of official labour is devolved; he will punish frauds, reform abuses, and retrench extravagant fees. He will be vigilant to the utmost of his power in taking fit measures to prevent the grievous injuries which the public may fuftain, both in a pecuniary light and in other respects, by dishonesty on the part of thofe who are to provide the requifite quantity, or to decide on the quality, of ftores defigned for national uses; whether provifions for the fleet and army, mafts and other timber for the navy, cannon and other articles in the ordnance line, or whatever elfe is to be expended for the fervice of the community at home or abroad. He will put an end to fuch forms and ufages in tranfacting bufinefs, as he difcovers to be detrimental to the public, whatever temporary advantage he might be likely to derive from their continuance. And he will make a cautious and fparing use of any power annexed to his fituation (c), the exercife of which, however expedient under particular circumftances, is in its own nature injurious to the comfort of individuals, or at

(c) As the right of detaining and opening letters, and other fimilar powers.

variance

variance with the free spirit of the British laws.

In the expenditure of public money entrusted to his care he will be honeft, punctual, and œconomical; and will be expeditious in delivering, as well as fair in drawing up, his accounts. He will appropriate the several sums to the particular articles to which they have been specifically allotted by parliamentary refolutions or if fudden emergences and unforeseen wants shall compel him to apportion them according to a different rule, or even to divert a part into other channels of service, he will accurately state to the Public the deviation, and the cause of it, and throw himfelf implicitly upon the national candour and judgeHe will not fuffer public money to be improperly detained by the receivers or other officers employed in collecting it, even though they should be men of confiderable rank and influence, and engaged to himself by perfonal or political connection. He will not expend what was raised for the general benefit of the community in private jobs for the emolument of himself and his adherents; nor in fapping the foundations of national independence,

ment.

by influencing elections, bribing Members of Parliament, or hiring newfpaper-writers and pamphleteers to spread direct or indirect falfehoods in his favour, and mifrepresent and vilify his opponents. If money to be dif

burfed in fecret fervices at home or abroad be committed to his difpofal; he will faithfully abstain, whether the fum be limited or not, whether the due application of it be or be not enforced by an oath (d), from expending any part of it for purposes either morally unjustifiable, or contrary the import of the truft confided to him. And if political expediency fhould tempt him to practise, directly or through intermediate agents, on the avarice of the subjects of foreign powers, in order to obtain information, or to derive fome other advantage to his country from their treachery; let hin confider what his own feelings would be, were a fimilar offer made to himself; and, by the refult of that confideration, be admonished to reverence and to apply the univerfal

(d) The money employed for fecret fervice at home may not exceed 10,000l. per annum. The fum to be employed for fecret fervice abroad is not limited by law: but the Secretary of State for the foreign department acts, in difpofing of it, under the responsibility of an oath.

precept

precept of Chriftianity, never to do evil for the fake of attaining even the most laudable and beneficial ends.

From principles of duty, which in this and in almost every other inftance evidently goes hand in hand with policy, he will rather ftimulate his co-adjutors to a diligent performance of their refpeclive functions, than seek to affume to himself confequence and credit by intruding into every province and department. Nothing excites more jealoufy and ill-will than this meddling fpirit; or more speedily extinguishes that official emulation, from which, if properly cherished and directed, the highest advantage may refult to the public fervice. But let not caution to avoid the error under confideration lead to the oppofite extreme. It has been known to happen, when the Cabinet has confifted of many members, that those among them who have been the chief conductors of the affairs of Government, being unwilling to feem to interfere in matters. committed to the management of their colleagues, have abftained, through a fuppofed point of honour, from making the enquiries

1

which were abfolutely neceffary to give them a comprehensive knowledge of the state and diftribution of the public force, and of other particulars of prime importance.

4. In felecting and digesting the measures which he is to bring forward, he will avail himself of every fit mode of obtaining previous information; and of guarding against those objections which might either prevent the accomplishment of the plan, or impede its fuccefs when established. He will carefully fubdivide his work, and allot different branches of investigation to able and confidential men; enjoining them however to lay the result before him for his cool confideration and final judgement, before a fingle ftep be taken to carry the project into execution. At all times this precaution is requifite, to fecure him from fuddenly finding himself responsible for a meafure which he difapproves: but it is altogether indifpenfable, when the friend whom he has employed is a comrade in office, and one who differs from himself in fome leading principle of politics; left, having advanced blindfolded, he fhould be afhamed to recede when his eyes

are