CHAP. IX. ON THE DUTIES OF THE LEGAL PRO FESSION. ' “A BARRISTER, according to the pre"fent mode of exercising his profeffion, lives by the practice of fyftematic and flagrant injuftice. It is his almoft daily business to vin"dicate proceedings which his understanding "and heart must condemn, to defend culprits "whom he knows to be guilty. How is the man, who strives by legal fubtleties to esta"blish for his client the validity of an iniqui"tous bargain, lefs criminal than if he had rob"bed the sufferer on the highway? How is the man more innocent in the eye of conscience, "who, by availing himself of verbal infor"malities in a will, gains the estate to his em"ployers in contradiction to the known inten❝tions of the teftator, than he would have "been, had he forged a deed of gift in their "favour? Why is the Advocate, who by the "aid of technical quibbles and flaws rescues "from public juftice the wretch who has "perpetrated a murder, lefs to be abhorred "than the murderer himself? Let the practi❝tioner at the Bar renounce at once all concern "with causes, the merit of which he has rea"fon to diftruft; or, if he is conscious that "he fhould thus reduce his emoluments below "the most moderate recompenfe which his industry and exertions demand, let him re"nounce a profeffion incompatible with the "fundamental dictates of morality." Such we may conceive to be in fubftance the objections, which, had they been decorated by the admired imitator of Lord Bolingbroke with the brilliancy of his eloquence, might have been formed perhaps into a powerful argument against one of the moft diftinguished inftitutions of civil fociety. The difficulty which they present has difquieted with scruples the minds of wife and good men. It becomes us therefore to clear the profeffion itself from the imputation of inherent criminality, before we attempt to illuftrate the duties of thofe who follow it. We We may reply then, in the first place, that civil fociety, for which men are evidently defigned, cannot be upheld unless effectual means are provided for maintaining the rights of its members; that injuftice cannot be repressed in any tolerable degree by unfettled and arbitrary proceedings adopted in particular cafes, nor by any other method than the establishment of general laws; and that thefe laws would become nugatory, were there not an order of men appointed to claim and apply their affiftance in behalf of the injured. We may proceed in the next place to obferve, that every man ought to be prefumed innocent until he is proved guilty; that it becomes the Advocate to leave to Judges and Juries the determination of doubtful points, and to confider almost every point as doubtful, until the trial fhall afford him an opportunity of learning and appreciating the various facts and arguments on which the claim of the oppofite party depends; and that although occasional evils may refult from the univerfal and invariable application of established laws, he may confcientiously demand, under any circumftances whatever, a decifion conformable to them, not merely because because the universal and invariable applica tion of them is effential to the due diftribution of juftice, but because the nation has avowedly confented and refolved to acquiefce in their decifion of all queftions to which they are meant to be applied. But does not this answer, it may be faid, give the Advocate a liberty which Chriftianity denies to him? Does it not teach him, that immoral means may be used to accomplish a beneficial end; that individual acts of fraud and injuftice may be vindicated and abetted, for the fake of upholding a system, by which fraud and injustice are on the whole reftrained? By no means: it gives no countenance to a doctrine fo clearly condemned in the Gofpel. Let it be remembered, that the standard to which the Advocate refers the cause of his client is not the law of Reason, or the law of God, but the law of the Land; and that he appeals no further to the two former than as they are incorporated into the latter; that his peculiar and proper object is not to prove the fide of the queftion which he maintains morally right, but legally right; that the law offers its protection only on certain preliminary conditions; that it refufes to take take cognizance of injuries, or to enforce redress, unless the one be proved in the specific manner, and the other claimed in the precise form, which it prescribes; and consequently that, whatever be the pleader's opinion of his cause, he is guilty of no breach of truth and justice in defeating the pretenfions of the perfons whom he opposes, by evincing that they have not made good the terms on which alone they could be legally entitled, on which alone they could fuppofe themselves entitled, to fuccefs. "It follows then," the objector will reply, "that a Barrister may confcientiously "undertake the management of any fuit what60 ever; convinced as he may be that it is both a "cruel and an iniquitous profecution, originating in rapacity, malice, or revenge." 66 This conclufion is altogether groundlefs. Cafes may frequently occur in which an Advocate would be highly blamable were he to undertake the defence of the caufe propofed to him, though by defending it he should violate no precept of justice. If in confequence of facts communicated to himself, or through circumstances established by public notoriety, a cause should prefent 7 |