CHAP. III.

ON THE DUTIES OF THE SOVEREIGN.

BEFORE we commence our enquiry into the duties incumbent on Englishmen, either in confequence of their common fituation as fubjects and fellow-citizens, or of their peculiar stations, profeffions and employments; it is neceffary to advert to the offices of the Chief Magiftrate whom the Constitution has placed on the throne. His power of influencing the public happinefs is as great as his flation is exalted.

The remarks to be made on the duties attached to royalty, may not improperly be preceded by a statement of the principal advantages refulting to Great Britain from the monarchical branch of the Government.

By lodging the fupreme executive power in the hands of a fingle perfon, fubjected to the fuperintending control of the Houses of Parliament,

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Parliament, and to the checks arifing from ministerial responsibility (a); the Conftitution has precluded, as far perhaps as any poffible contingency in human affairs can be faid to be precluded, thofe civil conflicts, by which the happiness and liberty of other ftates have been fubverted. The noble, however aspiring; the demagogue, however turbulent; the general, however renowned for his victories, fees every channel obftructed, by which he might hope to raise himself to dominion over his fellowcitizens. Every ambitious project is extinguished by the absence of all probability of fuccefs. The fplendid prize of empire is already bestowed by the nation on its chofen Sovereign. In Rome, and other ancient republics, the want of a common fuperior encouraged popular and military leaders fucceffively to aim at rendering themselves mafters of the State; until the people at length fought a refuge from the miseries brought upon them by the diffenfions of the contending chieftains in fubmiffion to abfolute defpotifm. The establishment of a limited monarchy, by preventing

VOL. I.

(a) Vide fupra, p. 38.

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fimilar

fimilar calamities and a fimilar termination of them, is one of the strongest safeguards of British freedom.

By the fame wife arrangement the Conftitution has likewise provided against the ruinous effects of quarrels and contefts between the Houses of Lords and Commons; against the reciprocal encroachments of those houses on the privileges of each other; and against the encroachment of either house on the rights of the people. Like the keyftene of an arch, the Monarchy binds together with compreffive energy the whole frame of Government; and unites it into a firm and well-cemented fabric, every part of which maintains its proper place. By the power of diffolving Parliament, the Crown is at all times enabled to put an end to any projects which a House of Commons may be pushing into execution in oppofition to the national will and the public good. By the power of adding without limit to the Peerage, it is no less qualified to curb any unjustifiable attempts of the Houfe of Lords. In critical emergencies it will commonly happen that the Sovereign will be fufficiently impelled by con

fiderations

fiderations of personal interest to resort to these measures; conscious as he muft be, that if either of the Houses were on the point of gaining an unconftitutional afcendancy over the other, he must effectually interpofe to maintain the balance, or expect fpeedily to fee the banners of the victor displayed over the ruins of royal authority. He would be equally prompted by fimilar motives, and equally enabled by the prerogatives already mentioned, to break any combination formed by the two Houses for the acquifition of dominion. And if we reflect on the immenfe revenues of this country, and the enormous patronage refulting from the civil, military, naval, financial, and other establishments; we shall fee ftrong reafon to believe, that if the monarchical branch of the legislature were annihilated, and the difpofal of thefe revenues and of this patronage were committed to either House, or to both Houses of Parliament; the event, whether of their conflicts or of their confederation, would be, that the Government of this kingdom would center in an aristocratic body, armed with inexhauftible refources to fecure the perpetuity of its own fway, and defpotically to hold the people in fubjection. E 2

From

From the unity of the Executive Power we may naturally expect freedom from corrup tion in refolving on measures to be pursued; fecrecy in negotiating treaties, and in concerting military operations; and universally, vigour and difpatch in enforcing the laws at home, and in the conduct of public affairs abroad.

The Conftitution likewife ordains, that the British Crown fhall defcend in a fixed order of hereditary fucceffion. The wisdom of this determination is incontrovertible. Whatever evils may occafionally arise from the sceptre falling into inefficient and improper hands; they are nothing in comparison with the miseries to which the subjects of an elective monarchy are exposed without intermiffion, from the cabals, foreign as well as domeftic, which uniformly take place during the life of each occupier of the throne, and the civil wars which frequently rage upon his death. These miseries are aggravated by the additional confiderations, that the Crown will feldom be placed by the violence of popular party, or by the final decifion of the fword, on a head

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