more worthy of it than that on which it would have devolved, had the principle of hereditary fucceffion been adopted; that the fortunate competitor will commonly treat one part of his people as friends and allies, the other as vanquished enemies; and that the frequent recurrence of elections to the throne will not improbably terminate in the country's being deprived of its liberties, either by being annexed to the territories of potent neighbours, or by the establishment of a military despotism at home. We have recently feen the Polish nation taught by fatal experience to feek for tranquillity and substantial freedom in the change of an elective to an hereditary Crown ; and have beheld with grief and abhorrence the iniquitous measures which have rendered its plans abortive,

The functions of the Sovereign are now to be confidered,

The British nation delegates the power of making the laws, by which the whole empire is to be governed, to three branches, as they are termed, in this refpect of co-ordinate authority:

E 3

thority: the King, the House of Lords, and the House of Commons. The right indeed of originating Acts of Parliament is, with the fingle (b) exception of Acts of Grace or Pardon, committed exclufively to the two latter; but the united affent of all the branches of the Legislature is effential to the existence of a law.

Though the Conftitution authorises the King to recommend certain measures to the confideration of Parliament, as well in perfon as through the medium of his Ministers; yet, with the exception already noticed, it does not suppose him to know any thing, in his official capacity, of Bills, until they are prefented to him after having received the affent of both Houses; and confequently prohibits him from all interference refpecting them during their paffage through either.

The legislative authority of the Crown has

(b)" When an Act of Grace or Pardon is paffed, it is "first figned by his Majesty, and then read once only in "each of the Houses, without any new engroffing, or "amendment." Blackftone, vol. i. p. 184.

been

been exercised for a confiderable period folely in approving the Bills prefented by the Lords and Commons; infomuch that its power of negativing them, though indifputably conftitutional, is not only regarded as a dormant right, but would probably be attended, if exerted, with very general odium. Whether the public welfare might be promoted in fome conceivable cafes by the revival of the royal negative, would be a queftion which might give birth to great variety of opinion. Yet it is clear, on the one hand, that in a free country the Chief Magistrate neither ought, nor would in fact find himself ablè, finally to refuse his affent to any just measure proposed to him by the other branches of the Legislature, and permanently demanded by the voice of the nation. And on the other hand it is not to be denied, that the rejection of an obnoxious Bill by a direct negative would be a measure far lefs injurious to the public good, than its defeat by fecret and unconstitutional influence. The one ftep would at least be an open and manly exercise of a legal right; the other by its very concealment would betray the consciousness of guilt; and would tend in its

effects to extinguish public spirit, to encourage future venality, and to fubvert the foundations of national freedom.

In this kingdom, and in every land where genuine liberty is established, whatever be the form of its government, and the denomination of its public officers, it is the steady voice of the people which decides what shall be law. This degree of popular weight is not the incidental refult of a free Constitution; it is effential to the Conftitution's being free. While fuch is the ftate of the Conftitution of Great Britain (and no man who is a friend to the true dignity of the throne or to the happiness of the subject can wish it otherwise), the actual power of the King will confift in the influence which he poffeffes over the mind of the people. And not only the beneficial ef fects, but the abfolute degree; of that influence will depend on the manner in which he difcharges the public functions committed to him by the laws; and avails himself of that pervading afcendancy, that undefinable but energetic control over men and manners, which refults from his elevated ftation.

The

The peculiar duty of the Sovereign is to promote the glory of God by promoting the true welfare of the people over which he reigns. The most obvious means by which it is to be discharged are, the care of the public fafety, and the improvement of the public morals. The virtue of a nation is indeed fo closely connected with its real fecurity, that every step which contributes to improve the former, tends to confirm the latter. The feveral prerogatives and offices of Royalty may be rendered instrumental to the attainment of both these objects.

In every free and well-regulated Government, the Sovereign will neither find himself compelled permanently to employ in the administration of public affairs men whom the fhort-lived vehemence of a faction may force into office; nor able to perfift in refusing to accept as his fervants those whom the voice of the nation, clearly and fteadily expreffed, shall recommend. Notwithstanding the deference which is paid by the Monarch of this country, and, except under extraordinary circumstances, ought to be paid, to the wisdom of the Houses

of