3. It is unquestionable, and has been sufficiently attested by the' nations, and even by some of the worst of them, that man has a conscience, that sometimes drags the greatest and most obstinate offenders to its tribunal, in their own breasts, accuses them, condemns them, and in some sort executes the sentence against them," for their counteracting known duty, how little soever they know. A Heathen poet could say,

-Prima est hæc ultio, quod se

Judice, nemo nocens absolvitur, improba quamvis
Gratia fallacis praioris vicerit urnam.*

4. We own that those laws of nature, which are of absolute ne cessity to the support of government and order in the world, and the maintenance of human society, are, in a good measure, knowable by the light of nature, and have been generally known.

5. We willingly admit that, what by tradition, and what by the improvement of nature's light, many of the wiser Heathens have come to know, and express many things excellently, as to the nature of God, man's duty, the corruption of nature, a future state, &c. and some of them have lived nearer up to the knowledge that they had than others: For which they are highly to be commanded, and I do not grudge them their praise.

6. I look on it as certain, that the light of nature, had it been duly improven, might have carried them in these things, and others of the like nature, further than ever any went.

But after all these things are granted, the question concerning the sufficiency of natural religion, remains untouched.

For clearing this, it is further to be observed, that, when we speak of the sufficiency of natural religion, or those notices of God, and the way of worshipping him, which are attainable by the mere light of nature, without revelation, we consider it as a mean in order to some end. For by sufficiency is meant, that aptitude of a mean for compassing some end, that infers a necessary connection betwixt the due use, that is, such an use of the mean, as the person to whom it is said to be sufficient, is capable to make of it, and the attain ment of the end.

Now natural religion, under this consideration, may be asserted sufficient or not, according as it is looked at with respect to one end, or another: For it is useful to several purposes, and has a respect to several.ends.

1. It may be considered with respect to human society, upon which religion has a considerable influence. "There could never

"This is the first part of the punishment, that every guilty person is con"demned by himself, although wicked interest should have overcome the integrity of his judge."

possibly be any government settled amongst Atheists, or those "who pay no respect to a Deity. Remove God once out of Hea66 ven, and there will never be any gods upon earth. If man's na "ture had not something of subjection in it to a Supreme Being "above him, and inherent principles obliging him how to behave "himself toward God, and toward the rest of the world, govern"ment could have never been introduced, nor thought of. Nor can there be the least mutual security between governors and "governed, where no God is admitted. For it is an acknowledging "of God, in his supreme judgment over the world, that is the "ground of an oath; and upon which the validity of all human en "gagements do depend," says an excellent person.* And the famed Cicero expresses himself very fully to the same purpose. Speaking of religion and piety, he says-Quibus sublatis, perturbatio vitae sequitur, & magna confusio, atque haud scio, an pietate adversus Deos sublata, fides etiam, & societas humani generis, & una excellentissima virtu, justitia tollatur.† If the question concerned this end, we might own natural religion some way sufficient to be a foundation for human society, and some order and govern ment in the world: For it is in fact evident, that where revelation has been wanting, there have been several well-formed governments. Though still it must be said, that they were obliged to tradition for many things that were of use, and to have recourse to pretended revelation, where the real was wanting. Which shews revelation necessary, if not to the being, yet to the well-being of society.

2. Natural religion may be considered in its subserviency to God's moral government of the world; and with respect to this, it has several considerable uses, that I cannot enter upon the detail of. It is the measure of God's judicial proceedings, with respect to those of mankind who want revelation; and as to this, there is one thing that is usually observed, that it is sufficient to justify God in punishing sinners. That God sometimes, even here in time, punishes offenders, and, by the forebodings of their consciences, gives them dreadful presages of a progress in his severity against them, after this life, cannot well be denied. Now certainly there must be some measure, whereby God proceeds in this maiter. Where there is no lan, there is no transgression. Punishments cannot be inflicted, but for the transgression, and according to the tenor of a law. And this law, if it is holy, just, and good in its precepts, and equal

See Ch. Wolseley's Unreas. of Atheism, page 152, &c.

De Natura Deorum, Lib. 1. mihi. page 5.-" Which being taken away, a great disorder and confusion in life must follow; and I know not whether, "after piety to the God's is taken away, truth and the social affections, and justice, the most excellent of the virtues, would not at the same time be taken away."

+ See Amyrald on Relig. Part 2. Cap. 8.

in its sanction, is not only the measure whereby the governor pro ceeds in punishing offenders; but that which justifies him in the punishment of them. It is needless to speak of the grant of rewards in this case; because with respect to them, not only justice but grace and bounty have place, which are not restricted to any such nice measures, in the dispensation of favours, as justice is in the execution of punishments. Now, if natural religion is considered with respect to this end, we say it is sufficient to justify God, and fully clear him from any imputation of injustice or cruelty, whatever punishments he may, either in time or after time, inflict upon mankind who want revelation. There are none of them come to age, who-1. Have not fallen short of knowing many duties, which they might have known. 2. Who have not omitted many duties, which they knew themselves obliged to. And 3. Who have not done what they knew they ought not to have done, and might have forborn. If these three are made out, as no doubt they may be against all men, I do not see what reason any will have to implead God either of hardship or injustice.

There are I know, who think it very hard, that those natural notices of God and religion should be sufficient to justify God in adjudging those, who counteract them, to future and eternal punishments, while yet such an attendance to, and compliance with them as men are capable of, in their present circumstances, is not sufficient to entitle us to eternal rewards.

But if, in this matter, any injustice is charged upon God, who shall manage the plea? Shall they who transgress and contravene those notices do it? But what injustice meet they with, if they are condemned for not knowing what they might have known? not doing what they were obliged to do, and were able to do? and for doing what they might and should have forborn? If all these may be laid to their charge, though there were no more, what have they to say for themselves, or against God? They surely have no reason to complain. If any have reason to complain, it must be they who have walked up to the natural notices of God. But where is there any such? We may spare our vindication till such an one be found. Nor is it easy to prove that man's obedience though perfect, must necessarily entitle to eternal felicity. And he who shall undertake to implead God of injustice upon the account of such a sentence, as that we now speak of, will not find it easy to make good his charge.

Were the difficulty thus moulded, that it is hard to pretend that those natural notices of God are sufficient to justify God in condemning the transgressors of them to future punishments, while punctual compliance with them is not sufficient to save those, who yield this obedience, from those punishments, which the contraveners are liable to for their transgression-though it were thus moulded, it would be a hard task to make good such a charge. But

I am not concerned in it; nor are any, who judge the persons, who have gone farthest in this compliance, liable upon other accounts; because they still own their compliance so far available to them, as to save them from those degrees of wrath, which deeper guilt would have inferred.

3. Other ends there are, with respect to which natural religion may be considered, which I shall pass without naming, and shall only make mention of that which we are concerned in, and is aimeď at in the present controversy, and that is, the future happiness of man in the enjoyment of God. This certainly is the supreme and ultimate end of religion with respect to man himself. For that the glory of God is the chief end absolutely, and must, in all respect, have the preference, I place beyond debate.

Now it is as to this end, that the question about the sufficiency of natural religion is principally moved. And the question, in short, amounts to this, whether the notices of God and religion, which all men by the light of nature have, or at least by the mere improvement of their natural abilities without revelation, may have, are sufficient to direct them in the way to eternal blessedness, satisfy them that such a state is attainable, and point out the way how it is to be attained; and whether by that practical compliance with. those notices, which man in his present state is capable of, he may certainly attain to acceptance with God, please him, and obtain this eternal happiness in the enjoyment of him? The Deists are for the affirmative, as we shall afterwards make appear, when we consider their opinions more particularly.

But before we proceed to offer arguments, it will be needful to branch this question into several particulars that are included in it, that we may the better conceive of, and take up the import of it, and how much is included and wrapt up in this assertion. The question which we have proposed in general, may be turned into these five subordinate queries:

1. Whether, by the mere light of nature, we can discover an eternal state of happiness, and know that this is attainable? Unless this is done, nothing in matters of religion is done. It is impossible that nature's light can give any directions as to the means of attaining future happiness, if it cannot satisfy us that there is such

a state.

2. Whether men, left to the conduct of the mere light of nature, can certainly discover and find out the way of attaining it? that is, whether, by the light of nature, we can know and find out all that is required of us, in the way of duty, in order to our eternal felicity? If the affirmative is chosen, it must be made appear by nature's light, what duties are absolutely necessary to this purpose; that those which are prescribed are indeed duties; and that they are all that are necessary in order to the attainment of the end, if they are

complied withal. Although we should have it never so clearly made out, that there is a future state of happiness, yet if we are left at an utter loss as to the means of attaining it, we are no better for the discovery.

3. Whether nature's light gives such a full and certain discovery of both these as the case seems to require? Considering what a case man at present is in, to hope for an eternity of happiness, is to look very high: And any man, who in his present circumstances, shall entertain such an expectation, on mere surmises, suspicions and may-bees, may be reproached by the world, and his own heart, as a fool. To keep a man up in the steady impression, and expectation of so great things, conjectures, suppositions, probabilities, and confused general hints, are not sufficient. Again, there are huge difficulties to be surmounted in the way to this blessedness, which are obvious and certain. Sensible losses are sometimes to be sustained, sensible pains to be undergone, and sensible dangers to be looked in the face. Now the question is, whether is there such a clear and certain knowledge of these attainable, as the importance of the case, the stress that is to be laid on them, requires? Certain it is, it will not be such notices as most please themselves with, that will be able to answer this end.

4. Whether the evidence of the attainableness of a future state of happiness, and of the way to it, is such as suits the capacities of all concerned? Every man has a concernment in this matter. The Deists inquire after a religion that is able to save all, whereof every man, if he but please, may have the eternal advantage. Now then the question is, whether the case is so stated, as that every man, who is in earnest, if he has but the use of reason, however shallow his capacity is, how great soever his inevitable entanglements and hinderances from close application are, may attain to this certainty about this end, and the way to it? For it must be allowed that there is a vast difference among men as to capacity. Men are no more of one measure in point of the reach of one, which another may easily attain to. Now, may as much be certainly known by the meanest capacity as is necessary for him to know? Again, all men have not alike leisure. That may be impossible to me, if I am a poor man, obliged to work hard to earn my own and family's bread, which would not be so if I had leisure and opportu nity to follow my studies. Now, if these discoveries, both as to their truth, certainty and suitableness, are not such as the meanest, notwithstanding any inevitable hinderances he may be under, may reach, they will not answer the end.

5. Whether, supposing all the former, every man, however surrounded with temptations, and inveigled with corrupt inclinations, or other hinderances, which he cannot evite, is yet able, without any supply of supernatural strength, to comply so far with all those