3 jurisdiction on it; consequently that court cannot ordinarily issue an original writ of mandamus. Such writs when issued must be in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. Where a circuit court dismisses an appeal from the district court, erroneously supposing it has no jurisdiction, a mandamus will go to the circuit court to hear and decide the case, provided the amount involved will permit an appeal to the supreme court, for every suitor has a right in a proper case to the judgment of the supreme court. If, however, the suit can in no case be taken to the supreme court, because the amount involved is not sufficient for its appellate jurisdiction, that court will issue no mandamus relative to it, since it will not be in aid of its appellate jurisdiction; nor will it issue the writ in other cases, when it is not necessary for the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction. A mandamus was asked from the federal supreme court to compel a state supreme court to revoke its order disbarring an attorney. It was held that that court could only issue that writ, except in a few cases where it had by the constitution original jurisdiction, as an exercise of its appellate jurisdiction or in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. In the case specified the writ could not be an exercise of appellate jurisdiction, because the act of 1789, and also section 688, Revised Statutes, only authorized the court to issue the writ to courts appointed by, or to persons holding office under the authority of, the United States; nor could such issue be claimed to be in aid of any appellate jurisdiction. The application for the writ was denied." This court has, however, decided that it can issue a mandamus to an inferior federal court to restore to practice an attorney who has been improperly suspended or disbarred. In this case, where 1 Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch, 137; United States v. Black, 128 U. S. 40; Riggs v. Johnson Co., 6 Wall. 166. 2 Insurance Co. v. Comstock, 16 Wall. 258; Bradstreet, Ex parte, 7 Pet. 634. 3 Burdett, In re, 127 U. S. 771; Newman, Ex parte, 81 U. S. 152. 4 Hoyt, Ex parte, 13 Pet. 279. 5 Green, In re, 141 U. S. 325; 12 Sup. Ct. R. 114. 6 Bradley, Ex parte, 7 Wall. 364. 3 this matter was fully considered the court decided that an order disbarring an attorney is not reviewable by a writ of error, it not being a judgment in the sense of the law for which that writ will lie. Yet the court granted the writ, relying on certain former decisions. Those decisions relate to signing a bill of exceptions,' and reinstating and trying causes improperly dismissed for supposed lack of jurisdiction; to signing the record of a judgment rendered in a case by the preceding judge; to allowing an appeal and compelling the production of the transcript, and to enforce a decree against which a supersedeas had been erroneously allowed, pending an appeal on a bond, which was not sufficient in amount to authorize a supersedeas. In those cases it might be held that the writ could properly issue in aid of the appellate jurisdiction of the court, but in a disbarment proceeding there is no question of appellate jurisdiction, and the court expressly says that in such cases no writ of error will lie. Though the issue of the writ in a disbarment proceeding called forth a dissenting opinion, yet the necessity for the writ in such cases will probably cause the ruling to be sustained in the future, though it be illogical. The new circuit courts of appeal, lately created by act of congress, can have no greater authority to issue the writ of mandamus than the supreme court of the United States, since they are merely authorized to assume the jurisdiction of the latter court in certain cases, thereby relieving the latter court of much of the overwhelming business pressing on it. § 217. Issue of writs of mandamus by subordinate federal courts. The jurisdiction of the United States courts, 1 Crane, Ex parte, 5 Pet. 190.. 2 Bradstreet, Ex parte, 7 Pet. 634. Life, etc. Co. v. Wilson, 8 Pet. 291. tion are: Burr, Ex parte, 9 Wheat. 529; Secombe, Ex parte, 19 How. 9. Another court which could only issue the writ of mandamus in aid 4 United States v. Gomez, 3 Wall. of its appellate jurisdiction decided 752. that it had no power to issue a writ 5 Stafford v. Union Bank, 17 How. of mandamus to restore an attor275. ney who had been disbarred. The earlier decisions on this ques- Walls v. Palmer, 64 Ind. 493. except the supreme court within the limits fixed by the constitution of the United States, is determined by act of congress. The federal circuit courts in the various states are not authorized to issue a mandamus in original proceedings. Congress has not yet granted them that authority, though it has the power to do so. They can issue writs of man- ! damus only in aid of a jurisdiction already acquired. On account of the absence of the power to issue an original writ of mandamus, and as not involving a jurisdiction already acquired, applications therefor to the federal circuit courts have been refused: to compel the register of a federal land-office to issue a certificate of the purchase of certain land; to compel a district court to vacate a rule allowing certain amendments to the record; to order state taxing officers to levy a tax to pay certain bonds;3 to compel the auditor of a state to issue a certificate in order to recover certain taxes improperly paid; and to compel a postmaster to receive and transmit through the mails a certain publication as second and not third class matter, though the circuit court is given express jurisdiction of all cases arising under the postal laws. The circuit court can issue the writ of mandamus to district courts only when necessary for the exercise of their own jurisdiction, as to compel the rendition of a judgment or decree. The only court excepted from this limited jurisdiction is the circuit court of the District of Columbia, which is now the supreme court of the District of Columbia; also by act of March 3, 1 Kendall v. United States, 12 Pet. 524; Riggs v. Johnson Co., 6 Wall 166; American, etc. Co. v. Bell, etc. Co., 1 McCrary, 175; McIntire v. Wood, 7 Cranch, 504. 2 Rosenbaum v. Bauer, 120 U. S. 450; Davenport v. Dodge (County), 105 U.S. 237; Labette Co. Com'rs v. United States, 112 U. S. 217. 3 McIntire v. Wood, 7 Cranch, 504. 6 U. S. 187; Davenport v. Dodge (County), 105 U. S. 237; Bath Co. v. Amy, 13 Wall. 244. 6 Graham v. Norton, 15 Wall. 427. 7 United States v. Pearson, 32 Fed. Rep. 309. Smith v. Jackson, 1 Paine, 453. 9 United States v. Kendall, 12 Pet. 524; Riggs v. Johnson Co., 6 Wall. 166; Weber v. Lee Co., 6 Wall. 210; United States v. Black, 128 U. S. 40. 1873, the federal circuit courts are given jurisdiction by mandamus to compel the Union Pacific Railroad Company to operate its road as required by law.1 § 218. Mandamus by federal courts to levy a tax to pay their judgments. When a judgment has been obtained in a federal circuit court against a municipality, a mandamus may be issued by such court to compel the municipal authorities to levy and collect a tax to pay such judgment. The issue of a mandamus in such case is simply a mode of executing the judgment, and not an original proceeding. It is a proceeding ancillary to the judgment, and a substi tute for the ordinary process of execution, which is generally not allowed to run against municipal corporations.3 But since the writ of mandamus creates no new rights or duties, the municipal officers can only be required to perform such duties as the state laws impose on them. If they return that they have already levied all the tax the law allows them to do, such return is a sufficient answer to the writ. Any limitation on the power of the municipal officers to levy a tax should be urged in the suit on the bonds before a judgment thereon is obtained, and not in the proceedings to compel the levy of a tax to pay the judgment. Where, however, the relator must go behind his judgment to show the remedy pertaining to the bonds relative to the power to tax for their payment, the court cannot decline to take cognizance of the fact that the bonds are utterly void, and that no such remedy exists for their payment." The 1 United States v. Union Pacific R. R., 2 Dill. 527. 2 Memphis (Merchants) v. Memphis (City), 9 Baxt. 76; Greene (County) v. Daniel, 102 U. S. 187; Davenport v. Dodge (County), 105 U. S. 237. 3 Riggs v. Johnson County, 6 Wall. 166; Weber v. Lee County, 6 Wall. 210; Walkley v. Muscatine (City), 6 Wall. 481; United States v. Oswego (Town), 28 Fed. Rep. 55. The mandamus is not required to be against the municipality, but it may issue against the officers whose duty it is to levy the tax. Labette County (Com'rs) v. United States, 112 U. S. 217. See § 237. 4 Graham v. Parham, 32 Ark. 676. 5 Supervisors v. United States, 18 Wall. 71. 6 United States v. New Orleans, 98 U. S. 381. 7 Brownsville v. Loague, 129 U. S. 493. court must use the agencies established by law for the imposition and collection of such taxes, and therefore cannot appoint its marshal to do so, unless the law authorizes such action. Jurisdiction of a court is not exhausted by the obtaining of a judgment, but continues till the judgment is satisfied, while the federal courts are supreme in their sphere; consequently any attempts in the state courts to prevent the collection of a tax ordered by a federal court to pay a judgment obtained therein, as by enjoining the officers from levying the tax,2 or by reversing on certiorari the order of the proper authority levying the tax,3 will be disregarded, and the proper officers will be compelled to levy and collect the tax. 1 Rees v. Watertown (City), 19 Wall. 107; Barkley v. Levee Commissioners, 93 U. S. 258. These decisions overrule Welch v. St. Genevieve, 1 Dill. 130, and Lansing v. City Treasurer, 1 Dill. 523. 2 United States v. Lee County (Sup'rs), 2 Biss. 77; Mayor v. Lord, 9 Wall. 409; Riggs v. Johnson Co., 6 Wall. 166; Weber v. Lee Co., 6 Wall. 210. 3 United States v. Silverman, 4 Dill. 224. |