jor Davis,* with such parties of militia as could be spared, for their support. Several skirmishes ensued, in which our people had always the advantage. They took, at different times, many prisoners, horses and waggons from foraging parties. In effect, so well did they cover the country, as to induce some of the most respectable inhabitants to declare, that the security of the persons, as well as the salvation of the property of many friends to freedom was owing to the spirited exertions of these two detachments; who, at the same time that they rescued the country from the tyranny of tories, afforded an opportunity for the militia to recover from their consternation, to embody themselves in warlike array, and to stand on their defence.

During this period, General Putnam having received unquestionable intelligence that a party of refugees, in British pay, had taken post, and were erecting a kind of redoubt at Lawrence's Neck, sent Colonel Nelson, with

As there happened to be in my possession a copy of one of his letters to those officers, it was thought worthy of insertion here, in order to demonstrate his satisfaction with their conduct.

"To Major JOHN DAVIS, of the third Battalion of Cumberland "County Militia.

"SIR,

"I am much obliged to you for your activity, vigour, and diligence since you have been under my command; you will, therefore, march your men to Philadelphia, and there discharge them; returning into the store all the ammunition, arms and accoutrements you received at that place.

66

am, Sir, your humble servant,

"Princeton, February 5, 1777.”

"ISRAEL PUTNAM.

one hundred and fifty militia, to surprise them. That officer conducted with so much secrecy and decision as to take the whole prisoners. These refugees* were commanded by Major Stockton, belonging to Skinner's brigade, and amounted to sixty in number.

A short time after this event Lord Cornwallis sent out another foraging party towards Bound-Brook. General Putnam, having received notice from his emissaries, detached Major Smith, with a few riflemen, to annoy the party, and followed himself with the rest of his force. Before he could come up, Major Smith, who had formed an ambush, attacked the enemy, killed several horses, took a few prisoners and sixteen baggage-waggons, without sustaining any injury. By such operations, our hero, in the course of the winter, captured nearly a thousand prisoners.

In the latter part of February General Washington advised General Putnam, that, in consequence of a large accession of strength from New-York to the British army at Brunswick, it was to be apprehended they would soon make a forward movement towards the

*Extract of a letter from General PUTNAM to the Council of Safety of Pennsylvania, dated at Princeton, February 18,

1777.

"Yesterday evening Colonel Nelson, with a hundred and fifty men, at Lawrence's Neck, attacked sixty men of Cortlandt Skinner's Brigade, commanded by the enemy's RENOWNED LAND PILOT Major Richard Stockton, routed them, and took the whole prisoners-among them the Major, a Captain and three sub alterns, with seventy stand of arms. Fifty of the Bedford Pennsylvania Riflemen behaved like veterans.'

Delaware: in which case the latter was directed to cross the river with his actual force, to assume the command of the militia who might assemble, to secure the boats on the west side of the Delaware, and to facilitate the passage of the rest of the army. But the enemy did not remove from their winter-quarters until the season arrived when green forage could be supplied. In the intermediate period, the correspondence on the part of General Putnam with the Commander in Chief consisted principally of reports and enquiries concerning the treatment of some of the following descriptions of persons: either of those who came within our lines with flags and pretended flags, or who had taken protection from the enemy, or who had been reputed disaffected to our cause, or who were designed to be comprehended in the American Proclamation, which required that those who had taken protections should give them to the nearest American officer, or go within the British lines. The letters of his Excellency in return, generally advisory, were indicative of confidence and approbation.

When the spring had now so far advanced that it was obvious the enemy would soon take the field, the Commander in Chief, after desiring General Putnam to give the officer who was to relieve him at Princeton, all the information necessary for the conduct of that post, appointed that General to the command of a separate army in the Highlands of NewYork.

documents

It is scarcely decided, from any yet published, whether the preposterous plans prosecuted by the British Generals in the campaign of 1777, were altogether the result of their orders from home, or whether they partly originated from the contingences of the moment. The system which, at the time, tended to puzzle all human conjecture, when developed, served also to contradict all reasonable calculation. Certain it is, the American Commander in Chief was, for a considerable time, so perplexed with contradictory appearances, that he knew not how to distribute his troops, with his usual discernment, so as to oppose the enemy with equal prospect of success in different parts. The gathering tempests menaced the northern frontiers, the posts in the Highlands, and the city of Philadelphia; but it was still doubtful where the fury of the storm would fall. At one time Sir William Howe was forcing his way by land to Philadelphia ; at another, relinquishing the Jerseys; at a third, facing round to make a sudden inroad; then embarking with all the forces that could be spared from New-York; and then putting out to sea, at the very moment when General Burgoyne had reduced Ticonderoga, and seemed to require a co-operation in another quar

ter.

On our side, we have seen that the old Continental army expired with the year 1776; since which, invention had been tortured with,

expedients, and zeal with efforts to levy another: for on the success of the recruiting service depended the salvation of the country. The success was such as not to puff us up to presumption, or depress us to despair. The army in the Jerseys, under the orders of the General in Chief, consisted of all the troops raised south of the Hudson; that in the northern department, of the New-Hampshire brigade, two brigades of Massachusetts, and the brigade of New-York, together with some irregular corps; and that in the Highlands, of the remaining two brigades of Massachusetts, the Connecticut line, consisting of two brigades, the brigade of Rhode-Island, and cne regiment of New-York. Upon hearing of the loss of Ticonderoga, and the progress of the British towards Albany, General Washington ordered the northern army to be reinforced with the two brigades of Massachusetts, then in the Highlands; and, upon finding the army under his immediate command out-numbered by that of Sir William Howe, which had, by the circuitous route of the Chesapeak, invaded Pennsylvania, he also called from the Highlands one of the Connecticut brigades, and that of Rhode-Island to his own assistance.

In the neighbourhood of General Putnam there was no enemy capable of exciting alarms. The army left at New-York seemed only designed for its defence. In it were several entire corps, composed of tories, who had flock