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Its poffeffor is fuppofed to be filled by his heir. Further, on the death of any king or queen, "the parliament in being fhall continue for "fix months, unless fooner prorogued or dif"folved by the fucceffor; if the parliament be at the time of the king's death feparated by "adjournment or prorogation, it shall notwithstanding affemble immediately; and if "no parliament is then in being, the members "of the last parliament fhall affemble and be again a parliament (i)." In like manner "the

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privy council shall continue for fix months "after the demife of the crown, unless foon

er determined by the. fucceffor (k)." The judges too, by an act of parliament passed in the reign and at the recommendation of our prefent Sovereign, are continued in their (/) offices notwithstanding any demife of the Crown. And all the great (m) officers of State, and in general all officers civil or military throughout the whole British empire, continue in office for fix months after the king's demise, unless fooner removed by the fucceffor.

(i) Blackstone, vol. i. p. 189. (k) Ib. p. 232.

(1) Ib. p. 268.

(m) By 6 Anne, c. 7, clause 8.

VOL. I.

D

6. The

6. The Legislative and Executive Powers ought to be diftinct.

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If the fame individual poffeffes the exclufive power of enacting and adminiftering the laws, he will be influenced in framing them by a reference to the persons whom he foresees that they will affect. Hence, inftead of being founded on comprehenfive principles of justice, and directed to the general good of the State, they will continually be fabricated for the pofe of gratifying the private animofities and promoting the selfish ends of the Legiflator. Tied down to no precedents, fubjected to no fuperior jurifdiction, nor limited by any coordinate authority; he can at pleasure strain the interpretation of an existing statute, or create a new one, to crufh the moft virtuous member of the community who may have offended him, or to screen a criminal partisan of his own. If the legiflative and executive functions be vested in the fame body of men, this reasoning will be equally applicable.

The British Conftitution has guarded against thefe dangers by committing the office of enacting laws to Parliament, and of executing them

to

to the Sovereign. The confent of the latter is requifite in all acts of legiflation; but the evils which have been specified are precluded by the previous and concurrent fanction of the Houfes of Lords and Commons being effential to the existence of every law. Statutes are enacted by the British Legiflature without its being in general poffible to forefee on whom they may attach; and muft unavoidably be executed by the judicial officers (n) of the Crown without

(2) Sir William Blackstone juftly observes, that it is of the highest importance to the fecurity of freedom, that the actual exercise of judicial authority should be committed to perfons neither removable at the will of the Crown, nor acting in other capacities as its immediate fervants. After noticing the evils which would arife if the adminiftration of common juftice were joined with the legislative power, he adds: "Were it joined with the executive, this "union might foon be an overbalance for the legislative. "For which reafon, by the ftatute of 16 Car. I. c. 10, "which abolished the Court of Star-Chamber, effectual

care is taken to remove all judicial power out of the " hands of the King's Privy Council; who, as then was " evident from recent inftances, might foon be inclined "to pronounce that for law, which was most agreeable "to the prince or his officers. Nothing therefore is more "to be avoided in a free country than uniting the pro"vinces of a judge and a minifter of ftate." Vol. i.

p. 269.

D 2

refpect

refpect of perfons. And though the Conftitution, in order to prevent the detriment to the public, and the private hardships which would refult on particular occafions, from an uniform application of general rules, has wifely intrufted the Sovereign with the power of remitting punishments; it has with equal wisdom laid various (0) reftrictions on the exercise of this privilege, that it may not be employed in fuch a manner as to give encouragement to vice; or to become dangerous to public liberty.

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7. The Executive Power fhould be one; it should be armed with fufficient authority to enforce obedience to the laws, and to fulfil the other functions with which it is intrufted and fhould at the fame time be deterred from an unjust or unwife use of its prerogatives, by being fubjected to a proper degree and a proper kind of control and of refponfibility.

Whatever may be the cafe with regard to petty States, there seems little reason to expect

(2) See thefe reftrictions enumerated, Blackstone, vol. iv. p. 398-401

that

that the affairs of a great empire will be permanently conducted at home and abroad with the requifite vigour, steadiness, dispatch, and tranquillity, unless the fuperintendency and control of the whole executive department be committed to a fingle perfon.

In Great Britain the powers of the Sovereign are proved by experience adequate to the discharge of the duties impofed upon him. If an unforeseen emergence fhould ever require fome temporary and conftitutional extenfion of them, the Parliament is authorised to grant it.

In Monarchical Governments, it would be equally difficult and unwise to inflict personal punishment on the fupreme magiftrate for neglect of duty, or breach of truft. The attempt, even when the crime was inconteftable, would commonly produce a civil war. Befides, the Sovereign, were he exposed to the poffibility of punishment like a common criminal, would fcarcely be able to retain the refpect of his fubjects in a degree fufficient to

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enfure respect to the laws. If guilt on his

part fhould be manifeft, and pass unpunished,

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