INSTRUCTIONS-Continued. INTOXICATING LIQUORS (7); MASTER AND SERVANT (11); INSURANCE. 1. In an action upon a policy of insurance, which forfeited the interest of the insured, under a by-law, for excessive use of intoxicants or narcotics, the evidence showing that deceased used morphine to excess, and had twice attempted to be cured of the habit, and no expert testifying that in his opinion the morphine used was not injurious to the deceased, it was error to refuse a peremptory instruction for the defendant. Conley v. Supreme Court, I. O. F., 190. 2. Failure of the representatives of deceased to prosecute his appeal from a suspension from the order precludes a recovery. Id. 3. No action could be instituted until the remedies given within the order were exhausted, as provided by a by-law of the association. Id. 4. Evidence that the policy of insurance set forth in the declaration did not permit other concurrent insurance, as alleged, is inadmissible unless the defendant in pleading denies the execution of the policy under oath. Miller v. Prussian National Ins. Co., 402. 5. It is proper to refuse to direct a verdict for a defendant, who is sued upon an insurance policy, on the ground that the plaintiff was not the sole and unconditional owner of the property insured, where he testified that he fully informed the agent of the true situation. Id. 6. The defendant has no ground to complain of the action of the trial court in submitting to the jury, as a question of fact, the increase of hazard claimed by defendant to have resulted from the failure of plaintiff to take out a license to conduct his retail liquor business. Id. 7. Letters tending to show that the insured, who has been absent more than seven years, had no cause to leave his wife, were admissible to strengthen the presumption of death created by 1 Comp. Laws, § 1225. Samberg v. K. O. T. M. M., 568. 8. A by-law of a fraternal beneficiary association which attempts to abrogate a statute that raises a presumption of death from an absence of seven years, is unreasonable and invalid as to a policy executed prior to the adoption of the by-law. Id. 9. It is a question for the jury to determine whether the presumption of death is overcome by the evidence of a witness who testifies that he met the alleged decedent and talked with him before the trial. Id. 10. The revocation of the charter of a subordinate lodge of a fraternal beneficiary association without giving an opportunity for a hearing, for the reason that the subordinate lodge failed INSURANCE-Continued. to convict a member of embezzlement, is arbitrary and illegal. Golden Star Lodge No. 1 v. Watterson, 696. 11. Although a member of a beneficiary association is required to exhaust his remedies given by the rules of the society before resorting to the courts, a lodge whose charter has been revoked is not bound by such requirement when no provision is made in the charter of the association for an appeal by a subordinate lodge, and the appeal of a member is not made final, and when admission of its members to other lodges is not a matter of right and involves the payment of additional fees. Id. See GUARDIAN AND WARD (3); MANDAMUS (9, 10). INTENT-See FRAUD (15); PRINCIPAL AND SURETY (4). INTERPRETATION-See CONTRACTS (1); PRINCIPAL AND SURETY (5). INTERSTATE COMMERCE-See CORPORATIONS (3). 1. A saloon which is accessible on Sunday from the living apart- 2. The record of the board of supervisors evidencing the action of the board upon a petition to submit to the voters the question of the adoption of local option, may not be collaterally attacked because of the failure of the clerk to sign the record before the final adjournment, where the record had been signed by the clerk during his term of office, and had been read and approved at a subsequent meeting, the record of which was properly authenticated. Derosia v. Loree, 64. 3. Evidence that plaintiff was assaulted in a saloon by one of the customers who had been drinking intoxicants and was under the influence of liquor, sustains a verdict against the saloonkeeper and his sureties. Shepard v. Platt, 181. 4. Mandamus will not issue to compel the common council of a city, which has, by an ordinance limiting the saloon district, prohibited the establishment of a saloon in the relator's location, to approve his bond and issue a license for the continuation of his business, upon a counter showing by the municipality that his saloon had been previously conducted in a disreputable manner and that the relator was of bad character. Sherlock v. Stuart, 96 Mich. 193. Mills v. Common Council of City of Ludington, 493. 5. It is incompetent to show, in defense to an action for selling liquor to plaintiff's husband while intoxicated, that he endeavored to secure liquor from the saloonkeeper through others, or that certain statements were made in furtherance of the attempt, not in the presence of the husband. McNetton v. Herb, 525. INTOXICATING LIQUORS-Continued. 6. Evidence is admissible under a declaration which charges defendant with selling liquors to plaintiffs husband while intoxicated. 2 Comp. Laws, § 5398 Id. 526. 7. The defendants are entitled to a requested instruction that the damages should not include luxuries or the total earnings of the husband, and should not include sums spent in purchasing intoxicants, but should be limited by such necessities and comforts as are suitable to the station of the wife. Id. 8. The trial court correctly excluded evidence which tended to show a different reason than was given by the plaintiff for her failure to qualify because of humiliation for an office of a fraternal order to which she had been elected, such reason being immaterial. Id. 9. In proceedings for mandamus to compei a village council to accept a liquor bond tendered by a saloonkeeper, inquiry whether the members of the council would accept the bond of a surety company was properly excluded. Knabush v. Common Council of Village of Britton, 577. 10. Where a witness as to the value of real estate is asked on crossexamination if he would take the price named by him for his own farm, similarly situated, it is not reversible error to exclude the testimony. Id. 11. On mandamus to compel the common council of a village to accept a liquor bond, the sufficiency of the surety is not in issue, only the good faith of the council in making the rejection. Id. 12. Where the evidence tended to show that the surety on the saloonkeeper's bond obtained certain property colorably in order to justify as a bondsman, it was not error to refuse a writ of mandamus to compel the acceptance of the bond by the village council. Id. See LANDLORD AND TENANT (3). JOINT DEFENDANTS-See LIBEL AND SLANDER (4); MANDAMUS (13); PARTIES. JOINT LIABILITY-See BILLS AND NOTES (8, 9); CARRIERS (10). JUDGES-See APPEAL AND ERROR (12, 13, 15); COURTS; MANDAMUS (8). JUDGMENT. 1. A complainant who files a bill to set aside tax deeds, is bound by a decree rendered against his predecessor in title adjudging the taxes valid prior to the date of the sale to the State under which the deeds were issued to defendant. Anker v. Schreib, 105. 2. On a petition for a modification of a decree of divorce entered upon the default of the husband, and granted upon the ground of extreme cruelty, the parties are concluded as to other alleged misconduct of the defendant and as to the defenses which might have defeated the bill. Camp v. Camp, 221. JUDGMENT-Continued. 3. On a bill to redeem from a deed, given without consideration 4. Releases given prior to the decree of foreclosure to one of the JURISDICTION-See ATTACHMENT (1); EXECUTORS AND ADMINISTRATORS (7); INSANE PERSONS (2, 7); LANDLORD AND TENANT (1); MANDAMUS (12). JURY-See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (4); EMINENT DOMAIN (2). On an appeal being taken from judgment in justice's court, an See STATUTES (1). JUSTIFICATION-See MALICIOUS PROSECUTION (2). LACHES-See EQUITY; JUDGMENT (4). LAND CONTRACTS. 1. The assignment of a land contract by the vendee does not relieve the vendee from the payment of the purchase price or create a liability therefor against the assignee. Midland County Sav. Bank v. T. C. Prouty Co., 656. 2. Under a land contract which creates no lien for the unpaid purchase money and no forfeiture for a default in its covenants, the right of the vendor or its assigns remains merely a debt secured by the contract. Id. 3. Upon a default in the contract an action at law for the debt or foreclosure in equity of the vendor's lien include the remedies of the vendor. Id. 657. 4. No lien is created by land contract, without express provisions, on personal property placed upon the premises. Id. LANDLORD AND TENANT. 1. A landlord has an adequate remedy at law where he made an 2. In a suit for injunction to restrain the complainant's tenant See CORPORATIONS (10); GUARDIAN AND WARD (2). LEASE-See CORPORATIONS (10, 11); LANDLORD AND TENANT (1, 3). LEGAL REMEDY-See MANDAMUS (11). LEGISLATIVE INTENT-See STATUTES (3, 4). LIABILITY OF OFFICERS AND AGENTS-See FRAUD (3). LIBEL AND SLANDER. 1. The public conduct of public men is a proper subject of legitimate discussion. Lawrence v. Herald Publishing Co., 459. 2. The publication in a newspaper of a false statement injurious to the plaintiff is not privileged although the plaintiff had been a police commissioner but was not a public officer at the time of the publication. Id. 3. Where an editorial was subsequently published, in response to a demand for a retraction of the libel, it was a question of fact whether it was published so far as possible in the same position as the original publication, or was published within a reasonable time, or whether reasonable and proper amends were made, in order to comply with 3 Comp. Laws, § 10425, in mitigating damages. Id. 4. That a judgment against a responsible defendant was rendered, for the damages found to have been sustained for the publication of a libel against the plaintiff, is not an answer to the claim of plaintiff that an error was committed as to a joint defendant found by the jury to be not liable. Id. 5. It is error for a trial court to direct a verdict for nominal |