I should not hitherto have fufpended the mention of a topic which might have been introduced fooner with obvious propriety; had it not feemed to lead to a difcuffion of fome length, with which I was unwilling to interrupt the tenor of the preceding pages. I allude to the information which the candidate fhould afford to the electors refpecting his political principles. This information ought on every account to be clear, accurate, and full.. Not that it is incumbent on him to enter into minute explanations; nor even to deliver his fentiments on the merits of any particular measure, unless he is exprefsly required by the electors, or urged by the aspect and circumstances of the times. But a ftatement of his general view of public affairs, and of the leading principles by which he conceives a Member of Parliament fhould be actuated, is alike beneficial to the candidate and the conftituents. It obliges the former previously to confider the proper grounds and fprings of political conduct with precilion. It tends to diffufe fimilar know ledge ledge among the latter, and leads them to attend to opinions as well as to men. It in fome degree pledges the former not to deviate from the rules which he has thus openly prefcribed to himself, except in cafes wherein he fhall be able to vindicate his deviation to the electors when he fhall again folicit their fuffrages on a diffolution of Parliament. And it gives the latter the satisfaction to which they are entitled, of knowing what they are to expect from the man to whom they entrust the defence of their liberties. Should the candidate be preffed to engage that he will fupport or oppofe a specific meafure; he will do well to paufe, and enter into a more copious explanation. It would be too much to affirm that in no poffible case, however palpable it may be in itself, and however maturely he may have confidered it, is he to venture to anfwer for his future conduct refpecting it. Yet, in most inftances, the utmost length to which he can fafely advance, is to express his prefent conviction; referving to himself the liberty of finally giving his vote in such a manner, as, after further reflection on the founda tion tion of his opinion, and impartial attention to the arguments of those who oppose it in or out of Parliament, his conscience shall prescribe. Another question naturally occurs, whether the candidate ought to bind himself to obey, if elected, the inftructions of his conftituents. Such obedience has been held by fome perfons to be an essential part of the duty of a Member of Parliament. If he difregards the directions of those who have deputed him to appear and act in their place, how, it is faid, does he fulfil the office of a Reprefentative? The general opinion however, and the juft opinion, feems plainly to be (e), that a Member of the House of Commons is to confider himself not as the mere deputy of those who fent him thither, but as one of the joint Representatives of the whole People of Great Britain; and that, as far as he is the deputy of his immediate conftituents, he may deem himself, if nothing has previously paffed to the contrary, to have received from them a difcretionary power of acting on their behalf exactly as he is to act in (e) Blackstone's Comm. vol. i. p. 159. behalf behalf of the reft of the Nation; that is to fay, in fuch manner as the public good and the principles of morality fhall in his judgement require. Whatever respect then may be due to their opinions and instructions, he is not neceffarily pledged to conform to them. If he has given the electors reasonable grounds to presume on his obedience, either expressly by his declared fentiments, or impliedly by permitting them to choose him under that expectation; he is undoubtedly bound to comply with their injunctions, or to give them the option of vacating his feat. But the question under confideration is, whether he ought to contract fuch an engagement; and it must be determined by the answer returned to another, whether the general welfare of the Nation would be forwarded or counteracted by eftablishing obedience to inftructions as the duty of the popular Representative? The latter queftion may for various reasons be answered with a decided negative, 1. The fundamental and indeed the only argument alleged to prove the utility of obe dience to instructions, namely, that it enfures in the House of Commons a fufficient regard to the sense of the People, cannot in the prefent inftance be applied with advantage. For, notwithstanding the apparent defects in the national reprefentation, the fenfe of the People concerning any particular measure, when deliberately formed and permanently expreffed, will become in no long time, from the connection between Members of Parliament and the rest of the Public, from the degree in which the former imbibe by means of converfation and familiar intercourfe the opinion of the latter, from the recurrence of Elections, and the operation of other causes, the sense of the House of Commons. While thofe defects continue, the evils refulting from them would be aggravated in a tenfold degree by the introduction of the paffive principle under confideration; and might give to the petty electors of enslaved and venal boroughs an immoderate and ruinous preponderance in the conftitutional fcale. And whenever a temperate reform of Parliament shall take place, this argument for obedience to inftructions. will cease to be at all applicable; as there could then |