senger en route for a foreign port, and | statement of the petition that the petitiontouching at the port of San Francisco while er was examined by a customs inspector, on his journey along the usual course of his baggage and papers opened, and his pertravel, and for the purpose of transhipping son searched; nor, on the other hand, the to another vessel; that the order under statements in the intervention of the Unitwhich he was held was illegal and void, and ed States, that the petitioner was a laborer not authorized by any law of the United by occupation, and that the decision of the States, or by any treaty between the United collector for his detention and deportation States and the Empire of China; and that was made after due and careful investigathe collector of customs had no authority tion, and for the reason that he was satis under the law to examine or to confine the fied that the petitioner did not intend in petitioner. good faith to continue his voyage through The district attorney, by leave of court, the territory of the United States to the intervened in behalf of the United States, Republic of Mexico. But the facts agreed and suggested that the petitioner was a na- are simply that the petitioner was a subtive of the Empire of China, and a laborer ject of the Empire of China, arriving at the by occupation, and before the filing of his port of San Francisco, whose intended despetition arrived at San Francisco from Hong tination, as appeared by the manifest of the Kong in transit, through the territory of vessel in which he arrived, and by his own the United States, for the Republic of Mex-allegation, was San Jose de Guatemala in ico; that the collector of customs for the the Republic of Mexico, and who had a tickport of San Francisco, after careful and et, or an order for a ticket, for a through due investigation, had decided that he was passage from Hong Kong, China, to San satisfied that the petitioner did not intend Jose de Guatemala by steamer; and that* in good faith to continue his voyage through the collector of customs at San Francisco the territory of the United States to the denied him the privilege of further pursu Republic of Mexico, and had for that rea-ing his journey to his alleged point of desson denied him the privilege further to con- tination, and issued an order directing him tinue his journey through the territory of to be detained and deported to China. the United States, and had ordered him deported to China; and that the court had no jurisdiction over the person of the petitioner, or over the subject-matter of this proceeding. The parties submitted the case to the decision of the court upon the following facts: "The petitioner is a subject of the Empire of China. He arrived at the port of San Francisco on the Japanese steamship Nippon Maru, the manifest of which vessel states that he intended to go to San Jose de Guatemala. Petitioner herein also alleges that that was his intended * destination. The collector of customs at the port of San Francisco did, on September 23, 1901, deny the petitioner the privilege of further pursuing his journey to his alleged point of destination. The petitioner has a ticket, or an order for a ticket, for a through passage from Hong Kong, China, to San Jose de Guatemala by steamer. The petitioner is now held by W. H. Avery, agent for the Japanese steamship company, by virtue of an order issued by the collector of customs for the port of San Francisco, directing him to retain the person of the petitioner in his custody, and deport him to China." The court ordered the petition and the writ of habeas corpus to be dismissed, and the petitioner remanded to custody; and he appealed to this court. Mr. Maxwell Evarts for appellant. Assistant Attorney General Hoyt for appellee. Mr. Chief Justice Fuller delivered the opinion of the court: The facts upon which the parties submitted the case to the decision of the court below do not include, on the one hand, the The whole question in the case, therefore, is whether this denial and order of the col lector were authorized by law. Before the treaty of 1894 between the United States and China, the privilege of transit of Chinese persons across the territory of the United States was not specifically mentioned in any treaty or statute, except in the last clause of § 8 of the act of September 13, 1888, chap. 1015, by which the Secretary of the Treasury was authorized to make, and from time to time to change, "such rules and regulations, not in conflict with this act, as he may deem necessary and proper to conveniently secure to such Chinese persons as are provided for in articles 2d and 3d of" a treaty between the United States and China, signed March 12, 1888, but not then ratified, "the rights therein mentioned, and such as shall also protect the United States against the coming and transit of persons not entitled to the benefit of the provisions of said arti cles." 25 Stat. at L. 478. As that treaty was never ratified, it may be doubtful whether that section ever took effect. See Li Sing v. United States, 180 U. S. 486, 490, 45 L. ed. 634, 636, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 449; United States v. Gee Lee, 50 Fed. 271, 1 C. C. A. 516, 7 U. S. App. 183. But such privilege of transit was recog nized by successive Attorneys General from 1882 to January, 1894 (17 Ops. Atty. Gen. 416, 485; 18 Ops. Atty. Gen. 388; 19 Ops. Atty. Gen. 369; 20 Ops. Atty. Gen. 693), and it was regulated by orders of the Treasury Department. By regulations of Secretary Folger of January 23, 1883, it was provided that "where a Chinese consul resides at the port of landing or entrance into the United States by any Chinese laborer claiming to be merely in transit through the territory of the United States in the course of a jour #301 *300 On December 8, 1900, Secretary Gage issued regulations amendatory of the regulations of September 28, 1889, and addressed "to collectors of customs and all other offi cers charged with the enforcement of the Chinese exclusion laws," the material parts of which were as follows: ney to or from other countries, the certifi- | L. 1211. That article was also in the uncate of such Chinese consul, identifying the ratified treaty of 1888. bearer by name, height, age, etc., so far as practicable, and showing the place and date of his arrival, the place at which he is to leave the United States, the date when his journey is to begin, and that it is to be continuous and direct, shall be accepted as prima facie evidence;" that, "in the absence of such certificate, other competent evidence "Complaints having reached the Departto show the identity of the person, and the ment of attempted violations of the laws fact that a bona fide transit only is intend-enacted for the exclusion of Chinese by ed, may be received;" and that "the produc- those who have been allowed to pass tion of a through ticket across the whole through the United States to foreign territerritory of the United States intended to be traversed may be received as competent proof, and should be exhibited to the collector and verified by him. Such tickets and all other evidence presented must be so stamped or marked and dated by the customs officer as to prevent their use a second time." By regulations of Secretary McCulloch of January 14, 1885, the regulations of January 23, 1883, "relative to the transit of Chinese laborers through the territory of the United States, will be applied to all Chinese persons intending to so go in transit through the United States;" and "Chinese persons who may be compelled to touch at the ports of the United States in transit to foreign countries may be permitted to land under the regulations of January 23, 1883, so far as the same may be applicable, such persons to take passage by the next vessel leaving for their destination, or the voyage of which may form part of the route necessary to carry them to their destination." tory, the following rules are hereby adopted for your guidance in granting permission for such transit: "Any Chinese person arriving at your port, claiming to be destined to some foreign country, and seeking permission to pass through the United States, or any portion thereof, to reach such alleged foreign destination, shall be granted permission for such transit only upon complying with the following conditions: "1. The applicant shall be required to produce to the collector of customs at the first port of arrival a through ticket across the whole territory of the United States (and to his or her alleged foreign destination according to the steamship manifest) intended to be traversed, and such other proof as he (or she) may be able to adduce, to satisfy the said collector that a bona fide transit only is intended; and such ticket and other evidence presented must be so stamped, or marked, and dated by the said collector, or such officer as he shall designate for that purpose, as to prevent their use a second time; but no such applicant shall be considered as intending bona fide to make such transit only, if he (or she) has previously, on same arrival, made ap plication for and been denied admission to the United States. "2. The applicant in each case, or some responsible person on his (or her) behalf, the transportation company whose through ticket he (or she) holds, shall furnish to the said collector of customs a bond in a penal sum of not less than $500, conditioned for applicant's continuous transit through, and actual departure from, the United States within a reasonable time, not exceeding twenty days from the date of arrival at said port." By regulations of Secretary Windom of September 28, 1889, "any Chinese laborer claiming to be in transit through the territory of the United States, in the course of a journey from and to other countries, shall be required to produce to the collector of customs at the first port of arrival a through ticket across the whole territory of the United States intended to be trav-or ersed, and such other proof as he may be able to adduce, to satisfy the collector of the fact that a bona fide transit only is intended; and such ticket and other evidence presented must be so stamped, or marked, and dated by the customs officer, as to prevent their use the second time;" a bond in the penal sum of $200 was required for each Chinese laborer, "conditioned for his These regulations repeat the requiretransit and actual departure from the Unit-ments of those of 1889 (which took the ed States within a reasonable time, not ex-place of previous regulations), that eviceeding twenty days from the date of ar lector "that a bona fide transit only is indence must be produced to satisfy the colrival;' and previous regulations on the tended." Clearly, in the absence of provisubject were rescinded. sion for review, his decision is final. By article 3 of the treaty between the United States and China*of March 17, 1894, it is "agreed that Chinese laborers shall continue to enjoy the privilege of transit across the territory of the United States in the course of their journey to or from other countries, subject to such regulations by the government of the United States as may be necessary to prevent said privilege of transit from being abused." 28 Stat. at The doctrine is firmly established that the power to exclude or expel aliens is vested in the political departments of the gov ernment, to be regulated by treaty or by act of Congress, and to be executed by the executive authority according to such regu lations, except so far as the judicial department is authorized by treaty or by statute, or is required by the Constitution, to intervene. Fong Yue Ting v. United States, 149 *303 U. S. 698, 37 L. ed. 905, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 1016; Lee Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U. S. 538, 39 L. ed. 1082, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 967; Li Sing v. United States, 180 U. S. 486, 45 L. ed. 634, 21 Sup. Ct. Rep. 449. And as a general proposition this must be true of the privilege of transit. The underlying principle is thus stated by Kent (vol. 1, p. 35): "Every nation is bound, in time of peace, to grant a passage, for lawful purposes, over their lands, rivers, and seas, to the people of other states, whenever it can be permitted without inconvenience; and burthensome conditions ought not to be annexed to the transit of persons and property. If, however, any government deems the introduction of foreigners or their merchandise injurious to the interests of their own people [which they are bound to protect and promote], they are at liberty to withhold the indulgence. The entry of foreigners and their effects is not an absolute right, but only one of imperfect obligation, and it is subject to the discretion of the government which tolerates it." transit has commenced that the privilege may be abused. The abuse of the privilege might consist in the use of passage across the country to reach a point from which to effect an entrance into it, contrary to law. The journey contemplated would in effect be continuous, and the intermediate destination could not absolve from the guilt involved in the effort to attain that forbidden ulterior destination. Such an abuse of the privilege could only be prevented by arresting the journey on the threshold. Necessarily the collector's decision could' not be controlled by the bare production of a through ticket to a point in foreign territory. The very question to be determined is good faith in the transit, and good faith would be lacking if that transit were merely a means of effecting admission into the United States. And the decision of the Treasury Department as to the right of admission is made final by statute. For instance, it is difficult, if not impossible, to police effectively the long frontier between the United States and Mexico, and if, in a given case, a Chinese laborer arrives In short, the privilege of transit, al-at San Francisco ostensibly bound to a port though it is one that should not be withheld in Mexico, but going there for the purpose without good cause, is nevertheless conced- of crossing thence into this country, this ed only on such terms as the particular gov- would be an abuse of the privilege, and deernment prescribes in view of the well be- nial of transit would be justified. And ing of its own people. If, then, these regu- this, in cases where such is the intent and lations have the force of law, they bind the purpose, is in accordance with the terms of courts. the treaty, and not in the exercise of a general power to prohibit that which the treaty permits. By the act of August 18, 1894 (28 Stat. at L. 390, chap. 301), the decision of the proper executive officer, if adverse to an alien's admission, was made final unless reversed on appeal to the Secretary of the Treasury. The 1st article of the treaty of December 8, 1894, provides that "the coming, except under the conditions hereinafter specified, of Chinese laborers to the United States, shall be absolutely prohibited." The 2d paragraph of article 3 reads: "It is also agreed that Chinese laborers shall continue to enjoy the privilege of transit across the territory of the United States in the course That act came under consideration in Lee of their journey to or from other countries, Moon Sing v. United States, 158 U. S. 538, subject to such regulations by the govern-39 L. ed. 1082, 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 967. Petiment of the United States as may be necessary to prevent said privilege of transit from being abused." tioner contended that while the immigration officers had authority to exclude aliens from coming into the United States, yet if We regard this as explicitly recognizing an alien was entitled of right to enter the existing regulations, and as assenting to country, and was nevertheless excluded by their continuance, and to such modification such officers, the latter exceeded their jurisof them as might be found necessary to pre-diction, and the courts might intervene; vent abuse. It dealt with the subject spe- but Mr. Justice Harlan, speaking for the cifically, and was operative without an act of Congress to carry it into effect. court, said: “That view, if sustained, would bring into the courts every case of an alien who claimed the right to come in to the United States under some law or The treaty of 1880 (22 Stat. at L. 826), in declaring in respect of the coming of Chi nese laborers into this country that the govtreaty, but was prevented from doing so by ernment of the United States might "regu late, limit, or suspend such coming or resi- the executive branch of the government. dence," did not refer to the privilege of This would defeat the manifest purpose of transit, and, as it was not self-executing, Congress in committing to subordinate imthe act of May 6, 1882, was passed to carry migration officers and to the Secretary of the stipulation into effect. But the provi- the Treasury exclusive authority to detersion of this treaty applicable here, in rec-mine whether a particular alien seeking adognizing the privilege of transit and providing that it should continue, proceeded on the ground of its existence and continuance under governmental regulations, and no act of Congress was required. Re Lee Gon Yung, 111 Fed. 998. Nor is the provision open to the ingenious construction suggested, that it is only after 22 S. C.-44. mission into this country belongs to the class entitled by some law or treaty to come into the country, or to a class forbidden to enter the United States. Under that interpretation of the act of 1894 the provision that the decision of the appropriate immigration or customs officers should be final, unless reversed on appeal to the Secretary of the Treasury, would be of no practical Assistant Attorney General Hoyt for apvalue." So in the case before us, the treaty manifestly operated to commit the subject of pellee. Mr. Chief Justice Fuller delivered the transit to executive regulation and deter-opinion of the court: mination; and by the then, as well as the This case was a writ of habeas corpresent, regulations, the final decision as to pus substantially like the preceding case permitting transit was devolved on the col- of Fok Young Yo V. United States, lector of customs, and no appeal to the 185 U. S. Secretary was provided for. It appears from the official documents referred to on the argument that the Treasury Department has "held that neither the treaty nor the laws relating to the exclusion of Chinese, either expressly or by implication, give to Chinese persons refused the privilege of transit the right of appeal;" but possession of the power to grant an appeal, or to supervise the action of the collector in some other appropriate way, in circumstances demanding intervention, has not been disavowed. ante, 686, 22 Sup. Ct. Rep. 686. The petition was addressed to the circuit court of the United States for the northern district of California; and alleged that the petitioner had taken passage from the agent of the Pacific Mail Steamship Company at Hong Kong to the city of Mexico, and received from him a ticket for passage on one of its steamships to the port of San Francisco, and an order upon the agent of the company at that port for passage by rail thence to the city of Mexico; that upon arriving at San Francisco the petitioner was, on September 28, This case is an attempt to transfer the 1901, examined by a customs inspector, his inquiry from the collector to the courts. baggage and private papers opened, and his Congressional action has placed the final person searched; and that he was held in determination of the right of admission in custody under an order of deportation by executive officers, without judicial interven- the collector of the port. The agent of the tion, and this has been for many years the steamship company at San Francisco made recognized and declared policy of the coun- a return to the writ, stating that he detry. The regulations to prevent abuse of tained the petitioner under the collector's the privilege of transit have been and are order of deportation. The district attorney intended to effectuate the same policy, and of the United States, in an intervention filed recourse to the courts by habeas corpus to by leave of court, suggested*"that the Unit-* determine the existence of such abuse ap-ed States collector of customs at the port pears to us equally inadmissible. The record does not present a case of regulation or action in contravention of the Constitution, and we think that, upon the admitted facts, the orders of the collector cannot be held to have been invalid. Order affirmed. of San Francisco, after a careful and due investigation, has decided that he is not satisfied that the said Chinese person, the petitioner herein, does intend in good faith to continue his voyage, if permitted so to do, through the territory of the United States to the Republic of Mexico, and has denied the said Chinese person for that rea Mr. Justice Brewer and Mr. Justice son the privilege to further continue his Peckham dissented. journey through the territory of the United States, and has ordered the said person deported to China, the country whence he came;" and that the court had no jurisdiction of the person of the petitioner, or of the subject-matter of the proceeding. The petitioner filed a demurrer to the return and to the intervention. The court overruled the demurrers, and ordered the writ of habeas corpus to be discharged and the petitioner remanded to custody. 111 Fed. 998. The court also allowed a bill of exceptions, stating that it excluded, against This case is governed by the decision in Fok the objection and exception of the petitioner, Yung Yo v. United States, ante, 686. evidence offered by him tending to support each and all of the allegations of his petition. He appealed to this court. This case must take the same course as Decided May 5, that just decided. The difference between PPEAL from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Northern District of California to review an order dismissing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. firmed. See same case below, 111 Fed. 998. them is that in this case the court sustained the objection to an offer of evidence. But as in our view the authority of the government in prescribing regulations is unqualified, and these regulations are not esAfsentially unreasonable, and do not transgress constitutional limitations, jurisdiction to interfere with the collector's orders was lacking, and the ruling was not erroneous. If petitioner had just cause of complaint of the conduct of the collector's subordinates, | pany was entered, decreeing the forfeiture the remedy is not to be found in his dis-of the charter and of all the franchises herecharge on habeas corpus. Order affirmed. tofore conferred upon the defendant. The company has brought the case here by writ of error for review. It appears from the petition filed in behalf of the state, through its attorney general, that in June, 1898, the general assembly of the state adopted a concurrent resolution providing for the appointment of a NEW ORLEANS WATERWORKS COM-committee, with instructions to investigate PANY, Plff. in Err., v. STATE OF LOUISIANA et al. Appeal-error to state court-Federal question-color of foundation. 1. A claim that a forfeiture of the charter of the complaints against the methods of operation of the New Orleans Waterworks Company, and to report back to the general assembly such action as it might deem necessary to the public interests in the premises. The committee was duly appointed, made the investigation, and having submitted two reports thereon, the legislature on July 14, 1898, adopted the following: waterworks company for maintaining illegal rates by a decree of a state court after "Whereas, the majority and minority refull hearing by all parties in a proceeding by ports of the joint committee of the house quo warranto impaired the obligation of a and senate, appointed to investigate the afcontract, or deprived the company of its prop- fairs, administration, and condition of the erty without due process of law, or denied it New Orleans Waterworks Company, have the equal protection of the laws, because by been submitted to the general assembly, toits charter mandamus was prescribed as the remedy for Illegal rates, is so clearly with gether with the testimony and evidence adout color of foundation as to give the Su-duced at the various sessions of the said preme Court of the United States no juris- committee; and diction to review such decree. "Whereas, the subject-matter of the said 2. No Federal question arises from the forfeit-reports involves the consideration and the ure of a charter of a corporation for alleged determination of intricate questions of law violation of its terms, by a decree of a state and fact; and court made after a full hearing by all the parties in a proceeding in the nature of quo warranto instituted in the name of the state by the attorney general, to whom the matter 8. The Supreme Court of the United States by the attorney general in the name of the [No. 590.] "Whereas, it is impossible in view of the limited time at its disposal, for the general assembly to give the matter the examination and consideration necessary for a proper determination thereof; "Be it therefore resolved by the senate, the house of representatives concurring, that the whole subject-matter of the said report, together with the testimony and evidence upon which they are based, be respectfully referred to the attorney general of the state for such action in the premises as he may deem proper." *The attorney general after such reference commenced this proceeding, and in the petition it was averred that the water company had been duly incorporated by the state leg. islature, and that after its incorporation it had been guilty of repeated and continuous Submitted March 10, 1902. Decided May violations of the charter, and had thereby 5, 1902. N ERROR to the Supreme Court of the forfeiture of the charter of a waterworks company. Dismissed. See same case below, 31 So. 395. Statement by Mr. Justice Peckham: This is a proceeding in the nature of a quo warranto, brought by the attorney general of the state of Louisiana, in the name of the state, to obtain a forfeiture of the charter of the defendant, the waterworks company. Upon the trial there was judgment in favor of the company, but upon appeal to the supreme court of the state that judgment was reversed, and judgment in favor of the state and against the com forfeited the same and its franchises, and the petition then set forth twelve different causes of forfeiture which were alleged to alleged that the company had failed to supply the inhabitants of the city with pure water; that the supply was not only muddy and impure, but also wholly inadequate, either to extinguish fires, to wash yards, alleys, and streets, or to furnish the inhabitants with water for bathing and domestic purposes; that the water furnished was at no time fit for drinking or cooking. It was also averred that the company had habitually, since 1878 to the time of filing the petition, illegally exacted and collected greater rates than those exacted and collected by the city of New Orleans for the same quantity of water when it was the owner of *337 |