as an agent, using the members of the body as instruments with which to work unrighteousness; and that, in contrast with God, using the same instruments, to work righteousness. The same form of expression is repeated in verse 19:-"For as ye have yielded your members servants to uncleanness and iniquity, unto the working of iniquity, even so yield ye your members servants to righteousness, unto works of holiness." So, "sin wrought in Paul all manner of concupiscence."-vii. 8. It deceived him and slew him, (vii. 11). And when he states of himself,—“that which I do I allow not: for what I would, that do I not; but what I hate, that do I;"-he concludes that it is not he that doeth it, but sin that dwelleth in him; (vs. 15, 17, 20).

3. This principle of sin is native in man, and pervasive of his being. It is the old man, the body of sin, (vi. 6). It is the characteristic of those who are in the flesh, (vii. 5),-of those who are not renewed by the Holy Spirit; (viii. 2-5, 9). Its essential characteristic-in which all its evil and enormity consists-is the fact that it is enmity against God, and therefore hostile to the law, (viii. 7), and, as such, the efficient cause of transgressions, (vii. 7-15).

4. The whole argument of the apostle is to the effect that the great end had in view, in the whole work of Christ, was the destruction of this body of sin, the eradication of this carnal nature, (vi. 6–18, &c.); and that the only efficiency which is adequate to accomplish this object is that of the Spirit of Christ, exerting a regenerating power, to the creation of a new principle of holiness, by the operation of which the old man-the principle of sin, derived by generation-will be destroyed; (viii. 2, 9-14).

in Adam.

One additional point we may not fail to insist upon, in our analysis of this most important part of the word of God. It is, 20. Its origin the relation which the whole exhibition of the apostle indicates between the offence, which he designates in the fifth chapter, and the sin, which he describes in those which follow. In the fifth chapter, from the twelfth to the nineteenth verses, he describes the offence in terms which, as we boye seen, determine it, unequivocally, to be the first sin

of Adam, the apostasy. Of this sin, he then says, that "the law entered that the offence might abound. But where sin abounded, grace did much more abound: that as sin hath reigned unto death, even so might grace reign through righteousness unto eternal life, by Jesus Christ our Lord.”—v. 20, 21. It is in view of the case thus presented, the offence abounding by virtue of the presence of the law, but grace triumphant over its curse, that he opens the discussion of the sixth and seventh chapters with the question, "Shall we continue in sin, that grace may abound?" As already hinted, the only way in which the offence could abound is, as being a principle of sin, bringing forth fruit in acts of disobedience, after Adam's example. The offence of Adam had in it two distinct aspects, in which it may be viewed; to wit, the assumption of an attitude hostile to God; and, the hostile attitude thus assumed. Viewed in the former light, it is the one offence, the transgression, by which death came on all men; whilst in the latter, it presents itself as a principle of evil, whence transgressions continually flow. But in these two there is but one criminality, which inheres inseparably in both, and consists essentially in that enmity to God which was enthroned in the first transgression, and thereafter reigns as a permanent principle of evil. In his discussion, the apostle recognises this identity in the two, and indicates it by the continuous flow of the argument, and by the manner in which the phrases, "the offence" and "the sin," are interchangeably used. At the same time, he discriminates the two aspects of the subject by the manner of discussion, which, after the order of nature, exhibits first, the doctrine respecting the offence as the sin of the world, involving the entire race in condemnation, and then, as a principle of sin, which abides in all men, and is the cause of all actual sins.

1. Guilt is criminal liability.

CHAPTER XV.

DEFINITION OF GUILT AND OF IMPUTATION.

THE word, guilt, is much used by the standard writers on original sin. By the Westminster divines, it is employed in such connections that their whole doctrine is materially involved in the sense in which it is to be understood. Thus, in the very definition of original sin, the word occurs:-"The guilt of Adam's first sin, the want of original righteousness, and the corruption of his whole nature," "is commonly called original sin." It is therefore requisite that we ascertain precisely the meaning of this word. It is the more necessary, as a definition is sometimes given which we are constrained to regard as materially defective; and which tends to modify very seriously the sense of our standards on the subject before us.

According to the definition to which we allude, the words, guilt and guilty, as applied to persons, do not convey any impeachment of crime. If the party is a criminal, other language is requisite to express the fact. All that is meant by guilt is, mere liability to punishment, at the bar of the law; and he who is guilty may be without crime, although condemned to suffer a penal infliction. This definition seizes upon a secondary and accidental element in the meaning of the word, and appropriates it, to the exclusion of that which is the primary and fundamental idea, from which the other takes its origin. That the question at issue is of importance, is evident. If the definition be adopted, which we suppose to be the true one, our Shorter Catechism is to be understood as teaching that "the sinfulness of that estate whereinto man fell, consists in the criminality of Adam's first sin, the want of original righteousness,

and the corruption of his whole nature." If the other be preferred, that sinfulness is made to consist in the liability to be punished for that sin, &c. How our children are to be satisfied of the sinfulness of a mere penal liability, is not very clear. This much, however, is evident,-that the matter at issue is worthy of a very careful investigation.

In respect to the Scripture usage as to the word, guilt, much need not be said. We have already had occasion to point out the fact that the essential idea expressed by the word, sin, is, deflection from a recognised rule of conduct; and that, although it ordinarily has respect to the law of God, it is also used in reference to other rules of action, as well as that; and hence the moral nature of the action involved is to be determined by the nature and obligation of the rule which is violated. The same remark applies to the word, guilt. It is invariably used to express the position of one who has sinned; that is, who has violated some law. Thus it is used in respect to the laws of the country. When, at the tribunal, a party is found guilty, the idea expressed is that of condemnation for violation of law. So, in the Scriptures, it is sometimes used in cases where great moral turpitude is not implied; but never where there has not been transgression of law. As Owen well expresses it, "Guilt is the respect of sin to the sanction of the law." It includes two ideas in its meaning. The one is, violation of law; and upon the character of the law which is violated depends the moral enormity which the word implies. Thus, the guilt of petty larceny is one thing, that of murder is another. One person may be guilty of violating conventional rules, which have no moral obligation; whilst another incurs the fearful guilt of blaspheming God. The second element in the meaning of the word, is, the liability to punishment which the transgression involves. This liability results from the terms of the law itself, denouncing the penal infliction against transgression; and the design of it is to vindicate the sovereignty of the law; which, if not honoured by the obedience of the subject, must be so by the infliction which it lays upon him. Hence no one can be guilty

except he has violated the law which condemns him. And the

amount of moral turpitude which the word imputes, is dependent upon the moral obligation of the law which has been transgressed. The law of God being of infinite obligation, its demands infinitely righteous, and its penalty infinitely just, it follows that there cannot be guilt at the bar of that law without moral turpitude, and that of infinite enormity. The word is never used in the Scriptures where the guilty party is not impeached of transgression. In fact, so intimate is the relation there recognised between sin and guilt, that the word, (D), which is the one commonly employed to express guilt, is used, as Owen truly remarks, equally for sin, the guilt of it, its punishment, and satisfaction for it, whether pecuniary or by expiation. How intimately such a usage as this identifies guilt with sin, we need not insist.

The definitions of the standard theologians accord perfectly with the principles which we have stated, and the practice of 2. Standard the Scriptures. Calvin does not formally define the writers. word; but we have his testimony on the question before us, in a line. He says of original sin, that "it is properly accounted sin before God; because there cannot be guilt without crime; (non esset reatus absque culpa)."

Says John Marck, "Guilt is obligation to punishment (ex peccato vel delicto) from sin or crime. It is, by some, inaccurately defined as the essence of the sin itself; but the essential matter of sin is the violation of law itself, which produces defilement and guilt. This guilt follows sin, partly by virtue of the divine law denouncing punishment against transgressions; partly from the intrinsic nature of sin, which, on account of its deformity and deviation from the ultimate end, always deserves punishment from a most righteous God. It therefore arises out of crime, and precedes punishment. As to its result, it pertains to the punishment; as to its source, to the crime. Guilt proceeds directly from sin; but the punishment, since it is by justice, is only from it by consequent provision."

"The papists improperly discriminate between the guilt of crime and of punishment; for if crime be taken for the offence,

* Institutes, Book II. chap. i. 8.