Art. XIII. THE MILITIA AND VOLUNTEERS.

1. Report of the Royal Commission on the Militia and Volunteers; with Minutes of Evidence and Appendices. London: Spottiswoode, 1904. (Cd. 2061-4.)

THE Royal Commission on the Militia and Volunteers seems to have been appointed by the Government not with a view to making large reforms, but rather as a means of escape from parliamentary troubles. In February 1903 Mr Beckett, in the House of Commons, moved as an amendment to the address,

'that this House humbly regrets that the organisation of the land forces is unsuited to the needs of the Empire, and that no proportionate gain in strength and efficiency has resulted from the recent increases in military expenditure.'

In the course of the debate the supporters of the amendment, some of whom were members of the party on which the Government relies, strongly urged the opinion that the land defence of the United Kingdom ought to be entrusted mainly, if not entirely, to the auxiliary forces. The effect of the debate was to shake the faith of the Government in Mr Brodrick's schemes, and to convince its members that some means must be found of staving off for the rest of the session a repetition of the attack. The simplest means appeared to be the appointment of a Royal Commission.

There was indeed a good reason why the Secretary of State should seek advice on the subject of the Volunteer force from persons conversant with its organisation and working. On November 4, 1901, an Order in Council had been issued modifying the conditions required to be fulfilled by volunteers and Volunteer corps for the purpose of earning the capitation grants by which the corps are maintained; and the Order in Council was followed by new regulations, dated November 27, 1901. One of the new conditions prescribed was that every corps should attend a camp of exercise for one week in each year, and that every volunteer should attend the camp for at least one week in every alternate year. This condition was not the invention of a perverse War Office. It was one

of the proposals made in a memorandum submitted to the Commander-in-Chief in February 1901 on behalf of the Manchester Tactical Society, a body of volunteer and regular officers formed in 1881 for purposes of study. The new regulation for attendance at camp was much attacked in the London newspapers, for it was inconvenient to many of the London Volunteer corps. The evidence published by the Royal Commission proves that the Manchester Tactical Society represented the Volunteer force better than the London newspapers; for, out of some 200 corps which attend camp every year, twentythree attend for a fortnight; and, of the remainder, 124 would be prepared to extend their time beyond a week if the money grants were increased. The outcry led to the appointment of an advisory board of volunteer commanding officers, and of similar boards for the Militia and Yeomanry. But the indifference of the Government to the special needs of the Militia and Volunteers is shown by the fact that, even before the Royal Commission reported, the advisory boards were dissolved.

To postpone a difficulty is not to solve it, but rather to insure that it will reappear in an aggravated form. The appointment of a Royal Commission is of all dilatory proceedings the one most liable to produce this kind of recoil on the Government that has recourse to it; for a Royal Commission, deriving its authority from the King, and being unpaid, is absolutely independent. The only means of regulating its action consists in the judicious definition of the task assigned to it-a definition which is embodied in the royal warrant. Now the terms of reference, in the present case, ran as follows:

'To inquire into the organisation, numbers, and terms of service of our Militia and Volunteer forces; and to report whether any, and, if any, what changes are required in order to secure that these forces shall be maintained in a condition of military efficiency and at an adequate strength.'

Nothing could be clearer, nothing more stringent, than the purpose here set forth; the Commission was to ascertain how to secure for the forces which it was to investigate both military efficiency and adequate strength.

* Appendices, p. 124.

Military efficiency means fitness for war; and adequate strength in a military body must be a strength sufficient to fulfil the duty which that body has to discharge. Thus the Commission was, by the terms of its reference, at once confronted with one of the most difficult and at the same time most vital problems of national defence. The Cabinet, which is responsible for the reference, had not sufficiently considered the meaning of its words, and was astonished and embarrassed by their consequences. The Marquis of Lansdowne said in the House of Lords on June 27, 1904, when the Report of the Commission was discussed :

'If our reference to the Commission was obscure, we greatly regret it; but we certainly understood that they were invited to report rather on the question of the measures which were necessary in order to maintain the popularity and the efficiency of the auxiliary forces than upon those much deeper and more complicated problems which have been touched upon during the debate and in parts of the Report.'

The Commission was bound, not by the unexpressed intentions of the Government, but by the terms of the reference, which are free from the obscurity lamented by Lord Lansdowne. There is, however, no sign that the Duke of Norfolk and his colleagues plunged into profound speculations, or tried to usurp the functions of a Committee of Defence. They received from the War Office a paper setting forth the requirements, as understood by the Secretary of State. But the questions put to witnesses in the elucidation of this paper revealed a startling divergence of opinion between the War Office and the Admiralty. The Commissioners sought enlightenment from the Admiralty. They were ready to offer themselves for conversion to the ideas of the blue-water school.' But the Government interfered by refusing to allow the Admiralty officers to give evidence, and by referring the Commission to the Committee of Defence. That body proposed to the Commission two hypotheses to be taken as the working basis of the enquiry, but was careful to avoid committing itself, except hypothetically, to either of them. The Commission, as requested, took these hypotheses to work from, but expressed no opinion upon them, and explicitly disclaimed responsibility for

them. 'It will be seen' (they say) 'that we had not the means of reaching, in any scientific manner, an independent conclusion as to the adequate strength to be provided.'* But, after the publication of the Report, the Government, by the mouth of Lord Lansdowne, reproached the Commission in the following terms:

'With regard to the further recommendation, that compulsion in some form or another should be resorted to, I think we must bear in mind that that recommendation was made upon a twofold hypothesis-in the first place, on the assumption that the country was denuded of regular troops, and, in the next place, that the Government had come to the conclusion that invasion, as distinguished from a mere raid, was within the bounds of possibility. Those are two very extensive hypotheses; and they are not the class of problem which, in our estimation, had been referred to the Commission.' †

Lord Lansdowne's hearers would hardly gather that the twofold hypothesis was the work, not of the Royal Commission, but of the Cabinet Committee of Imperial Defence.

The terms of the reference to the Commission, the estimate given by the War Office of the force required, and the correspondence with the Committee of Imperial Defence, led the Commission to the following conclusions, which are the key to the Report:

An effective force-in other words, an army of the strength proposed to us, can be required only to meet an invasion. Either an invasion is possible or it is not. If not, no military force is required for home defence; and our enquiry could hardly serve any practical purpose. But, if invasion is possible, it can be undertaken only by one of the great European Powers which possess forces highly trained and ready to move in large numbers at the shortest notice. The Militia exist chiefly, and the Volunteers solely, for the purpose of resisting a possible invasion of the United Kingdom, which would be attempted only by a first-rate army. This purpose will not be fulfilled merely by a brave or creditable, but unsuccessful, resistance; it requires the defeat of the enemy. The standard of efficiency to be aimed at is therefore not a matter of opinion; the conditions of war

* Report, § 22.

+ Times, June 28, 1904.

and of the battlefield must be met, and no lower standard can be laid down.'

The Commissioners proceed, in section III of their Report, 'to measure by the standard of war conditions the Militia and Volunteer forces as they are.' As regards the Militia, the estimate is that the drill and training undergone by this force are insufficient to enable it at short notice to oppose trained troops in the field; that the average militia battalion would not be fit for fighting against a serious enemy until after several months' embodiment, though the militia garrison artillery would not require very much extra training to be ready for its war work. The Commissioners further find that the training of the militia officer is inadequate to enable him properly to lead troops. The Militia is imperfectly organised and equipped for war. Thus the Commission was 'forced to the conclusion that the Militia, in its existing condition, is unfit to take the field for the defence of this country.'

As regards the Volunteer force, the Commission observes that its training is hampered by difficulties as to both time and space; that the efficiency of the units varies greatly, and that, on the whole, neither the musketry nor the tactical training of the rank and file reaches the standard attained by the troops of a continental army. The organisation for war is imperfect. The Report dwells at some length on the qualifications of the officers of the Volunteer force :

"That which distinguishes an army from a number of armed men is the cohesion which enables it to act as a single organism. The men are given their places in a framework which is formed by the officers and non-commissioned officers; and this framework is the skeleton by which the whole is supported and made one.'

The volunteer officers receive less systematic training than the officers of any regular army, and are not, as a rule, so well trained as the officers of the Swiss Militia. The consequence is that

'they are of very unequal quality. Many of them have given themselves an excellent military education, and would be a valuable element in any army; the majority, however, have neither the theoretical knowledge nor the practical skill in