and imunpaid wages in money rather than in some munities of the defendant as a citizen of thing less valuable. Its tendency, though the United States, and deprived him of his slight it may be, is to place the employer property and liberty without due process and employee upon equal ground in the mat- of law. But it was held, after full review ter of wages, and, so far as calculated to of the previous cases, that the act in quesaccomplish that end, it deserves commendation was a valid exercise of the police power tion. Being general in its operation and en-of the state, and the judgment of the suforceable by ordinary suit, and being unim-preme court of Utah, sustaining the legispeached and unimpeachable upon other con-lation was affirmed. stitutional grounds, the act is entitled to Where a contract of insurance provided full recognition as the 'law of the land' and that the insurance company should not be 'due process of law' as to the matters em- liable beyond the actual cash value of the braced, without reference to the state's po- property at the time of its loss, and where lice power, as was held of an act imposing a statute of the state of Missouri provided far greater restrictions upon the right of that, in all suits brought upon policies of contract, in the case of Dugger v. Mechan insurance against loss or damage by fire, the ics & T. Ins. Co. 95 Tenn. 245, 28 L. R. A. insurance company should not be permitted 796, 32 S. W. 5, and as had been previously to deny that the property insured was worth decided in respect of other limiting statutes therein mentioned. 95 Tenn. 253, 254, 28 at the time of issuing the policy the fulls L. R. A. 799, 32 S. W. 6, 7.

émount of the insurance, this court held: “Furthermore, the passage of this act that it was competent for the legislature of was a legitimate exercise of police power, Missouri to pass such a law, even though and upon that ground also the legislation is it places a limitation upon the right of conwell sustained. The first right of a state, tract. Orient Ins. Co. v. Daggs, 172 U. S. as of a man, is self-protection, and with the 557, 43 L. ed. 552, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 281. state that right involves the universally ac

In St. Louis, I. M. & 8. R. Co. v. Paul, 173 knowledged power and duty to enact and en- U. S. 404, 43 L. ed. 746, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. force all such laws not in plain conflict with 419, a judgment of the supreme court of some provision of the state or Federal Con- Arkansas sustaining the validity of an act stitution as may rightly be deemed neces of the legislature of that state, which prosary or expedient for the safety, health, vided that whenever any corporation or permorals, comfort, and welfare of its people. son engaged in operating a railroad should

discharge, with or without cause, any em"The act before us is, perhaps, less strin-ployee or servant, the unpaid wages of any gent than any one considered in any of the such servant then earned should become due cases mentioned. It is neither prohibitory and payable on the date of such discharge nor penal; not special, but general; tend- without abatement or deduction, was afing towards equality between employer and firmed. It is true that stress was laid in employee in the matter of wages; intended the opinion in that case on the fact that, and well calculated to promote peace and in the Constitution of the state, the power good order, and to prevent strife, violence, to amend corporation charters was reserved and bloodshed. Such being the character, to the state, and it is asserted that no such purpose, and tendency of the act, we have no power exists in the present case. But it is hesitation in holding that it is valid, both also true that, inasmuch as the right to as general legislation, without reference to contract is not absolute in respect to every the state's reserved police power, and also matter, but may be subjected to the reas a wholesome regulation adopted in the straints demanded by the safety and welfare proper exercise of that power.”

of the state and its inhabitants, the police The supreme court of Tennessee justified power of the state may, within defined limiits conclusions by so full and satisfactory tations, extend over corporations outside of a reference to the decisions of this court and regardless of the power to amend char. as to render it unnecessary for us to travel ters. Atchison, T. & 8. F. R. Co. v. Matover the same ground. It will be sufficient theus, 174 U. S. 96, 43 L. ed. 909, 19 Sup. to briefly notice two or three of the latestCt. Rep. 609. cases.

The judgment of the Supreme Court of In Folden v. Hardy, 169 U. S. 366, 42 Tennessee is affirmed. L. ed. 780, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 383, the validity of an act of the state of Utah, regulat. Mr. Justice Brewer and Mr. Justico ing the employment of workingmen in un- Peckham dissent.

•21

ror.

I

(183 U. S. 23) DAYTON COAL & IRON COMPANY (Lim- / writ of error from this court was allowed ited), Piff. in Err.,

by the chief justice of the state supreme

court. T. A. BARTON.

* Mr. F. L. Mansfield for plaintiff in er Foreign corporationssubject to state laws ror.

-store orders redeemable in money. Mr. B. G. McKenzie for defendant in er. The fact that a corporation is foreign, and not

domestic, does not help it in contesting the constitutionality of the Tennessee act of

Mr. Justice Shiras delivered the opinion March 17, 1899, requiring the redemption in of the court: money of store orders and scrip Issued to em The only question presented for our conployees in payment of wages, which act is sideration in this record is the validity, unbeld valid as to domestic corporations. der the 14th Amendment of the Constitution

of the United States, of the act of the leg. [No. 26.)

islature of the state of Tennessee prescrib

ing that corporations and other persons is. Argued March 7, 1901. Decided October 21, suing store orders in payment for labor 1901.

shall redeem them in cash, and providing a

legal remedy for bona fide holders of such N ERROR to the Supreme Court of the orders.

In the case of Knoxville Iron Co. v. Har. affirming a judgment against a corporation bison, in error to the supreme court of Tenin a suit to recover money on store orders nessee, decided at the present term, 183 0. issued to employees for labor. Affirmed. S. 13, ante, 1, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1, we af

See same case below, 103 Tenn. 604, 53 firmed the judgment of that court sustain. S. W. 070.

ing the constitutional validity of the state

legislation in question, and the cause now Staternent by Mr. Justice Shiras: before us is sufficiently disposed of by a

This was an action tried in the circuit reference to that case. court of Rhea county, Tennessee, wherein The only difference in the cases is that in T. A. Barton, a citizen of Tennessee, sought the former the plaintiff in error was a doto recover from the Dayton Coal & Iron mestic corporation of the state of TennesCompany (Limited), a corporation organ- see, while in the present the plaintiff in er. ized under the laws of Great Britain, and ror is a foreign corporation. If that fact doing business as a manufacturer of pig iron can be considered as a ground for a differand coke in said county. The company ent conclusion, it would not help the presowns a store, where it sells goods to its em- ent plaintiff in error, whose right, as a for. ployees and other persons. The company eign corporation, to carry on business in the also has a monthly pay day, and settles in state of Tennessee, might be deemed subcash with its employees on said pay day. ject to the condition of obeying the regulaIn the meantime, and to such of its em- tions prescribed in the legislation of the ployees as see fit to request the same, it is state. As was said in Orient Ins. Co. v. sues orders on its storekeeper for goods. Daggs, 172 U. S. 557, 43 L. ed. 552, 19 Sup.

On March 17, 1899, the legislature of Ct. Rep. 281, that "which a state may do Tennessee passed an act requiring "all per- with corporations of its own creation it may sons, firms, corporations, and companies do with foreign corporations admitted into using coupons, scrip, punchouts, store or the state.

The power of a state to ders, or other evidences of indebtedness to impose conditions upon foreign corporations pay laborers and employees for labor or is certainly as extensive as the power over otherwise, to redeem the same in good and domestic corporations, and is fully exlawful money of the United States in the plained in Hooper v. California, 155 U. S. hands of their employees, laborers, or a bona | 648, 39 L. ed. 297, 5 Inters. Com. Rep. 610, fide holder, and to provide a legal remedy 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 207." for collection of same in favor of said la We do not care, however, to put our presborers, employees, and such bona fide hold- ent decision upon the fact that the plaintiff ers."

in error is a foreign corporation, nor* to be This was a suit brought by said Barton understood to intimate that state legislato recover as a bona fide holder of certain tion, invalid as contrary to the Constitution store orders that had been issued by the of the United States, can be imposed as a defendant company to some of its laborers condition upon the right of such a corpora. in payment for labor. The defendant com- tion to do business within the state. Homo pany denied the validity of the legislation, Ins. Co. v. Morse, 20 Wall. 445, 22 L. ed. as well under the laws and Constitution of 365; Blake v. McClung, 172 U. S. 239, 254, Tennessee as the 14th Amendment of the 43 L. ed. 432, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 165. Constitution of the United States. The The judgment of the Supreme Court of plaintiff recovered a judgment against the Tennessee is affirmed. company in the circuit court of Rhea county, and this judgment was affirmed by the Mr. Justice Brewer and Mr. Justice supreme court of Tennessee, whereupon a' Peckham dissent.

(183 U. S. 1) HOLZAPFEL'S COMPOSITIONS COM., decided in the court below, and that the de PANY, Limited, Petitioner, cree ought to be affirmed. 0.

The defendant and petitioner then prayed RAHTJEN'S AMERICAN COMPOSITION | this court for a writ of certiorari, which COMPANY, Respondent.

| was granted, and the case thus brought here.

The trademark in regard to which this Trademarks use of word "patent”-right contest arises pertains to a certain kind of to use name after patent expires.

paint for the protection of ships' bottoms

from rust and from vegetable or animal 1. No right to a trademark which includes the growth thereon, either in salt or fresh water. word "patent" and which describes the article as "patented" can arise when there is and respectively, Nos. 1, 2, and 3. The evidence has been no patent; nor is the claim a valid

in the record shows that some time between one for the other words used, where it is

the years 1860 and 1865 one John Rahtjen based upon their use in connection with that word.

invented in Germany & particular kind of 2. The right to use the word "patent" as part

paint for the purpose above mentioned. In of the name of an article for which a patent connection with his sons he began in 1865 has been obtained ceases on the expiration of to manufacture the paint for general use, the patent.

and it speedily acquired a high reputation 8. The name "Rahtjen's Composition" for paint | among owners of shipping as valuable for

first prepared by Rahtjen, and which was for the purposes intended. The elder Rahtjen years covered by a patent, becomes common nova

never obtained a patent for the article in property after the expiration of the patent,

Germany; neither did he or his sons apply where that name has always been given to the article and is the only name by which it

for or obtain one in the United States. is possible to describe it.

They first shipped some of the paint manu."

factured by them in Germany to the United [No. 54.)

States in 1870, consigned to Henry Gelien.

They did not put it upon the market by Argued April 25, 26, 1901. Decided Octo- sending generally to those who might wish ber 21, 1901.

to use it, but all their consignments from

1870 to 1878 were made to Gelien. Under ON WRIT of Certiorari to the United what marks he sold the article does not ap. U States Circuit Court of Appeals for the pear. Second Circuit to review a decision revers On November 19, 1869, one of the firm ing a decree of the Circuit Court for the wrote to Mr. Gelien from Bremerhaven, Southern District of New York which dis making him the sole agent of the firm for missed a bill to restrain the use of an al. the sale of its paint in the United States, leged trademark. Reversed.

and informing him that they had not obSee same case below, 41 C. C. A. 329, 101 tained a patent for their composition in Fed. 257.

America, nor applied for one in the United

States, as there was no danger in introducStatement by Mr. Justice Peckham: ing the composition in America, the inven

The respondent, a New York corporation, tion not being of a nature facilitating good a commenced this suit in equity in the circuit limitations. The father died in 1873. after court for the southern district of New York, which the sons continued the business. against the petitioner, which is a foreign Gelien was succeeded as the consignee of corporation organized under the laws of the the paint in the United States, in 1878, by Kingdom of Great Britain and having a the firm of Hartmann, La Doux, & Maecker, place of business in the city of New York, to whom for a short time the paint was con. to restrain it from the use of the trademark signed from Germany, and then it was sent which the respondent averred it had ac- them from England through Rahtjen's ag. quired in the name “Rahtjen's Compo- signs there. The Hartmann firm was suc. sition," and to obtain an accounting of the ceeded in July, 1886, by Emil Maecker, as profits and income which the petitioner had agent for the sale of the paint in the United unlawfully derived from the use of such States, and on January 1, 1889, Maecker trademark, and which it had by reason was succeeded by one Otto L. Petersen, and thereof diverted from the respondent. Is in 1891 Petersen was succeeded by the resue was taken on the various allegations in spondent corporation, and was made its the bill, and upon the trial the circuit court president. disinissed the same (97 Fed. 949), but upon On January 15, 1878, “Joh” Rahtjen as. appeal to the circuit court of appeals the signed to “Messrs. Suter, Hartmann, & Co., decree of the circuit court was reversed and in London, the exclusive right of sale of my the case remanded to that court, with in-patent composition paint for the United structions to enter a decree enjoining the States of North America, for the period of petitioner from selling or offering to sell twelve years from the commencement of Rahtjen's Composition under that name, 1878 to the end of 1889.” After 1870 the and from using the name upon its packages firm of Hartmann Brothers, or Suter, Hartor in its advertisements. 41 C. C. A. 329, mann, & Co., manufactured the composition 101 Fed. 257.

for themselves in England, by the license of Judge Wallace dissented from the judg. the Rahtjens, and for a time after 1874 ment and opinion of the circuit court of ap. Rahtjen also manufactured in England as peals, holding that the case was properly well as in Germany. During this time the

COMPOSITION

HARTMANN'S MANUFACTURE

composition when manufactured by Hart | “Rahtjen Composition.” This, too, was opmann was marked "Rahtjen's Patent Com- posed, and the application thereafter hela position, Hartmann's Manufacture.” Up to to be withdrawn. the time of the above assignment the Raht On June 28, 1883, Suter, Hartmann, & Co. jens had consigned their paint to New York filed an application for registration of the in barrels or casks addressed to Gelien, and words "Rahtjen's Patent Composition for with labels affixed thereon, in which the Ships' Bottoms, Buoys, &c. None genuine article*was described as "Rahtjen’s Patent without this signature, Suter, Hartmann, & Composition;". and after Hartmann, La Co.” This application was opposed by deDoux, & Maecker became agents, the casks fendant's predecessors, Holzapfel & Co., and were addressed to that firm at New York, was withdrawn. and labeled the same way.

On the 25th of April, 1883, Hartmann While Gelien acted as consignee he pre- Brothers filed an application for a trade pared and issued a show card and also let- mark in this form: ter heads and circulars with “Rahtjen's Composition Paint, known as the German Paint," on the cards and on the heading of

GENUINE his letters and circulars, and also directly underneath was the picture of a vessel. The show cards and circulars were issued for the purpose of advertising the paint, and the show card was copyrighted by Gelien for himself. After the assignment to Suter, Hartmann,

TRADE MARK & Co. of the exclusive right of sale in the United States, and up to the year 1883, that firm sent the paints to the United States under the description of “Rahtjen's Patent Composition," and the Rahtjens themselves sent no more paint to the United States

The application was granted, and from from Germany.

that time they had an exclusive right to use In 1873 they entered into negotiations that mark. It is not charged that the dewith Suter, Hartmann, & Co., in England, fendant has ever in any way imitated or in. for the sale of their paint in that country,

fringed upon it. and on November 29, 1873, Heinrich Rahtjen

On January 9, 1884, Suter, Hartmann, & obtained in England a patent for the paint Co. filed an application for the registration for the term of fourteen years from the

date of the words "Rahtjen’s Patent Composition thereof, provided, among other conditions,

for Ships' Bottoms, Buoys, &c. Directions. he should at the end of seven years pay a

Suter, Hartmann, & Co. In their applicastamp duty of £100, and in case he did not tion for registration they said: "We do not. pay, the patent was to "cease, determine, çlaim the exclusive use of the words Raht and become void.” It remained in existence jen’s Patent Composition for Ships' Botfor seven years, or until November 29, 1880, toms, Buoys, &c., Directions,' or any of and then ceased because of the failure to such words, except as part of the combinapay the £100 stamp duty as provided for tion constituting our trademark, as reprein the patent.

sented annexed, and to which we claim ex. The label used by Suter, Hartmann, & Co. clusive right.”. This trademark was regis. in sending the paint to their different agents tered. The following is a copy: and customers contained the words "Řahtjen's Patent Composition" and "None_genuine without this signature, Suter, Hart

RAHTJEN'S mann, & Co.” These words were used by them from the outset of their career as con

PATENT COMPOSITION, signees for the composition.

In May, 1883, two years and a half after FOR SHIPS' BOTTOMS, Booys, &c. the expiration of the English patent, the predecessors of the petitioner commenced

Directions. in England to make and sell this paint, and in 1884 they sent it to the United States un.

SUTER, HARTMANN & Co. der the name of "Rahtjen's Composition, Holzapfel's Manufacture."

* On June 25, 1883, John Rahtjen filed with There has never been any infringement of the English office an application for regis- it by defendant, but it has used the words tration as a trademark of the words "Genu- "Rahtjen's Coniposition" in connection with ine Rahtjen's Composition for Ships' Bot- the statement that it was manufactured by toms,” &c. This application was opposed Holzapfel & Co., and it has so used them on by Holzapfel & Co., through their solicitors, goods sold in the United States, and did so and no counter statement having been filed at the time of the commencement of this by Rahtjen the application was deemed to suit. be withdrawn.

Before the assignment to Suter, HartOn July 7, 1883, Rahtjen filed another ap- mann, & Co. of the exclusive right to sell plication for registration of the words the composition in the United States, Raht

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