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entitled to support, in the plans for remedying them which are suggested by others. And that Judge would ill deserve his honourable post, who from unwillingness to part with some privilege or emolument, or to acquiesce, it may be, in some accession to the rights of the Jury, should resist a proposed alteration, when convinced that it would be conducive to the public good.
Few circumstances contribute more effectually to stimulate the young Barrister to exemplary conduct and active exertions ; few circumstances have a more cheering influence on the mind of the experienced Counsel, when engaged in preparing for the public eye hiftorical or practical disquisitions on subjects of jurisprudence, than the applause of those who have arrived at the summit of their profession. The Judge who feels a due solicitude to bring forward latent abilities, and enlarge the boundaries of legal knowledge, will not neglect to encourage merit in every stage by public approbation; and, whenever an opportunity is afforded him, by a wise distribution of his patronage.
In trials in which the decision of the Court depends on the plurality of voices, it is the duty of each Judge to conduct himself on the fame principles as he would have done had the final determination of the cause pertained exclusively to himself. While he fhews the refpect which is due to the Chief of the particular bench to which he belongs, let him not be influenced by selfish views, cr by timidity and falíe shame, rather to surrender the evercise of his understanding than oppose the authority of his superior. If he is himself pre-eminent in rank, let him not harbour a wish for so disgraceful a mark of deference from those who are below him. And whatever be his situation in point of precedence, let him not be dismayed from stating with firmness what he conceives to be law, when called upon to deliver his sentiments either in a Court of Justice or before the House of Lords ; although he should know that every one of his brethren entertains a diametrically opposite opinion.
If a Judge is bound steadily to hold the middle track between man and man; he is
under an obligation no. less folemn to steer an independent course between party and party. Let him not be blinded and biassed by miniIterial or anti-ministerial attachments. Let not the turbid stream of politics pollute the fountain of justice. Let him not be betrayed into an unmerited and intemperate opposition to the Crown and its Executive Officers, when causes in which they are concerned come before him, by a desire of gaining popularity and the reputation of disinterestedness and patriotism ; nor bear hard on the freedom and property of the subject, from a pufillanimous reluctance to resist the inclinations of Government, an ambitious delire for further elevation, or a mercenary wish to conciliate the favour of those who distribute the preferment and the patronage of the State. That sacrifice of justice to political considerations, and that submission to the will of the Crown, which marked the conduct of some of the Judges in the earlier periods of our history, would be more criminal at present even than they were formerly. The light which has been thrown in later times on the proper foundations of civil government, and the extent of civil obedience, has taken away from modern Judges the plea of ignorance; and their entire deliverance from the control of the Crown has in a very great degree leffened the allurements of temptation.
ON THE DUTIES OF JUSTICES OF THE PEACE
AND MUNICIPAL MAGISTRATES.
FROM the consideration of the duties of Judges of the Supreme Courts of Law, we naturally proceed to enquire into the moral obligations incumbent on those subordinate Magistrates, who, as the various ramifications branching off from the great arteries convey the blood to cherish and invigorate every portion of the human frame, distribute the falutary streams of justice through every part of the body politic.
Of these Magistrates, Justices of the Peace' occupy the most eminent station. Their functions therefore will properly be considered in the first place.
1. The points on which a person who proposes to act as a Justice is primarily bound to