prefent an aspect fo dark as to leave him no reasonable doubt of its being founded in iniquity or baseness, or to juftify extremely strong fufpicions of its evil nature and tendency; he is bound in the fight of God to refuse all connection with the business; and, if he finds himself inadvertently entangled in it, to relinquish it without delay (a). The foregoing reafoning may be illustrated by an example. The father of a family dies, having bequeathed his eftate, in confequence of difapproving his fon's way of life, to a nephew. The fon claims the property in a court of law; pleading that the teftator was disordered in his understanding, and that the will was not attefted by competent witneffes. A Barrister well acquainted with all the circumstances of the cafe, is defired by the nephew to undertake his defence. Suppose the private fentiments of the Counsel to be, that (a) Were we to fuppofe a cause to depend for fuccefs on a human law manifeftly contrary to the law of God, a Barrister would be obliged in confcience to refufe all concern with it. Thus, in former times, no Lawyer ought to have taken any fhare in profecutions founded on acts of Parliament for burning of heretics. the the father had cherished unreasonable prejudices against his fon; and therefore was guilty of a moral crime in making the nephew his heir. Yet he may defend with a fafe confcience the title of the latter. For it is no part of his office to vindicate the motives of the parent. They are not the points against which the attack of the fon is directed; they are not the grounds on which the law will form its decifion. Whatever then may be the opinion of the Advocate refpecting them, he may fairly endeavour to fubftantiate matters of fact perfectly distinct from them, the foundnefs of the teftator's intellect, and the legal admiffibility of the perfons who attefted the will. But if he were aware that the disgust which the father had conceived against his child arose from the fecret machinations of the nephew; if he were aware that parental affection had been extinguished by infidious artifices, and the credulity of old age besieged by fabricated calumnies; he ought to decline the retainer with inward abhorrence, and not to difgrace himself for a moment by appearing to countenance guilt fo palpable and enormous, though VOL. I. Ꮓ though perfuaded that it might appeal with fuccefs to the forms of legal juftice. If any obfcurity still remains on the fubject, it may probably be difpelled by confidering that the reasoning, here applied to the profeffion of the Law, is grounded on general principles applicable to every profeffion. For on the one hand it is univerfally true, that no man is guilty of an actual infringement of juftice, nor neceffarily criminal, in selling at a fair price the commodity, whatever it may be, in which he deals; though he should difapprove the manner in which the purchaser means to employ it. And on the other, it is undeniable that cases may exist, in which, if he should furnish the article to his cuftomer, he would be highly culpable. Thus a diftri butor of stamps would not neceffarily act a guilty part in felling one to a neighbour, who should manifeftly intend to use it in borrowing money to fupply his extravagance, and on terms which he could not properly afford; nor a gunsmith in difpofing of a brace of pistols to a person whom he might think not un likely to leave them charged on his table, to the hazard of thoughtless vifitors. But did the former conceive that the ftamps were to be employed in a forgery; or the latter that the pistols were intended to extort purses on the highway; a compliance with the request of the customer would be indefenfible and flagitious. The way being fmoothed by the removal of these obftacles, we may proceed to diftribute the subject of this chapter into four principal heads. Under the firft will be confidered the general qualifications at which a Barrifter is to direct his aim; and the general prejudices and temptations against which he is to guard himself. The fecond will relate to his conduct in the management of a caufe previous to and during the trial. The third, to the peculiar fituation of those Lawyers, who are Members of the Houfe of Commons. The fourth, to the duties of Judges. I. The study and the practice of the law being in a high degree laborious; the former to those who hope to attain confiderable eminence, the latter to thofe who have attained it; no man ought voluntarily to engage in the profeffion, who does not poffefs that strength of bodily conftitution which is requifite for a faithful performance of its duties. Sedentary confinement, continued intensity of thought, the exertion of long and frequent pleadings in hot and crowded courts, and the anxiety which attends the consciousness of being refponfible for numerous and important concerns, are little adapted to a weak and languid frame. Better were it at firft to feek for moderate competence in a more tranquil occupation; than either to be at length compelled by broken and perhaps irrecoverable health to abandon the profpect of legal emoluments and honours; or to persevere in the purfuit with tottering and painful steps, until it terminates in an untimely grave. If a robuft bodily temperament be effential to the Barrister who looks forward to profeffional eminence, a large portion of natural intellect is equally indifpenfable. In vain may he hope for mental comfort in the exercise of his vocation, if he is not endowed with a found, clear, comprehenfive, and penetrating understanding, |