culated to accomplish; conducive at once to the ftability of the remaining parts, and to the prefervation of popular liberty.

1. In confequence of the neceffity to which every Bill paffed by the Houfe of Commons is fubjected of being reconfidered in all its parts in the Upper House, and undergoing the delays occafioned by various forms and standing orders, by means of which the number and intervals of difcuffions may be protracted almoft to whatever length the fituation of affairs renders advifable, and are ufually protracted to a confiderable length, except in cafes of great and real urgency; the intrinfic merit of any propofed measure becomes much more likely to be ascertained. It is not merely that a longer period for deliberation is afforded; that time is allowed for ferments to fubfide; that further opportunities are given for perfons interested in the fate of the Bill to produce evidence in fupport of their respective opinions; and that both its friends and its enemies without doors are enabled to come forward afresh with particular advantage, by having mutually learnt during its paffage through the

Lower

Lower House the ftrongeft arguments offered in its behalf, and the moft powerful objections urged against it: but in addition to circumstances so favourable to a juft and wife deter mination, the tribunal which tries the caufe is altogether new; the members who form it, collectively confidered, are refpected for their talents, knowledge, and integrity; and, though exposed by their ftation to prejudices of their own, are likely to be exempted from many by which the decisions of the House of Commons may have been influenced. The latter peculiarity will more especially incline them to confider with the moft fcrupulous attention, and except in great emergences will induce them to reject, Bills which they conceive to have originated in the fudden heat of popular phrenand to ftem the torrent of democratic power, if it should pass its established bounds.

fy;

When a Bill originates in the House of Lords, advantages in most respects fimilar to those which have now been enumerated refult from its being obliged afterwards to go through the Houfe of Commons.

2. The House of Lords is interpofed as a bulwark between the Crown and the People } and eventually defends the conftitutional rights of both by withstanding the encroachments of either. To this useful line of refiftance its members are led by principles inherent in the very nature of Peerage, and therefore promifing to be permanent. Their attachment to the Crown as the fource of the honours which they poffefs, and of the further elevation to which they may afpire; and the dread of changes, which may detract from their preeminence, but can rarely be expected to increase it, have an obvious tendency to engage them in the defence of the royal prerogatives. These principles however, when confidered in a moral point of view, are not the pureft; and must be expected fometimes to operate with too ftrong a bias. Yet this bias will be materially checked in the minds of Peers by the consciousness, that if once the Crown were to extend its authority by trampling on the rights of the Commons, they might themselves be preferved in fplendid trappings to gild the pageantry of a Court, and be convened under ancient folemnities and forms to give con

ftrained

Atrained approbation to royal edicts; but would not long retain the free enjoyment of those functions in which their true dignity is placed, the exercise of legislative and judicial power.

The Houfe of Lords is continually led to perform its office of keeping asunder the monarchical and democratical branches of the Conftitution, and preventing the innumerable and perhaps remedilefs evils which would refult from their collifion, in a manner fingularly advantageous. It ufually maintains the balance, not by profeffedly standing forward in support of the one against the other, but by watching with a careful eye over the preservation of some of its own rights, which are clearly important to the public welfare; and may alternately fave the prerogatives of the Crown and the rights of the People from fatal inroads, while it deems itself to be occupied in mere felf-defence. Thus both the Crown and the House of Commons may frequently perceive the barriers of their respective privileges ftrenuously defended without any exertions of -their own; and without being reciprocally filled with that difguft and fufpicion, or impelled

VOL. I.

K

pelled to those animofities and attempts at reprifal, which would inevitably arife were they to find themselves engaged in an immediate conteft with each other.

The inftitution of Peerage likewise tends eventually, by exciting a difference of fentiments and views in different claffes of the community, to preclude any private individual from acquiring fuch predominant influence over his countrymen as to become dangerous to public liberty. Were a Peer to make the attempt, he would scarcely be fupported by the confidence and sympathy of the People and their Representatives. And a Commoner who fhould undertake a fimilar enterprise would experience the want of personal dignity and fplendour, and would be much more likely to be counteracted by the jealousy than to be aided by the co-operation of the Peers.

3. This inftitution enables the Crown, or, as it may with more propriety be faid, the Nation by the difcretional agency of its Firft Magiftrate, to reward men who have diftinguished themselves in the public fervice; and

to