cus encroachments have been made upon the ancient maxim, and a rule has grown up in modern times that legislatures may deal with the personal as well as with the real property of nonresidents within their jurisdiction, and that such property, while enjoying the protection and benefits of the local law, may be taxed for the expenses of the local government. These doctrines have found expression in a large number of cases in this court. Green v. Van Buskirk, 5 Wall. 307, 18 L. ed. 599, 7 Wall. 139, 19 L. ed. 109; Hervey v. Rhode Island Locomotive Works, 93 U. S. 664, 23 L. ed. 1003; Walworth v. Harris, 129 U. S. 355, 32 L. ed. 712, 9 Sup. Ct. Rep. 340; Security Trust Co. v. Dodd, 173 U. S. 624, 43 L. ed. 835, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 545, and cases there cited.

Recent cases in this court have affirmed very broadly the right of the legislature to tax the local property of nonresidents, and particularly of corporations who are permitted by comity to do business within the state. Delaware Railroad Tax, 18 Wall. 206, sub nom. Minot v. Philadelphia, W. & B. R. Co. 21 L. ed. 888; Erie R. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 21 Wall. 492, 22 L. ed. 595; Western U. Teleg. Co. v. Atty. Gen. 125 U. S. 530, 31 L. ed. 790, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 961; Marye v. Baltimore & O. R. Co. 127 U. S. 117, 32 L. ed. 94, 8 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1037; Pullman's Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U. S. 18, 35 L. ed. 613, 3 Inters. Com. Rep. 595, 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 876; Adams Exp. Co. v. Ohio State Auditor, 166 U. S. 185, 41 L. ed. 965, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 604. The same principle has been applied not only to tangible property but to credits and effects. Tappan v. Merchants' Nat. Bank, 19 Wall. 490, 22 L. ed. 189; Savings & L. Soc. v. Multnomah County, 169 U. S. 421, 42 L. ed. 803, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 392; New Orleans v. Stempel, 175 U. S. 309, 44 L. ed. 174, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 110; Bristol v. Washington County, 177 U. S. 133, 44 L. ed. 701, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 585.

by the will consisted of Federal, municipal, and corporation bonds, in custody of the agents of the deceased in New York. It is the locality of the property within the jurisdiction of the United States which subjects it, if at all, to the legacy or succession tax.

It is an old and familiar rule of the English courts, applicable to all forms of taxation, and particularly special taxes, that the sovereign is bound to express its intention to tax in clear and unambiguous language, and that a liberal construction be given to words of exception confining the operation of duty (Warrington v. Furbor, 8 East, 242, 247; Williams v. Sanger, 10 East, 66, 69; Denn ex dem. Manifold v. Diamond, 4 Barn. & C. 243, 245; Tomkins v. Ashby, 6 Barn. & C. 541; Doe ex dem. Scruton V. Smith, 8 Bing. 146, 152; Wroughton v. Turtle, 11 Mees. & W. 561, 567; Gurr v. Scudds, 11 Exch. 190), though the rule regarding exemptions from general laws imposing taxes may be different. Cooley, Taxn. 146; Re Enston, 113 N. Y. 174, 177, sub nom. People v. Sherwood, 3 L. R. A. 464, 21 N. E. 87.

We have ourselves had repeated occasion to hold that the customs revenue laws should be liberally interpreted in favor of the importer, and that the intent of Congress to impose or increase a tax upon imports should be expressed in clear and unambiguous language. Hartranft v. Wiegmann, 121 U. S. 609, 30 L. ed. 1012, 7 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1240; American Net & Tuine Co. v. Worthington, 141 U. S. 468, 35 L. ed. 821, 12 Sup. Ct. Rep. 55; United States v. Wigglesworth, 2 Story, 369, Fed. Cas. No. 16,690; Powers v. Barney, 5 Blatchf. 202, Fed. Cas. No. 11,361.

It is pertinent in this connection to examine similar statutes passed in other countries and in the several states of this Union, and to inquire what construction is given to them. By the English tax legacy act of The question in each case is not of the 1796 a tax was imposed on every legacy power of the legislature to tax the personal "given by any will or testamentary instruproperty of nonresidents, both tangible and ment to any person who shall die after the intangible, since that is well established passing of this act." In Atty. Gen. v. Cockboth in England and America (Mager v. erell (1814) 1 Price, 165, this was held by Grima, 8 How. 490, 12 L. ed. 1172), but of the court of exchequer to apply to a legacy its intent to do so by the particular act in | bequeathed by a British subject residing in question. The inheritance-tax law of the the East Indies to persons living in EngUnited States above cited applies to prop- land, if the executor proved the will in Eng. erty "passing by will or by the intestate laws land, and paid the legacy there, though the of any state or territory." As the property testator held his property in India, and rein this case did not pass under any will ex-sided and made his will and died there. The ecuted in any state or territory of the Unit-case was put upon the ground that the will ed States, or by the intestate laws of any was proved in England, that the executors such state or territory, the case is not with- had received the property there, and that in the literalism of the act, unless we are the legatees resided there and were to be to use the word "state" in a sense broad paid there. But the case is further distinenough to include a foreign state or terri-guishable from the one under consideration in tory. As matter of fact, the decedent was the fact that the testator was a British suba Spanish subject, who had never resided ject and domiciled in a British possession, in the United States, had executed a will at Paris in the Spanish language, pursuant to the laws of Spain, under which will one third of his property passed to his son and two thirds to the same person under the intestate laws of Spain. The property left

although the stress of the case was laid upon the residence of the legatees in England. Atty. Gen. v. Beatson (1819) 7 Price, 560, differs from the last one only in the fact that the property bequeathed was in India, and was remitted to England and paid to

Finally, in Thomson v. Advocate General, 12 Clark & F. 1, a British-born subject died, domiciled in a British colony. At the time of his death he was possessed of personal We proceed now to an examination of the property in Scotland. Probate of his will state decisions upon the same subject, was taken out in Scotland for the purpose which, with one or two exceptions, tend in of administering that property, and legacies the same direction. The Massachusetts were paid to legatees residing there. It collateral-inheritance law of 1891 imposen was held by the House of Lords that no leg- a tax upon "all property within the jurisacy duty was payable. The two cases from diction of the commonwealth, Price were flatly overruled, the other cases whether belonging to inhabitants of the comcited and discussed at length, and the doc-monwealth or not, and whether tangible or trine of domicil applied. This case must be regarded as settling the law of England upon the subject.

intangible, which shall pass by will or by the laws of the commonwealth_regulating intestate succession," etc. In Callahan v. It will be observed in these cases that the Woodbridge, 171 Mass. 595, 51 N. E. 176, testator was a British subject, but in the it was held that under this act the succesCase of Bruce, 2 Cromp. & J. 436, the tes- sion to property of nonresidents was tator was an American who lived and died pressly taxed as if the property belonged to abroad, having appointed an English exec- inhabitants of the commonwealth, and that utor and bequeathed property in England the language, "which shall pass by will or to legatees residing there. The case is ex- by the laws of the commonwealth regulat actly in point, and the court had no diffi- ing intestate succession,' taken in connec culty in reaching the conclusion that the tion with the clauses immediately preceding property was not liable to legacy duty. it, applies to foreign wills, and to property There are some later cases in England, that passes under the statute of this combut none that seem to qualify the rule laid monwealth which regulates the succession down in Thomson v. Advocate General. In to the property of a nonresident owner aftsome of them a distinction is drawn beer his death." The testator in that case

*587

889.

lived in the state of New York, but the Maryland consisted of an undivided quarter property was within the jurisdiction of of the personal estate of the brother of the Massachusetts. The statute was held to testator, who died in Maryland. The act apply to property tangible or intangible. was held to apply, though the testator's We make no criticism of this case, which domicil was in California. The English was placed expressly upon the language of cases were cited and held to be distinguishthe statute. able by reason of the peculiar language of the Maryland act. The language was evidently ambiguous, but the court having held that the words "being in this state" applied to the property, and not to the person, of course its liability followed. A like construction was given to the same words in Com. v. Smith, 5 Pa. 142; Re Short, 16 Pa. 63. The case of Billings v. People, 189 Ill. 472, 59 N. E. 798, is of no value, as the testator, as well as his legatees, were domiciled in Illinois, and the question was as to the liability of the widow's dower.

effect

The inheritance tax law of New York of 1885 imposed a tax upon "all property which shall pass by will or by the intestate laws of this state, from any person who may die seised or possessed of the same while being a resident of the state, or which property shall be within this state, or any part of such property transferred by deed, grant, sale, or gift made or intended to take after the death of the grantor," etc. [N. Y. Laws 1885, chap. 483, 8 1.] In Re Enston, 113 N. Y. 174 sub nom. People v. Sherwood, 3 L. R. A. 464, 21 N. E. 87, this was held not to apply to property within the state which passed by will or intestacy from a nonresident decedent to collateral relatives or strangers, legatees domiciled in the state, and the latter clause, "or which property shall be within the state," was held to be limited to such as was transferred by deed, grant, sale, or gift inter vivos. The act was amended in 1887 so as to include "all property which shall pass by will or by the intestate laws of this state, from any person who may die seised or possessed of the same while a resident of this state, or if such decedent was not a resident of this state at the time of his death, which property or any part thereof shall be within this state." [N. Y. Laws 1887. chap. 713, § 1.] And in Romaine's Case, 127 N. Y. 80, 12 L. R. A. 401, 27 N. E. 759, it was held to apply to personal property in New York, owned by a nonresident intestate at the time of his death, which was habitually kept or invested by him there. There can be but little doubt of the propriety of this ruling. In Whiting's Case, 150 N. Y. 27, 34 L. R. A. 232, 44 N. E. 715, the same rule was extended to bonds of foreign as well as domestic corporations, and certificates of stock of domestic corporations (but not of foreign), owned by a nonresident decedent, but deposited by him in a safe deposit vault in New York. See also Bronson's Case, 150 N. Y. 1, 34 L. R. A. 238, 44 N. E. 707, and Houdayer's Case, 150 N. Y. 37, 34 L. R. A. 235, 44 N. E. 718. These cases seem rather to accentuate the general principle that general statutes imposing taxes upon legacies do not apply to the personal property of nonresident testators, and that a special inclusion of such is necessary to subject it to taxation. The inheritance tax law of Maryland subjects to taxation all property "passing from any person who may die seised or possessed thereof, being in this state," and it was held in State v. Dalrymple, 70 Md. 294, 3 L. R. A. 372, 17 Atl. 82, that the words "being in this state" referred, not to the decedent himself, but to his property. The testator was a resident of California, and his property was also bequeathed to residents of the same state. The property which was in

The case of Alvany v. Powell, 55 N. C. (2 Jones Eq.) 51, is directly in point, and undoubtedly sustains the positions of the gvernment in this case. The North Carolina inheritance act imposed a tax upon "all personal property or goods bequeathed to strangers or collateral kindred, or which shall be distributed to or amongst the next of kin, of any intestate, when such next of kin are collateral relations of such intestate." The act was held to apply to property in North Carolina descending to a brother from an intestate domiciled in Canada. The court was satisfied that the true prin ciple, both in regard to real and personal property, was the situs of the property. The English case of Thomson v. Advocate General, 12 Clark & F. 1, decided by the House of Lords, was considered at length, and thus criticised: "No one can read the opinion delivered before the Lords in the case of Thomson v. Advocate General, which is the case in which the principle of the domicil is finally settled, without being struck with the fact that there is throughout a marked paucity of reasoning." The North Carolina case was decided in 1854, and, so far as we know, has not been fol lowed in any other state, and it is the only one to which our attention has been called that seems to be in point in favor of the construction contended for by the govern

ment.

There are a number of other cases in the state courts, but they either involve ques tions of taxation under general laws impos ing taxes upon real and personal property, not being special inheritance taxes, or the language of the particular statute is such as to create little doubt as to the intention of the legislature to tax or not to tax the particular inheritance in question. Small's Estate, 151 Pa. 1, 25 Atl. 23, 28; Weaver v. State, 110 Iowa, 328, 81 N. W. 603; State ex rel. Taylor v. St. Louis County Ct. 47 Mo. 594; Catlin v. Hull, 21 Vt. 152; People v. Home Ins. Co. 29 Cal. 533; People ex rel. Hoyt v. New York City & County Tax & A. Comrs. 23 N. Y. 224; People en rel. Jefferson v. Gardner, 51 Barb. 352. In some jurisdictions a distinction has been made between tangible and intangible

property which does not arise in this case. Orcutt's Appeal, 97 Pa. 179.

"or the intestate laws of any state or territory." We are clearly of opinion that they are, and that the words "passing by will" are limited to wills executed in "any state or territory" under whose laws the property would pass, if the owner had died intestate. The whole scheme of the act evidently contemplates the application of the tax only to the property of a person domiciled in a state or territory of the United States whose property is transmitted under our laws. This is evident not only from the language of § 29, above quoted, but from the provision of 30, "that every executor, etc.,

shall pay to the collector or deputy collector of the district of which the deceased person was a resident the amount of the duty or tax assessed upon such legacy or distributive share," etc. It would be difficult to find language more expressive of an intent to confine the tax to persons domiciled in this country. It need only be added that while the words "state or territory" are used in treaties, and perhaps also in some acts of Congress regulating our inter

states, they are used in the Constitution and in ordinary acts of Congress as applying only to states or territories of the Unit

The tax in question in this case, not be ing upon the property itself, but upon the succession (United States v. Perkins, 163 U. S. 625, 41 L. ed. 287, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1073; Magoun v. Illinois Trust & Sav. Bank, 170 U. S. 283, 42 L. ed. 1037, 18 Sup. Ct. Rep. 594; Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U. S. 41, 44 L. ed. 969, 20 Sup. Ct. Rep. 747), laws imposing general taxes upon real and personal property are not controlling when applied to taxes upon the succession, when such succession takes place and is governed by the laws of a foreign country. The act ual situs of the property in such cases cuts but a small figure, while in the case of general taxes upon such property it is now considered determinative of the whole question. The question involved in this case, however, arose under the act of June 30, 1864 [13 Stat. at L. 285, chap. 173], before Mr. Justice Gray of this court, while holding the circuit court for Massachusetts, in United States v. Hunnewell, 13 Fed. 617. Section 124 of that act imposed a duty on lega- national relations, as including foreign cies or distributive shares arising from personal property passing from any person possessed of such property, either by will, or by the intestate laws of any state or terri-ed States. tory. The action was brought to recover the If, as in several of the states, the words tax upon American securities bequeathed by "passing by will or by the intestate laws of a French citizen domiciled in France to a son this state," or similar words, are connected who was also domiciled there. The will was with words declaring that the tax was inexecuted in conformity with the French law tended to be imposed upon the estates of and was duly proved there, though a local persons domiciled abroad, the latter proviexecutor was appointed by the probate sion is held to apply, and the words "passcourt in Boston to transfer to the legatee ing by will or the intestate laws of this the securities in question. It was held that state" are held to include the estates of § 124 did not make the duty payable when persons domiciled abroad. Such is the case the person possessed of such property died in Illinois: Billings v. Illinois, 189 III. testate if it would not be payable if such 472, 59 N. E. 798; Massachusetts: Callahan person died intestate; and as if the deceased v. Woodbridge, 171 Mass. 595, 51 N. E. 176; had died intestate her son would not have Greves v. Shaw, 173 Mass. 205, 53 N. E. taken a distributive share by the intestate 372; Maine: State v. Hamlin, 86 Me. 495, laws of any state or territory, his rights 25 L. R. A. G32, 30 Atl. 76; Ohio: Laws of were the same if he took by will. In other 1894, p. 166; Connecticut: Laws of 1889, p. words, that the words "either by will or by 106; Tennessee: State v. Alston, 94 Tenn. the intestate laws of any state or territory" 674, 28 L. R. A. 178, 30 S. W. 750. But it must be construed together, and would ap is hardly necessary to say that the conply only to wills executed within any state struction given to these statutes would or territory of the United States. The case is precisely in point.

have no application to cases where words expressly providing for the estates of non

We regard this case as a correct exposi-residents are omitted. tion of the law. It is not necessary to rely To say that we recognize by comity the exclusively upon the English cases, or upon law of a foreign domicil as controlling the those in the state courts, which hold that a transmission or succession of personal propgeneral law imposing an inheritance tax erty because it thereby becomes our law upon property passing by will or descent (and the property therefore taxable), as is does not apply to intangible personal prop-indicated in some cases, notably in Alvany erty within the jurisdiction of the taxing v. Powell, 55 N. C. (2 Jones Eq.) 51, is power, but owned by persons domiciled misleading, and little more than a play upabroad, under the laws of which domicil the on words. When we speak of our laws we property passes, since the statute in ques- mean to be understood as referring to our tion here applies only to property passing own statutory laws, or the common law we "either by will or by the intestate laws of inherited from the mother country, and any state or territory." Now, as the find when we apply the laws of a foreign domicil ing in this case is that the property passed we do so, not because they are our laws, but partly under a Spanish will and partly un-because upon principles of comity we recogder the intestate laws of Spain, the only nize those laws as applicable to the partic question is whether the words "passing by ular case. But to speak of such foreign will" are limited by the subsequent words laws as thereby becoming "the intestate

062.

*592

imposed by the war revenue act of June 18, 1898.

laws of any state or territory" wherein they are enforced is practically to confound the whole distinction between the law of the situs and the law of the domicil. We do not enforce the law of Spain in this case because it is our law, but because the practice Argued November 21, 1901. Decided March

of all civilized nations is to recognize the law of the domicil as governing the trans

[No. 295.]

17, 1902.

Statement by Mr. Justice Brown: This was also an action brought in the circuit court for the southern district of New York by Ruckgaber, as executor of the last will and testament of Louisa Augusta Ripley-Pinède, against the collector of internal revenue, to recover an inheritance tax paid to the defendant upon certain personal property in the city of New York.

mission and inheritance of personal prop. UPON CERTIFICATE from the Circuit erty, and to prevent the confusion that Court of Appeals for the Second Cirwould follow if estates, situated possibly cuit on a question as to the inheritance tax in half a dozen countries, were administered imposed by the war revenue act. Answered and distributed according to the laws of in the negative. each country in which any portion of such See same case in circuit court, 104 Fed. 947. estate happened to be located. We decline to hold the tax involved in this case applicable to this estate because the words of the statute do not require it, and because the thing taxed, that is, the transmission of the property to the legatees or next of kin, takes place in a foreign country. It is true that Congress may, and in certain cases has seen fit to, adopt the laws of a particular state, and apply them wthin a territory, as was done when Congress applied the laws of Oregon to Alaska (23 Stat. at L. 25, The material facts, as set forth in the chap. 53), and certain statutes of Nebraska certificate, are briefly as follows: to Oklahoma (26 Stat. at L. 87, chap. 182). The testatrix, Louisa Augusta RipleyThey thereby became the laws of those ter- Pinède, died at Zürich, Switzerland, on ritories as much as if enacted by a territo- September 25, 1898, being at that time a rial legislature, and were universally appli- nonresident of the United States, and havcable. But that result follows expressly ing, for at least eight years immediately from the statute, and not from the recogni-preceding her death, been domiciled in, and tion of the foreign law as applicable to a a permanent resident of, the Republic of particular case. Section 2694 of the New France. She left a will dated November 6, York Code [Civil Proc.] recognizes this dis- 1890, which was made in New York and in tinction, in its requirement that "except conformity to the laws of that state, where where special provision is otherwise made the testatrix was then sojourning, whereby by law, the validity and effect of the testa- she bequeathed all her personal property in mentary disposition of any other [than the United States to her daughter, Carmelia real] property situated within the state, and the ownership and disposition of such property where it is not disposed of by will, are regulated by the laws of the state or country of which decedent was a resident at the time of his death."

Conceding it to be within the power of Congress to impose an inheritance tax upon property in this country, no matter where owned or transmitted, it has not done so in this case, and the questions propounded by the Court of Appeals must be answered in the negative.

von Groll, who was then, and is now, also a nonresident of the United States, domiciled in Germany. Said will was probated* in the* surrogate's court of Kings county, New York, on February 17, 1899, and letters testamentary were thereupon issued to the defendant in error, a resident of said county and state, who alone qualified as executor.

At the time of her death the testatrix owned a claim in account current against one Carl Goepel and one Max Ruckgaber, Jr., constituting the firm of Schulz & Ruckgaber, both of whom resided in the county of Kings and state of New York. She was

Mr. Justice White and Mr. Justice Mc- also the owner of a share of stock in the Kenna concurred in the result.

(184 U. S. 593)

Tribune Association, a New York corporation. The testatrix was also the owner of bonds and coupons of divers American corporations hereinafter particularly described. Said chose in action, stock, bonds, and certificate constituted all the personal property of every kind in the United States of America referred to in the said will. The value of the said property of the testatrix Inheritance tax-personal property of non-at the date of her death, September 25, resident alien will executed in United

FRANK R. MOORE
v.

MAX RUCKGABER, Executor, etc.

States.

Personal property in the United States, passing

under the will of a nonresident alien executed

in New York during a temporary sojourn there, is not subject to the inheritance tax

1898, as fixed and determined by appraisers duly appointed, was $105,670.70. On or about the 15th day of June, 1899, upon the written demand of the collector of internal revenue for the first district of New York, and under protest, the executor did make and render in duplicate to the said collector