visitor's duties are confined to the enforcement of the private laws of the corporation. When the laws of the land are disobeyed, the courts will take cognizance of the matter. A mandamus was issued to the officers of a college to compel them to remove fellows thereof who had failed to take a certain oath, as required by the law of the land.' § 176. Mandamus issues in ecclesiastical matters only when property rights are affected.― Applications have often been made to the courts for writs of mandamus relative to the acts of ecclesiastical tribunals. Since in America there is no connection between church and state, the courts have no direct control over them as official bodies or as officers, so the writ of mandamus will not run to them. But their actions may come in question where private corporations have subjected themselves by their charters to the decisions of certain ecclesiastical tribunals, and the writ of mandamus is sought to compel such private corporation to take action contrary to the decisions of such tribunals. Since such corporations are by their charters subject to such ecclesiastical tribunals, it is the duty of their officers to obey the decrees emanating therefrom. When members of such corporations ask for a writ of mandamus to prevent the enforcement of such decrees, the courts inquire first whether any rights of property of the relator are involved. The courts will not interfere unless the relator's rights of property will be affected by such action. Though the relator's rights of property are involved in the proposed action, yet the judgment of the ecclesiastical tribunal is conclusive as to purely ecclesiastical offenses, if it had jurisdiction in the premises under the laws of the church organization which created it. The courts will not review the decisions of 1 R. v. St. John's College, 4 Mod. Walker v. Wainwright, 16 Barb. 233. 486; Connitt v. Reformed, etc. Church, 54 N. Y. 551; State v. Hebrew Congreg., 31 La. An. 205; German Reformed Church v. Com., 3 Pa. St. 282. 2 Livingston v. Trinity Church (Rector), 45 N. J. L. 230; Bouldin v. Alexander, 15 Wall. 131; Sale v. Baptist Church, 62 Iowa, 26. 3 Chase v. Cheney, 58 IL 509; ecclesiastical tribunals, nor inquire whether such decisions were justified by the truth of the case. Such church tribunals are the best judges of what constitutes an offense against the word of God and against the discipline of the church. Their decisions are also conclusive on doubtful and technical questions, involving a criticism of the canons, even though they may comprise jurisdictional facts. The regularity of their proceedings will not be inquired into by the courts, since every competent tribunal must of necessity regulate its own formulas, and the decree will be accepted as conclusive proof of the matters therein contained." The converse of these propositions is, that when property rights are involved and the church did not have jurisdiction under the rules of the church in the matter, the courts will issue the writ of mandamus in proper cases to prevent the enforcement of such decrees, provided the cases are such as fall within the principles under which such writs are issued. § 177. Mandamus to a foreign corporation. Whether a writ of mandamus will run against a foreign corporation seems to be a questionable proposition. Under the common law the officers of a foreign corporation did not represent the corporation and were not recognized as such." The attorneys or agents of such corporations, however, are recognized as such. Where the state statute was broader than the common law, and authorized the use of the writ of mandamus to restore a person to the use and enjoyment 1 State v. Farris, 45 Mo. 183; Grosvenor v. United Society, 118 Mass. 78; Walker v. Wainwright, 16 Barb. 486; Harmon v. Dreher, 1 Speer's Eq. Cas. 87; State v. Hebrew Congreg., 31 La. An. 205; Connitt v. Reformed, etc. Church, 54 N. Y. 551. 4 Harmon v. Dreher, 1 Speer's Eq. Cas. 87. 5 Bouldin v. Alexander, 15 Wall. 131; Shannon v. Frost, 3 B. Mon. 253. 6 McQueen v. Middleton M. Co., 16 John. 5; State v. Penn. R. R., 42 N. J. L. 490; State v. McCullough, 2 German R. Church v. Com., 3 3 Nev. 202. Pa. St. 282. 3 Chase v. Cheney, 58 Ill. 509. 7 State v. McCullough, 3 Nev. 202; McQueen v. Middletown M. Co., 16 John. 5. of a right from which he was unlawfully precluded by another person, such writ was issued to enable the agent of a foreign corporation to represent it instead of another person who claimed to be the proper representative.1 But it has been decided that the rule of the common law is obsolete, and the writ of mandamus was issued against a foreign corporation doing business in the state, and was served on its officers within the state.2 1 State v. McCullough, 3 Nev. 202. 2 State v. Penn. R. R., 42 N. J. L. 490. ་ § 178. CHAPTER 13. MANDAMUS TO CANVASSERS OF ELECTIONS. The duties of canvassing boards are ministerial. 179. When the canvassing board may reject, and when they must count, votes. 180. Will any evidence be received except the returns when a mandamus is asked for against the canvassers of an election? 181. A mandamus will issue to compel the proper officer to declare the result of the election. 182. Mandamus will issue to the canvassing board though they have already given another the certificate. 183. The peremptory writ will specifically direct the canvassing board what to do. 184. Mandamus will not lie when another remedy or the board had discretion or the writ was illegal. 185. By mandamus the canvassing board may be required to reconvene and do their duty, though they have adjourned sine die. § 178. The duties of canvassing officers are ministerial. The writ of mandamus has often been used to compel the performance of their duties by those officers who have had charge of elections and of the declaration of the results thereof. Such duties are very important and are vitally connected with the well-being of a republic, wherein the whole governmental forces are controlled by the results of elections. The law has wisely left but little to the discretion of such officers, and has thereby subjected them to the supervision and control of the courts. It may be stated, as an almost invariable rule, that the duties of judges of elections and of canvassing boards are purely ministerial, and that the writ of mandamus lies to compel the proper performance thereof. Where the system of registering 1 Wiliford v. State, 43 Ark. 62; Dalton v. State, 43 Ohio St. 652; Calaveras (Co.) v. Brockway, 30 Cal. 325; Jayne v. Drorbaugh, 63 Iowa, 711; State v. Williams, 95 Mo. 159; Mackey, Ex parte, 15 S. C. 322; not be ascertained with sufficient clearness. In fact it is asserted, that the return must be an absolute nullity, a thing void of all substance, with nothing in it, to allow the canvassers to reject it; that, since such action will disfranchise the voters of a precinct, the courts will, as far as it may be without violence to the clear legislative intent, so construe election laws as to avert the disfranchisement of the legal electors of a precinct through the ignorance, neglect or fraud of election officers. So if the returns upon their face are sufficiently authentic to show that they are genuine,3 or when they are known to be the proper returns, the canvassers cannot pass on their sufficiency, and they must be counted. The latter decisions are more in harmony with the necessities of the case. These duties are performed by men unlearned in the law, and during the hurry of an election; and though a certain amount of discretion is allowed to such officers," yet such duties are considered to be ministerial and are reviewable by the writ of mandamus, and the least discretion possible should be allowed to such officers, and the true intent of the voters should be sustained so far as practicable. Such returns are not to be invalidated because they include more than the law requires." The additional statements must be rejected as surplusage.' They can never be used to contradict the return itself." When it was sought to compel the secretary of state to return certain resolutions and papers, sent to him with the election returns, and to cause him to abstain and refrain from allowing such papers to be brought before the state board of canvassers, the writ was refused, because, such 1 State v. Bailey, 7 Iowa, 390; Hudmon v. Slaughter, 70 Ala. 546; State v. State Canvassers (Board), 17 Fla. 29. 2 Dalton v. State, 43 Ohio St. 652. 3 State v. Peacock, 15 Neb. 442. 'State v. Marshall Co. (Judge), 7 Iowa, 186. Drew v. McLin, 16 Fla. 17; State v. 6 State v. Berg, 76 Mo. 136. 7 Heath, Ex parte. 3 Hill, 42; State v. Berg, 76 Mo. 136; Dalton v. State, 43 Ohio St. 652. 8 State v. State Canvassers, 36 Wis. 5 State v. Foster, 38 Ohio St. 599; 498. |