ftream of the mighty river, which diffuses plenty and prosperity over empires.

it

There is yet one topic remaining, connected with the subject recently confidered, on which may be advisable to make a few remarks; and as they will relate to most of those who occupy the upper and middle claffes of fociety, they may properly be introduced in this place. The point to which I allude is the degree of attention, which perfons not immediately engaged in the adminiftration of public affairs ought to pay to the conduct of Government. There are two extremes into which it is not very uncommon for men of this description to deviate. Some from a reftlefs curiofity, fome from a meddling spirit of interference, or from a defire to raise themselves into importance in the eye of their neighbours, take a busy and eager part in every public measure, frequently the most busy and eager part in those measures with the drift of which they are least acquainted; and are never fatisfied except when they are engaged in the heat of political difcuffions, in contriving popular meetings, and in the fabrication of refolutions, petitions, addreffes,

and

and remonftrances, By continually displaying their ignorance in open view, by obtruding on their fellow-citizens their crude and impracticable schemes, they preclude themselves from attaining real political weight. Their cenfure and approbation, alike ill-timed or misplaced, generally defeats its own object; their private affairs in the mean time are neglected, and go to ruin; and while they reprefent themselves as gloriously facrificing every thing to the public good, they experience the ridicule, contempt, and diflike, which fall to the lot of vifionary and troublesome projectors. Nor is this the worst effect of their abfurdity. They bring a general odium and difcredit on all popular enquiry into the conduct of the Legislature, on the most falutary fpecies of control which a people can exercise over its deputed rulers $ and thus contribute to rivet others in an error, oppofite indeed to their own, but equally prejudicial to the welfare of fociety. For they who from indolence, from apathy, or from a distaste to political investigations, profeffedly decline all exercise of infpection and fuperintendence over the conduct of thofe to whom the management of national affairs is committed, ufually vindicate

vindicate themselves by deriding the blunders and extravagancies of felf-conftituted politi cians. But they are not fufficiently aware of the natural confequences of the fupineness which they recommend. No circumftance fo effectually deters the Government of any country from involving itself in unjust or pernicious enterprises at home or abroad; ne circumstance so powerfully ftimulates it, when engaged in them, to measure back with speed the steps which it had taken; as the conscioufness that the vigilant eye of the people is fixed on all its proceedings. He is the fincere and the wisest friend of his country, who, aware of the fallibility of the most experienced Administration, and of the almost irresistible temptations which are attached to the poffeffion of authority, regards with ftedfast though unoftentatious attention the conduct of thofe who manage the affairs of Government; who gives them every degree of reasonable confidence, makes candid allowances for their unintentional defects, and forbears to weary and embarrass them by interference on trivial occafions; but who is at all times ready on a crifis of importance, whether it be for the purpose of fur

thering.

thering equitable and beneficial undertakings, or of counteracting measures which are iniquitous and impolitic, to give a temperate yet a manly and decided teftimony of his opinions, by communications to his Representatives, by petitions to Parliament, by addreffes, and, if circumftances require, by remonftrances to the Throne.

CHAP.

CHAP. V.

ON THE DUTIES OF PEERS.

OUR enquiry into the peculiar duties of

those claffes of fociety, which fall within the limits of the plan propofed, leads us in the first instance to an order of men elevated above their fellow-fubjects by the honours and privileges of Peerage.

It may be proper

in the outset to premise a few brief observations, respecting the conftitutional purposes which a House of Lords is intended to answer.

At one time we have heard fober argument alleged, to fhew the impolicy of investing a body of men with fuch extensive powers on grounds independent of personal merit; and at another, ridicule has been employed in conftructing comparisons between hereditary legiflators and hereditary poet-laureats. It is not however difficult to state several very important ends, which this part of the Constitution is cal

culated