rescission of the contract on account of false representations as to the quality of the goods. In neither of these counts is there an affirmance of the contract and a recovery sought upon defendant's promises. The only distinction between the counts is the grounds for the rescission. That there was a rescission of the contract on the part of plaintiff is not disputed. The court was not in error in refusing to require plaintiff to elect upon which count he would ask for a recovery. Under the first count the court allowed the plaintiff to introduce evidence tending to prove one of the four grounds for rescission declared upon, namely, that defendant had not sufficiently instructed plaintiff as agreed in paragraph 2 of the contract, and refused to do so. The fraudulent representations relied upon, which plaintiff claimed were made orally and in writing, and upon which the court allowed him to go to the jury, were: That the defendant and his agents fraudulently represented to him that he intended to establish a permanent branch office and distributing depot at Des Moines, Iowa; that defendant fraudulently represented that he was the largest exclusive manufacturer of this line of goods in this country, and that he fraudulently represented the goods manufactured by him and shipped to plaintiff were equal in quality to the highest standard of such goods in this country or in Europe; and that experience on the part of plaintiff was unnecessary. Evidence upon each of these propositions relied upon in his declaration was offered by him to establish his case, and was received by the court. Defendant argues at length that the declaration was not sufficiently broad to warrant the court in permitting much of this evidence to be received, and that error was committed in so doing. All of this evidence was material to the issue, and, in our opinion, the declaration was sufficiently broad to warrant its admission. 1. The errors assigned by the defendant in his first group of 10, as classified by him, relate to the admission of letters which passed between these parties; the conversation with McGuire, who furnished a copy of the "booklet," describing the goods and their quality; and the answer of a question as to whether McGuire invited him to test any samples. These letters were material. They all of them contained inquiries on the part of plaintiff, and answers and representations on the part of defendant, which tended to establish plaintiff's claim of defendant's representations as to the quality of his goods, the magnitude of his production, and his statement of intention to establish a permanent branch and distributing depot. These were express statements, some of them in answer to direct inquiries of plaintiff, which plaintiff claimed were false and by which he was induced to enter into the contract. McGuire represented defendant, and the “booklet" he furnished was a copy of the same one defendant had previously sent to plaintiff. The letters also show the history of the transaction leading up to the contract, and that the advertisement which plaintiff claims contained a false statement was the inducement to the correspondence. That no tests were invited by McGuire might be considered as bearing upon the good faith of representations of quality furnished by him. It would be the only way that the quality of perfumes and toilet goods could be ascertained. It was not error to admit this proof in the case. 2. Twenty-five assignments of error upon exceptions to the "admission in evidence of letters, documents, evidence of acts of plaintiff, and other testimony relative to transactions between the parties, etc., all subsequent to signing the contract," are urged as errors prejudicial to defendant. Such of these as are claimed erroneous, and the evidence inadmissible, because of the claimed inconsistencies between the counts in the declaration, need no discussion, for the reason that our construction of the declaration, herein given, has disposed of the objection. His testimony and letters as to the canvassers employed by him, the difficulties in procuring them, and results, were material upon the question of defendant's having given sufficient instruction to him, and representations as to the necessity of experience before undertaking this work. The letters from the Iowa and Michigan attorneys were admissible to show rescission. The last one was an affirmance of the first and a more explicit tender of goods. A letter notifying defendant that his agent Doud had been there and of the nonarrival of the stock, also relative to insurance on the stock and the answer thereto, were properly admitted. Errors are assigned upon the admission of three exhibits, which were afterwards stricken out. Such action cured the error, if any was committed. Short extracts from them were afterwards allowed only as bearing upon the matter of payment of salary. Two letters or parts of them were read in evidence, one written by plaintiff to defendant, and the other his answer. They related to the understanding of the parties relative to expenses of the business and salary. Each states his view. If error was committed, it was harmless in view of the fact that the court took from the jury later all consideration of the matter of expenses and salary. Ward's testimony, describing the office as furnished and fitted by defendant, was admissible as bearing upon intention to establish a permanent branch distributing depot; how the goods were packed and displayed also. 3. The court allowed in evidence a sample case, furnished by defendant, containing 50 samples of products of defendant, which were the basis of tests made by plaintiff of the quality of these goods. Defendant objected because not sufficiently identified. It appears that this was an old sample case and was not locked when received by plaintiff with its contents. The evidence offered relative to its identity was proper to submit to the jury to determine identity. 4. Under this subdivision the only objection, for which a reason is given, was to an inquiry as to whether or not plaintiff became suspicious as to the statement of defend ant about conducting the largest exclusive manufactory of these goods. It was clearly admissible. 5. Errors are assigned upon evidence admitted relative to other similar cases, which in the briefs are called col: lateral cases. The record shows that there were 30 persons attracted by this advertisement, who entered into contracts indentical with the one plaintiff signed. Four of these agents were produced as witnesses by plaintiff and allowed to testify. This testimony was offered and admitted to show similar transactions by defendant with other parties as bearing upon the fraudulent intent of defendant. The testimony of these four witnesses shows that that same advertisement was answered; the same preliminary letters and later correspondence was had; the same contract was signed, and $1,000 cash was paid by each after coming to Detroit, and being met in the same way and told the same story, which was relied upon; the circumstances of fitting out the office; giving instructions; securing the prepared written receipt; the sudden departure of the representative; the late arrival of the goods; the old sample case and contents; and the representations made were in each case practically indentical with those in plaintiff's case. This evidence was admissi- ble upon the ground claimed. 53; Stubly v. Beachboard, 68 Mich. 401 (36 N. W. 192), and cases cited. It is urged that the court allowed too great latitude in the examination of these witnesses, permitting them to give their understanding of the contract. It was necessary and proper to go into the entire history of each of these cases. The allowance of this evidence objected to, in view of the exact and explicit charge upon this line of proof, was not prejudicial to defendant. The fact that the other contracts were made, as stated by these witnesses, was not disputed, nor was it denied that the letters sent before and after the contracts were executed were sent by defendant. 6. On the offer by plaintiff "to show that sales of mer chandise, such as that manufactured by the defendant, could not be made without experience," the testimony was excluded on the objection of defendant. The defendant was the next witness called, and on his direct examination, after testifying that he had talked with plaintiff about the matter of the statement in the advertisement, and also testified to his own lack of experience, was asked: "Q. As a matter of fact, in order to sell your goods, does a man have to have any experience in selling that line before?" Plaintiff objected and called attention to the above ruling of the court upon the same ground in defendant's favor. The court sustained the objection. This was not erroneous. Defendant was simply required by the court to be consistent. Any other course in the trial of a cause would lead to great confusion and would be disastrous. 7. On cross-examination of defendant, relative to the form of this contract, he was asked, under objection, where he obtained it, and was permitted to answer. It is claimed that in this the court was in error. From this cross-examination it appears that in the contract the words "it" and "its" were used in referring to defendant instead of "he" or "his." He testified that he did not get the contract from a corporation; that he obtained the idea from a concern which recommended it to him. He, however, insisted that he wrote this contract specially for the plaintiff; that in using these words he referred to himself and the business. We think the cross-examination was proper in this case where fraud was charged. It would be a legitimate inference for the jury to draw from this testimony that the purpose of defendant was to misrepresent, in using these words, the character and importance of his concern. 8. Several errors are assigned upon testimony of plaintiff permitted by the court relative to his reliance upon the representations of defendant (a) that experience was |