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To give full fecurity to the people, the right of elective fuffrage should be conferred on great numbers, and fhould be eafily attainable. Thus in Great Britain the electors amount to fome hundred thousands; and befides the multitudes who may acquire the right of voting in boroughs by various methods, every man may purchase a vote for a county, who can pay for a piece of land worth forty fhillings a year.

It is a thing by no means unreasonable in itself, or repugnant to the liberal spirit of political wisdom, that the Conftitution should require a large portion of thofe who choose to live under its protection, to be fatisfied without poffeffing a voice in the appointment of their immediate legiflators. The grand object to be had in view in imparting the elective franchise is to fecure, as far as may be poffible, the choice of proper reprefentatives. By this confideration alone the number and defeription of electors ought to be regulated. That the defcription of electors in Great Britain might in some respects be altered with great advantage to the public, fo as to produce, often perhaps a better choice of a reprefentative, and ftill more frequently a

very important diminution of corruption, profligacy, and vice, cannot, I think, be reasonably doubted. But if the confideration already stated undeniably requires, on the one hand, that the whole number of electors in the kingdom should bear an adequate proportion to the amount of the inhabitants; it seems equally to require, on the other, that the right of voting fhould be confined to men competent, and likely to discharge the truft committed to them in a manner conducive to the public good. If we reflect on the uninformed condition of multitudes in the lower ranks of fociety; on the blind deference which they commonly pay to the will of their immediate fuperiors; on the temptations they are under of being corrupted by bribes; on the facility with which they may be deluded by artful mifrepresentations and inflammatory harangues; on the difficulty of preventing confufion and riots in popular affemblies spreading over the face of a whole kingdom; on the rapidity with which tumults excited by design or accident in one affembly would be communicated by contagion to another, until the country would be agitated with general convulfions: if we reflect on the dangers to be dreaded

dreaded from these and other circumstances which would attend the plan of universal fuf frage, we fhall probably fee great reason to rejoice that the elective right is limited under the British Conftitution. And we are not to forget that, if any inconveniences and hardships are to be apprehended in confequence of limiting it, they are neceffarily much diminished, if not altogether removed, by the very fmall share of property requifite to procure the privilege of voting for county members.

3. The Legislature of every well regulated State ought to be fo conftructed that the meinbers of it may have a common intereft with the reft of the community; it fhould be compofed of men belonging to various claffes and profeffions; and fhould be open in all its parts, and on all occafions, to the petitions and reprefentations of the people.

It is obvious how neceffary the observance of these rules is to the welfare of the whole community, and to the intereft of each particular clafs of citizens. And it is no lefs obvious with what marked attention they are regarded in the British Conftitution.

4. Legislative affemblies fhould be confiderably, but not immoderately, numerous; they should enjoy perfect freedom of debate; and should be regulated in their proceedings by fuch forms as may ensure a full and deliberate investigation of each subject which comes before them, and at the fame time admit of accelerated decifions in critical emergences.

If a legislative affembly confifts of few members, it wants the wisdom which refults from the collected counfels of many able. men; it is apt able.men; to become arbitrary in its proceedings; and is more within the reach of ordinary corruption. If it is extremely numerous, it becomes tumultuous and disorderly in its difcuffions, intemperate and capricious in its refolves; and each member is liable to act lefs under the restraints both of confcience and of fhame, trufting that the misconduct of an individual will not be difcerned in the crowd, or will be obliterated by the multitude of fimilar examples. The remainder of the rule requires no explanation.

With refpect to each of the particulars specified in this rule, the British Constitution evidently merits the highest praife.

5. Legiflative bodies ought to be fo far renewed from time to time as to prevent them from degenerating into tyrannical oligarchies; and in fuch a manner that the change, or course of fucceffion, in any part of them, should take place without confufion, tumult, ftoppage of public bufinefs, or interruption of the cftablished form of government.

The policy of this rule is fufficiently manifeft. The requifite change and renewal in the British Legislature is attained by the limited duration of parliament. And as it is made in that branch of the Legislature which is appointed by the people; thofe dangers are prevented, which otherwife might have been dreaded from the hereditary power lodged in the other branches. Strict laws are in force to prevent diforders at elections; and the Conftitution has provided that not even the death of the fupreme magistrate shall afford room for fedition and anarchy, or create any material impediment to the progrefs of public bufinefs. In the eye of the law the throne is never vacant; but from the moment (%) of the death of

(%) Blackstone, vol. i. p. 249.

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