of a large amount of metropolitan police warrants, issued to officers and members of the metropolitan police, and assignee of sundry creditors of said board of metropolitan police, on the 21st of October, 1886, brought suit in the 26th judicial district court in and for the parish of Jefferson, Louisiana, against said city of New Orleans, said city of Kenner and said parishes of Jefferson and St. Bernard, in behalf of himself and all other creditors of said board, similarly situated, praying the appointment of a receiver and enforcement of the liabilities of said several defendants, for the purpose of paying and discharging the obligations of said board; that citation was served on the 26th of October, 1886, upon each of said defendants to appear and answer in said suit, and afterwards said suit was removed into this honorable court, where holders of warrants and claims against said board, amounting to a much larger sum, appeared before the master appointed by the order of the court, and proved their demand, the claims now held by your orator being among those so presented and proved, as will appear by said master's report now on file, which is here referred to for greater certainty; that the case as against the city of New Orleans was afterwards dismissed upon the ground that this court had not acquired jurisdiction thereof; but as to all other defendants the same still remains pending and undisposed of.

of is hereto annexed as Exhibit 'A,' and made a part of this bill; that said claims have been duly assigned and transferred to your orator for a valuable consideration, and he is now the holder and owner thereof.

"And your orator avers that each of said persons in whose favor said claims accrued, and to whom said certificates were issued, or their heirs or legal representatives, are citizens respectively of states other than Louisiana, and competent as such citizens to maintain suit in this honorable court against said defendant for the enforcement of said indebtedness, represented by said certificates and transfers, if no assignment or transfer thereof had been made, the citizenship of said persons being as follows, viz.:

"Said D. M. Moore is a citizen of the state of New York.

"Said Eli Jones is a citizen of the state of Texas.

"Said Peter Joseph is a citizen of the state of Colorado.

"Said Robert Crofton is a citizen of the state of Mississippi.

"Said W. C. Bodechtel is a citizen of the state of California.

"Said J. H. Moore is a citizen of the state of Colorado.

"Said Edward Masterson is a citizen of the state of Ohio.

"Said John Dinan is a citizen of the state of Ohio.

"Said F. Coleman is a citizen of the state of Ohio.

"Said R. H. Taylor is a citizen of the state of Illinois.

"Said W. H. Murphy is a citizen of the state of Michigan.

"Said G. H. Hamersley resided in and was a citizen of the state of California, until he died recently, leaving two sons, G. H. Hamersley and Hamersley, as his sole heirs, who are also citizens of the state of Cali

"That afterwards, to wit: February 9th, 1891, Henry W. Benjamin exhibited and filed his bill of complaint in this honorable court against said city of New Orleans and others for an account of the sums due by said defendants, applicable to the payment of the certificates and claims against said police board held by him, being the same claims upon which said Goldstein brought suit as aforesaid, and which said Benjamin had acquired; that various persons having like claims against said police board intervened in said suit and proved the same be-fornia. fore the master therein; that among said claims sued upon by said Benjamin and said interveners were included the obligations and claims since acquired and now held and owned by your orator, hereinafter enumerated and described; that process of subpoena in said case was duly served upon said city of New Orleans February 9th, 1891, that she afterwards appeared and answered and a final decree was made against her in favor of said complainant, and the interveners therein establishing their claims and decreeing the said city to pay the same, which suit was afterwards dismissed for want of jurisdiction in this honorable court, but without prejudice to a new bill, which decree became final January 31st, 1898.

"Said Dr. J. B. Cooper resided in and was also a citizen of the state of California, where he died leaving Mrs. Catherine E. Cooper, his widow in community, as sole heir under the laws of said state of which she is a citizen.

"15th. And your orator further shows and avers that there are now outstanding, due and unpaid, other warrants and certificates issued by said board of metropolitan police, and sums due and owing by it, for services rendered and supplies furnished thereto, amounting to a large sum, the exact amount thereof being unknown to your orator, but he avers upon information and belief that, including interest thereof, the amount ex ceeds two hundred thousand dollars ($200,"12th. That your orator is the holder and 000); that the only assets of said board of owner of certificates issued by said board of metropolitan police, at the time it was abol metropolitan police in acknowledgment of ished, were the amounts due to it by the said its indebtedness for services rendered to it city of New Orleans, and by other municipal by the persons therein named and of trans- corporations within said police district; fers of debts due by said police board, amount- that the amount due by said city as afore ing to three thousand, thirty and forty- said is applicable to the payment of the eight-100 dollars ($3,030.48), a list where-'claims held and owned by your orator as

88.

aforesaid, the same being for services ren- of the city of New Orleans are fully suffi dered within said city, and that he is enti- cient. tled to an accounting by said city, in order that the amount due by her may be ascertained and fixed and decreed to be paid, and applied to the payment of your orator's claims, and of such others as shall join herein and contribute to the expense of this suit.

"It is further ordered that defendant's third and fourth grounds of demurrer are hereby sustained, the court finding and decreeing that there is no equity in the bill of complaint herein, and said bill is therefore dismissed for want of equity with full reservation of complainant's right to sue and proceed at law.'

"The complainant below prosecuted an appeal to this court, and assigns herein errors as follows:

"'1st. Said circuit court erred in sustaining the demurrer to the complainant's bill, and in dismissing the same.

"Wherefore, for the errors assigned, and others manifest in the record, said complainant prays that said decree be reversed and said cause reinstated to be proceeded with according to law.'

"In consideration whereof and inasmuch as your orator has not a complete and adequate remedy at law to the end therefore that the said defendant may, if she can, show why your orator should not have the relief hereby prayed, and that she may full, true, and perfect answer make to all and singular the premises (but not under oath, the oath "2d. Said court erred in holding that thereto being expressly waived); that an ac- complainant's bill does not state a case withcount be taken before a master to be ap-in the jurisdiction of a court of equity. pointed by the court, of the amount of taxes collected by the defendant on account of the assessments and levies of taxes for police purposes, as set forth in the bill, and of the amounts due by the defendant on account of the apportionments aforesaid due by her, and that the defendant may be decreed to pay into the hands of a receiver the amount of said taxes collected, with interest thereon, since the same have come into the hands of the defendant, and a sufficient amount of the said apportionments as trust funds, to meet the demands of the complainant and other creditors similarly situated who may come into this cause and take the benefit of these proceedings, and all expenses and costs; and that the same be applied to their payment."

Then followed prayer for process and for general relief and signatures of counsel; also Exhibit "A," "list of certificates of indebtedness of board of metropolitan police and claims against it held and owned by said complainant." These were in small amounts, some of them dated in October, November, and December, 1874, some in December, 1875, and some in November and December, 1876. The original payees were D. M. Moore, Eli Jones, Peter Joseph, Robert Crofton, W. C. Bodechtel, Edward Masterson, R. H. Taylor, John Dinan, G. H. Hamersley, W. H. Murphy, F. Coleman, and Dr. J. B. Cooper.

The city demurred to the bill on the ground that the circuit court had no jurisdiction as such for want of proper averments of diverse citizenship; that necessary parties were lacking; that plaintiff had not stated a case entitling him to the relief prayed; and that the remedy was at law, and not in equity. On hearing the circuit court entered the following decree:

""This cause came on to be heard at a former day upon the demurrer to the bill, filed by defendant, and after arguments from counsel, was submitted.

*""On consideration thereof for the reaBons on file:

"It is ordered that the defendant's first ground of demurrer be and the same is hereby overruled, the court finding and decree ing that the allegations of the citizenship of the complainant, of the original payees, and

"And now at this term this cause came on to be heard on the transcript and was argued,

"Whereupon, for the proper decision of the case, this court, desiring the instruction of the honorable, the Supreme Court of the United States, certifies to that court the following questions and propositions of law arising on the record, to wit: 1. This being a suit brought by an assignee to recover the contents of choses in action, does the bill state sufficient facts to give the court jurisdiction on the ground of diverse citizenship? 2. Under the facts stated in the bill and under the proper construction of act No. 35 of the Laws of Louisiana, approved March 31, 1877, can the city of New Orleans, as a legal successor of the defunct metropolitan police board, be held liable to the complainant as the holder of valid outstanding certificates of indebtedness issued by the late board of metropolitan police for the amounts due on said certificates? 3. Under the facts stated in the bill, can the complainant maintain a suit in equity in the circuit court of the United States for the eastern district of Louisiana against the city of New Orleans for the establishment of a fund out of which he in common with other creditors of the late metropolitan police board may be paid pro rata upon their claims?"

Messrs. J. D. Rouse and William Grant for appellant.

Messrs. Frank B. Thomas and Samuel L. Gilmore for appellee.

Mr. Chief Justice Fuller delivered the opinion of the court:

This is a certificate under § 6 of the judiciary act of March 3, 1891 (26 Stat. at L. 826, chap. 517), and it is settled as to such certification that each question propounded must be a definite point or proposition of law clearly stated, so that it can be definitely answered without regard to other issues of law in the case; that each question must be a question of law only, and not of fact, or of

had been no assignment or transfer. We lay out of view as inapplicable the limitation on amount prescribed as to parties plaintiff by another clause with a different purpose.

But it is objected that the restriction re

signed, and not to the time of the commencement of the suit; and that if there were intermediate assignees jurisdiction in respect of them must appear, and does not appear on the face of this bill.

mixed law and fact; and that the certificate cannot embrace the whole case, even where its decision turns on matter of law only, and even though it be split up in the form of questions. Graver v. Faurot, 162 U. S. 435, 40 L. ed. 1030, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 799; Cin-lates to the time when the paper was as-" cinnati, H. & D. R. Co. v. McKeen, 149 U. S. 259, 37 L. ed. 725, 13 Sup. Ct. Rep. 840. Rule 37 provides: "Where, under § 6 of the said act, a circuit court of appeals shall certify to this court a question or proposition of law, concerning which it desires the instruction of this court for its proper decision, the certificate shall contain a proper statement of the facts on which such question or proposition of law arises." In this case there is no such statement, but the entire record is certified, and the questions contemplate an examination of the whole case and in large part its decision on the merits. We cannot regard this certificate as in compliance with the rule, and are constrained to decline to answer the second and third questions, but we think we may properly answer the first question in view of the narrow limits by which it was apparently intended to be circumscribed.

We are of opinion that the inquiry is to be determined as of the date when the suit is commenced. Jurisdiction vests then and cannot be devested by subsequent change of residence; but jurisdiction cannot be held to have vested prior to action brought. There have been many decisions to this effect, the same question being presented under all the acts from 1789.

In Chamberlain v. Eckert, 2 Biss. 126, Fed. Cas. No. 2,577, Judge Drummond held that the time of the commencement of the suit determined the question; and, among other things, said: "But if the rule contended for by the defendant is the true rule, then no change in the status of the payee, after the The judicial power extends to controver-assignment, could ever enable a party to sies between citizens of different states; and between citizens of a state and citizens or subjects of foreign states; but the judiciary act of 1789 provided that the district and circuit courts of the United States should not "have cognizance of any suit to recover the contents of any promissory note or other chose in action in favor of an assignee, unless the suit might have been prosecuted in such court to recover the said contents if no assignment had been made, except in cases of foreign bills of exchange" (1 Stat. at L. 78, chap. 20, § 11); and the same provision of the act of March 3, 1887, as corrected by that of August 13, 1888, is in these words: "Nor shall any circuit or district court have cognizance of any suit, except upon foreign bills of exchange, to recover the contents of any promissory note or other chose in action in favor of any assignee, or of any subsequent holder if such instrument be payable to bearer and be not made by any corporation, unless such suit might have been prosecuted in such court to recover the said contents if no assignment or transfer had been made." 25 Stat. at L. 433, 434, chap. 866, § 1.

bring a suit, and it might happen, where the note was executed by the maker to the payee of another state, and at the time of the commencement of the suit in the Federal court, he was of the same state with the maker, the suit could be maintained by the assignee, a citizen of another state, because you have to look according to the view of the defense, to the status of the parties at the time that the assignor held the note. And if he ever could have prosecuted the suit, the assignee could prosecute it, although at the time when the suit is brought the payee and maker are citizens of the same state. That would be the necessary consequence, and the question recurs, What does the language of the statute mean, ‘unless the suit might have been prosecuted in said court, if no assignment had been made?' I think it means at the time the suit was prosecuted, so that if it appears then that the assignor could have maintained the suit if no assignment had been made, the assignee, being a citizen of another state, can maintain the suit." And see Thaxter v. Hatch, 6 McLean, 68, Fed. Cas. No. 13,866.

In White v. Leahy, 3 Dill. 378, Fed. Cas. To prevent abuse of the constitutional No. 17,551, the same conclusion was anright to resort to the Federal courts, juris-nounced by Judge Dillon. The suit was a diction in respect of assignees or transferees was thereby denied except as to suits upon foreign bills of exchange, suits upon choses in action payable to bearer and made by a corporation, and suits that might have been prosecuted in such court to recover the said contents if no assignment or transfer had been made. New Orleans v. Quinlan, 173 U. S. 191, 43 L. ed. 664, 19 Sup. Ct. Rep. 329.

The bill shows that at the time this suit was brought the circuit court had jurisdiction as between plaintiff and defendant, and also that the payees of these warrants might themselves then have instituted it, if there

bill to foreclose, brought in the circuit court
for the district of Kansas by plaintiff, a cit-
izen of Missouri, as the assignee of a note
and mortgage. The maker and payee of the
note were citizens of Kansas, and were such
at the time the note and mortgage were
made and the payee indorsed the note and
assigned the mortgage, and delivered the
same to plaintiff in Missouri. But at the
time the suit was brought the payee was a
citizen of Texas. Judge Dillon said:
no assignment of this note had been made,
the assignor might, being at the time when
suit was brought a citizen of Texas, have
then commenced it; and under the statute

"If

his assignee has the same right. If the re- | striction on the assignee does not exist at the time suit is commenced, the court has jurisdiction if the case involves the requisite amount and is between a citizen of a state where the suit is brought and a citizen of another state."

The same ruling was made by the circuit court of appeals for the fifth circuit in Jones v. Shapera, 6 C. C. A. 423, 13 U. S. App. 481, 57 Fed. 457, and the foregoing and other cases were cited. See also Portage City Water Co. v. Portage, 102 Fed. 769.

served that the payees were not only citizens of Alabama when the suit was commenced,, but when the note was assigned.

In Mollan v. Torrance, 9 Wheat. 537, 6 L ed. 154, the declaration contained two counts. The first was against the defendant, Torrance, as indorser of a promissory note made by Spencer and Dunn, payable to Sylvester Dunn, and indorsed by him to Torrance, by whom it was indorsed to Lowrie, and by him to plaintiffs. The other count was for money had and received by Torrance to plaintiffs' use. The declaration stated plainIn Milledollar v. Bell, 2 Wall. Jr. 334, tiffs to be citizens of New York, and defendFed. Cas. No. 9,549, which was a bill to fore-ant to be a citizen of Mississippi, but was close, complainant, the mortgagee, was a cit- silent "respecting the citizenship or resi izen of New York, and defendant was a cit-dence of Lowrie, the immediate indorsee of izen of New Jersey, but there had been in Torrance, through whom the plaintiffs trace termediate assignments. Mr. Justice Grier their title to the money for which the suit said: "The complainant's case is therefore is instituted." within the strict letter of the law; nor can The ruling in Young v. Bryan, 6 Wheat. we discover anything in the spirit, equity, 146, 5 L. ed. 228, "that an indorsee who reor policy of the act, or in adjudged cases, sides in a different state may sue his im which would compel us to give it a construc-mediate indorser, residing in the state in tion such as the defendant asks. The statute does not take from the assignee of a chose in action his right to sue in the courts of the United States, unless his immediate assignor could have sustained such action; but only in case the court could have had no jurisdiction as between the original parties to the instrument, if no assignment had been made. The situation or rights of temporary intermediate assignees, holders, or indorsers enter not into the conditions of the case."

which the suit is brought, although that indorser be a resident of the same state with the maker of the note," was affirmed, but it was pointed out that, "in this case the suit is brought against a remote indorser, and the plaintiffs, in their declaration, trace their title through an intermediate indorser, without showing that this intermediate indorser could have sustained his action against the defendant in the courts of the United States. The case of Turner v. Bank of North AmerWilson v. Fisher, Baldw. 133, Fed. Cas. ica, 4 Dall. 8, 1 L. ed. 718, has decided that No. 17,803, was approved. There a citizen this count does not give the court jurisdic of New York had obtained a judgment tion. But the count for money had and reagainst a citizen of Pennsylvania in the su-ceived to the use of the plaintiffs being free preme court of that state. The judgment from objection, it becomes necessary to look was assigned to citizens of Pennsylvania, farther into the case." The record showed and subsequently to complainant, who was that defendant Torrance had filed a plea to an alien, and jurisdiction was sustained; the jurisdiction, in which he stated that the Hopkinson, J., saying: "The suit cannot be promises laid in the declaration were made maintained here unless it might have been to Lowrie, and not to plaintiffs, and that prosecuted here if no assignment had been Lowric and defendant were both citizens of made; that is, as we understand it, if it had the state of Mississippi. Plaintiffs deremained with the original parties to the murred to this plea, the demurrer was sustransaction, contract, or cause of action. tained, and judgment rendered for defendThe law does not declare that no assignee ant. The court overruled the plea because shall prosecute his suit in this court unless it averred that Lowrie and defendant were his assignor might have done so; but, unless citizens of Mississippi at the time of the plea a recovery of the right claimed might have pleaded, not that they were citizens of the been had in this court if no assignment of it said state at the time the action was brought; had been made; and of course in every case and Chief Justice Marshall said: "It is in which a recovery might have been prose-quite clear that the jurisdiction of the court cuted in the courts of the United States if no assignment had been made, it may be so prosecuted after such assignment to a party competent to sue here."

depends upon the state of things at the time of the action brought, and that after vesting it cannot be ousted by subsequent events. Since, then, one of the counts show jurisdic tion, and the plea does not contain sufficient matter to deny that jurisdiction, we think that judgment ought not to have been rendered on the demurrer in favor of the defendant." The judgment was reversed and the cause remanded.

In Kirkman v. Hamilton, 6 Pet. 20, 8 L. ed. 305, where the payees of a note and the makers thereof were citizens of Tennessee, and before the note became due the payees became citizens of Alabama and indorsed it to a citizen of Alabama, the jurisdiction of the circuit court for the western district of That was a suit on the distinct contract Tennessee of a suit brought by the holder of between indorsee and indorser, but as plainthe note was upheld because the payees tiff was not the immediate indorsee, and could have prosecuted a suit to recover the made title through Lowrie, who was, the contents of the note in that court if no as-court held that the first count should have signment had been made. But it is to be ob- shown the competency of the latter to in

96

APPEAL from the Supreme Court of judgment ordering a peremptory mandamus to issue to the loan commissioners of AriAction-abatement-change of personnel in continuing municipal body-statutes-re-bonds of that territory. Affirmed. zona, directing the refunding of certain peal by substantial re-enactment-power See same case below, 64 Pac. 427. of territorial legislature to repeal act of Congress-territorial bonds-validity as Statement by Mr. Justice Brown: affected by subsequent conduct of holders. *This was an appeal by the loan commis-* sioners of Arizona from a judgment of the 1. A change in the personnel of the loan commission of Arizona, created by Arizona Laws supreme court of that territory rendered 1887, title 31. substantially re-enacted in the March 22, 1901, granting a peremptory writ act of Congress of June 25, 1890 (26 Stat. at of mandamus and commanding such loan L. 175, chap. 612), for the express purpose of commissioners, upon the tender by plaintiff's liquidating and providing for the payment of of $150,000 bonds of the county of Pima the outstanding indebtedness of the territory, with coupons attached, described in the pe does not abate a proceeding against the mem-tition, to issue and deliver to the petitioners bers of such commission, in their official capacity, to compel by mandamus the issue of