wise submitted himself to that jurisdiction. He was under no obligation to do so, by reason of the notice of the suits which he thus received or otherwise, unless that court had lawful jurisdiction over him.

Under these circumstances there was, in their lordships' opinion, nothing to take this case out of the general rule, that the plaintiff must sue in the court to which the defendant is subject at the time of suit (actor sequitur forum rei), which is rightly stated by Sir Robert Phillimore (International Law, vol. iv., s. 891) to "lie at the root of all international, and of most domestic, jurisprudence on this matter." All jurisdiction is properly territorial, and extra territorium jus dicenti, impune non paretur. Territorial jurisdiction attaches (with special exceptions) upon all persons either permanently or temporarily resident within the territory while they are within it; but it does not follow them after they have withdrawn from it, and when they are living in another independent country. It exists always as to land within the territory, and it may be exercised over movables within the territory; and, in questions of status or succession governed by domicile, it may exist as to persons domiciled, or who when living were domiciled, within the territory. As between different provinces under one sovereignty (e. g., under the Roman Empire) the legislation of the sovereign may distribute and regulate jurisdiction; but no territorial legislation can give jurisdiction which any foreign court ought to recognize against foreigners, who owe no allegiance or obedience to the power which so legislates.

In a personal action, to which none of these causes of jurisdiction apply, a decree pronounced in absentem by a foreign court, to the jurisdiction of which the defendant has not in any way submitted himself, is by international law an absolute nullity. He is under no obligation of any kind to obey it; and it must be regarded as a mere nullity by the courts of every nation except (when authorized by special local legislation) in the country of the forum by which it was pronounced.

These are doctrines laid down by all the leading authorities on international law; among others, by Story (Conflict of Laws, 2d ed., sects. de 6, 549, 553, 554, 556, 586), and by Chancellor Kent (Commentaries, dell. i., p. 284, note c, 10th ed.), and no exception is made to them, in favor of the exercise of jurisdiction against a defendant not otherwise subject to it, by the courts of the country in which the cause of action arose, or (in cases of contract) by the courts of the locus solutionis. In those cases, as well as all others, when the action is personal, the courts of the country in which a defendant resides have power, and they ought to be resorted to, to do justice.

The conclusion of the learned judges in the chief court of the Punjaub is expressed in the following sentence of the judgment delivered 'by Sir Meredyth Plowden in the first of the two actions :

"On the whole, I think it may be said, that a State assuming to exercise jurisdiction over an absent foreigner, in respect of an obligation arising out of a contract made by the foreigner while resident in the

state and to be fulfilled there, is not acting in contravention of the general practice or the principles of international law, so that its judg ment should not be binding merely on the ground of the absence of the defendant."

If this doctrine were accepted, its operation, in the enlargement of territorial jurisdiction, would be very important. No authority, of any relevancy, was cited at their lordships' bar to support it, except Becquet v. Macarthy, 2 B. & Ad. 951, and a passage from the judgment delivered by Blackburn, J., in Schibsby v. Westenholz.

Of Becquet v. Macarthy, it was said by great authority in Don v. Lippman, 5 Cl. & F. 1, that it "had been supposed to go to the verge of the law;" and it was explained (as their lordships think, correctly) on the ground that "the defendant held a public office in the very colony in which he was originally sued." He still held that office at the time when he was sued; the cause of action arose out of, or was connected with it; and, though he was in fact temporarily absent, he might, as the holder of such an office, be regarded as constructively present in the place where his duties required his presence, and therefore amenable to the colonial jurisdiction. If the case could not be distinguished on that ground from that of any absent foreigner who, at some previous time, might have been in the employment of a colonial government, it would, in their lordships' opinion, have been wrongly decided; and it is evident that Fry, L. J., in Rousillon v. Rousillon, 14 Ch. D. 351, took that view.

The words of Blackburn, J.'s, judgment, in Schibsby v. Westenholz, which were relied upon, are these:

"If, at the time when the obligation was contracted, the defendants were within the foreign country, but left it before the suit was instituted, we should be inclined to think the laws of that country bound them; though, before finally deciding this, we should like to hear the question argued."

Upon this sentence it is to be observed, that beyond doubt in such a case the laws of the country in which an obligation was contracted might bind the parties, so far as the interpretation and effect of thr. obligation was concerned, in whatever forum the remedy might im sought. The learned judge had not to consider whether it was a legitimate consequence from this, that they would be bound to submit, on the footing of contract or otherwise, to any assumption of jurisdiction over them in respect of such a contract, by the tribunals of the country in which the contract was made, at any subsequent time, although they might be foreigners resident abroad. That question was not argued, and did not arise, in the case then before the court; and, if this was what Blackburn, J., meant, their lordships could not regard any mere inclination of opinion, on a question of such large and general importance, on which the judges themselves would have desired to hear argument if it had required decision, as entitled to the same weight which might be due to a considered judgment of the same authority. Upon

the question itself, which was determined in Schibsby v. Westenholz, Blackburn, J., had at the trial formed a different opinion from that at which he ultimately arrived; and their lordships do not doubt that, if he had heard argument upon the question, whether an obligation to accept the forum loci contractus, as having, by reason of the contract, a conventional jurisdiction against the parties in a suit founded upon that contract for all future time, wherever they might be domiciled or resident, was generally to be implied, he would have come (as their lordships do) to the conclusion, that such obligation, unless expressed, could not be implied.

Their lordships will therefore humbly advise Her Majesty to reverse the decrees of the chief court of the Punjaub, and to restore those of the additional commissioner of Lahore. The respondent will pay the costs of the appeals to the courts below and of these appeals.

HENDERSON v. STANIFORD.

SUPREME JUDICIAL COURT OF MASSACHUSETTS. 1870.

[Reported 105 Massachusetts, 504.]

CONTRACT on a promissory note dated October 20, 1864, made by the defendant payable in one month to the order of the plaintiff, who was described in the writ (which was dated January 20, 1869), as of Crescent City in the county of Del Norte and State of California. The answer put the plaintiff to his proof concerning the making of the note, and set up "that if the plaintiff shall show that the defendant made the note, then the defendant answers that there is a judgment upon said note in the county of Del Norte and State of California, against the defendant and in favor of the plaintiff, and the same has never been reversed, reviewed, or annulled, but is still in force against the defendant in said State, where said contract was made, and where said defendant for a long time, to wit, from the year 1849 until some time in the year 1867, had his residence, that he came to the State of Massachusetts some time in the year 1867, but with the intention in a short time of returning to the State of California.”

The parties stated the case, referring to the pleadings, admitting the making of the note by the defendant, and continuing as follows: "In the year 1849 the defendant went from Massachusetts to California, and voted and was taxed there until he returned to Massachusetts in the year 1867. When he came to Massachusetts it was his intention to return to California, but in consequence of domestic affliction he has remained here. While in California he had his residence in the township of Crescent, otherwise known as Crescent City. In June, 1868, the plaintiff commenced an action before a justice's court, against

this defendant, in Crescent township and county of Del Norte, where said defendant had resided, upon the note in this suit, notice of the pendency of said action being duly given by publication; and the same was prosecuted to final judgment upon default, the defendant not appearing personally or by counsel. Said judgment has never been arrested, reversed, reviewed, or annulled, but is now a valid and unsatisfied judgment in full force in the State of California. Upon the above facts it is agreed that the court may render such judgment as is warranted by the pleadings." The superior court gave judgment for the defendant, and the plaintiff appealed.

WELLS, J. The defendant was not in California when the action was commenced against him there; nor at any time during its pendency. No service of process or notice was ever made upon him personally. He did not appear by counsel, or otherwise, nor assent to the judgment, which was rendered upon his default of appearance. But he had been, for a long time before that, a citizen of California; the contract was made there; and that continued to be his legal domicile when the judgment was rendered. He was, therefore, upon principles of international right, subject to the laws, and to the jurisdiction of the courts of that State. Story Confl. Laws, §§ 546, 548; Hall v. Williams, 6 Pick. 232, 240; Gillespie v. Commercial Insurance Co., 12 Gray, 201. In Massachusetts, jurisdiction is assumed to be exercised in suits against parties who have been inhabitants of the State, although not so at the time of action brought. Gen. Sts. c. 126, § 1; Morrison v. Underwood, 5 Cush. 52; Orcutt v. Ranney, 10 Cush. 183. We must presume that the exercise of jurisdiction, in the suit in question, was in accordance with the laws of California. The agreed facts state that the judgment" is now a valid and unsatisfied judgment, in full force in the State of California." 1

DARRAH v. WATSON.

SUPREME COURT OF IOWA. 1873.

[Reported 36 Iowa, 116.]

MILLER, J. The judgment record, on which this action is brought, shows that the action was commenced in the county court of Monongalia County, Virginia (now West Virginia), by the issuance of a summons, returnable on the first Monday of June, 1859. The sheriff's return on the summons shows a a personal service thereof on the 6th day of June, 1859. . .

1 The remainder of the opinion, in which the effect of the judgment is discussed, is here omitted.

Acc. Hunt v. Hunt, 72 N. Y. 217; Frothingham v. Barnes, 9 R. I. 474 (semble).— ED.

2 Part of the opinion is omitted. — ED.

On the trial the defendant Watson was sworn as a witness, and testified that during the year 1859, he resided in Greene County, Pennsylvania, and had so resided there for about three or four years prior to June, 1859, and never afterward resided in the State of Virginia; that during the month of June, 1859, he went from his residence in Pennsylvania into Monongalia County, Virginia, temporarily and on business; was there only two or three hours and returned again to Greene County, Pennsylvania, which latter county adjoins Monongalia County, Virginia; that while thus in the latter county he was served with some kind of paper or process, which was the only paper or process ever served on him in said county; that he paid no attention to the matter, never appeared in the action, made no defence and authorized no one to appear for him. Whereupon defendant's counsel asked the court to instruct the jury in substance, that if they found that the defendant, at the time of the rendition of the judgment in Virginia, was not a resident of or domiciled in said State, but was a resident of and domiciled in the State of Pennsylvania; that defendant, when the summons or original process was served upon him, was in the State of Virginia only for a few hours temporarily and on business; that defendant never afterward resided in said State; that defendant did not appear to the action or authorize any one to appear for him, then the county court of Monongalia County, Virginia, did not, by virtue of such service or by any proceedings in said action, acquire jurisdiction of the person of defendant to render a personal judgment as would be binding against him in this State.

This instruction was refused, and this ruling is assigned as error. We have before said that the insufficiency of the service of the summons would not have the effect to render the judgment void as for want of jurisdiction. But it is insisted by appellant's counsel that "even admitting that the summons had been served in time and personally on defendant in Virginia," the court did not acquire jurisdiction of the defendant who was a resident of another State, and never afterward was a resident of Virginia, but was merely temporarily therein when he was served with original process in the action. The position assumed by counsel is, that the courts of Virginia could not acquire jurisdiction of the person of a citizen and resident of Pennsylvania by the service of original process upon him while temporarily in the former State on business.

The doctrine is well settled that no State can by its judgments rendered in its courts bind personally a defendant who is not within its jurisdiction, and on whom no notice has been served. Melhop & Kingman v. Doane & Co., 31 Iowa, 397, and cases cited. And that to entitle a judgment rendered in one State to the full faith and credit mentioned in the Constitution and laws of the United States the court must have had jurisdiction not only of the subject-matter, but of the person of the defendant. Ibid. But is it true that the courts of one State cannot acquire jurisdiction of the person of a citizen and resi