town made a certificate, as required by section 119 of the act in regard to roads and bridges, stating the amount of money to be raised as a road and bridge tax and levying the said tax at the rate of twenty-five cents on each $100 assessed valuation of property in the town. That section requires the commissioners to give to the supervisor of the town a statement of the amount necessary to be raised and the rate per cent of taxation, which he is required to submit to the board of supervisors for the action of the board at its annual September meeting, and it was objected that the provisions of that section were not followed or observed. In the towns of Pilot and Norton objections were also made to the district road taxes in the districts numbered 1 and 2 in each town upon the grounds that the delinquent lists were not delivered by the overseers to the supervisors of the respective towns five days previous to the annual meeting of the board of supervisors, that they were not laid before said board as provided by the statute, and that said board did not levy said district road taxes or cause same to be levied. The record in these particulars is identical with that in People v. Illinois Central Railroad Co. (ante, p. 416,) and it is unnecessary to repeat here what was said in that case. For the reasons there given, the objections to the road and bridge taxes of the towns of Limestone, Pilot and Norton and the district road taxes of districts Nos. 1 and 2 of the town of Norton and of district No. 1 of the town of Pilot were properly overruled. As to the district road tax of district No. 2 of the town of Pilot, the additional objection was made that the delinquent list was sworn to by the overseer of district No. 4 and not by the overseer of district No. 2, as required by law. The record discloses that this objection was well founded. The delinquent list should have been sworn to by the overseer of the district to which it pertained, and an affidavit by any other person will not suffice. The delinquent list for said district No. 2 of the town of Pilot was

not a sufficient basis upon which to levy the tax, and the objection to that tax should have been sustained. People v. Illinois Central Railroad Co. supra.

Appellant objected to the excess of the road and bridge tax of the town of Momence above thirty-six cents on each $100 valuation of property. The rate was sixty-one cents on each $100, and it was levied by virtue of a certificate of the commissioners of highways and the consent of the board of town auditors and assessor. The commissioners certified that in their opinion a greater levy than thirtysix cents was needed for the purpose of building a wagon bridge at the place specified in the certificate and building concrete floors on three other specified bridges and graveling approaches to the bridges on which concrete floors were to be constructed, and that they needed twenty-five cents on each $100 valuation of property for those purposes. The board of town auditors and assessor gave consent to the additional levy. It is contended that the reason for an additional levy, which is to be specified in the certificate, must be something different from ordinary road and bridge purposes, and that the amendment of section 14 in 1911 did not change the objects and purposes for which an additional levy may be made. We have considered that question and taken a different view from counsel in People v. Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis Railway Co. (ante, p. 423.) The court did not err in overruling objections to that tax.

The judgment is affirmed as to the road and bridge taxes of the towns of Limestone, Pilot, Norton and Momence and as to the district road taxes of districts Nos. I and 2 of the town of Norton and district No. 1 of the town of Pilot, and reversed as to the district road tax of district No. 2 of the town of Pilot.

Affirmed in part and reversed in part.

THE PEOPLE ex rel. George P. Heikes, County Collector, Appellee, vs. THE CLEVELAND, CINCINNATI, CHICAGO AND ST. LOUIS RAILWAY COMPANY, Appellant.

Opinion filed December 17, 1912.

TAXES―an additional tax may be levied for "building roads.” Under section 14 of the Roads and Bridges act, as amended in 1911, an additional road and bridge tax may be levied for “building roads," where such is the reason certified to by the highway commissioners and consented to by the board of town auditors and the assessor.

APPEAL from the County Court of Iroquois county; the Hon. JOHN H. GILLAN, Judge, presiding.

FREE P. MORRIS, Eugene P. MORRIS, and R. C. SOUTH, (Glennon, Cary, Walker & Howe, of counsel,) for appellant.

JOHN P. PALLISSARD, State's Attorney, and SAUM & MALO, for appellee.

Per CURIAM: This is an application by the county collector of Iroquois county for judgment against the land of the Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago and St. Louis Railway Company for $52.61 delinquent road and bridge tax for the year 1911, levied by the highway commissioners of Beaver township, in said county, and extended by the county clerk.

The highway commissioners levied thirty-six cents per $100 valuation under section 13 of the Road and Bridge law, and an additional twenty-five cents per $100 valuation under section 14 by the consent of the board of town auditors and the assessor upon a certificate certifying that the additional tax was required for "building roads." only point urged for a reversal is, that the certificate of the highway commissioners was insufficient to warrant the ad

The

ditional levy under section 14, as amended in 1911. Section 14 as amended has had the consideration of this court at the present term in People v. DeKalb and Great Western Railroad Co. (ante, p. 290,) and in People v. Cairo, Vincennes and Chicago Railway Co. (ante, p. 286,) and under the construction there given to the amendment to section 14 the objections to this additional tax were properly overruled.

The judgment of the county court of Iroquois county is therefore affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

CARL A. BJORK, Appellee, vs. JACOB GLOS, Appellant.

Opinion filed December 17, 1912.

1. REGISTRATION OF TITLE—when specific objection to admission of abstracts of title cannot be urged. Where the defendant to an application to register title does not object to the admission in evidence of an abstract of title or to the preliminary proof but asks and obtains permission to file objections later, he is not entitled, after the applicant's testimony is closed, to urge before the examiner specific objections, in writing, which should have been made orally at the time the evidence was offered.

2. SAME-exceptions to examiner's report must be as specific as exceptions to report of master in chancery. Exceptions to the report of an examiner of titles must not be so general as to require a search through the evidence to ascertain whether they are well taken, but must point out the evidence objected to and the reasons for the objections.

3. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Section 18 of Torrens law is not unconstitutional. Section 18 of the Torrens law, concerning the admission in evidence of abstracts of title or certified copies thereof, is not unconstitutional. (Brooke v. Glos, 243 Ill. 392, Waugh v. Glos, 246 id. 604, and Tower v. Glos, ante, p. 121, followed.)

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Cook county; the Hon. ADELOR J. PETIT, Judge, presiding.

JOHN R. O'CONNOR, for appellant.

O. C. PETERSON, (EINAR C. HOWARD, of counsel,) for appellee.

Mr. JUSTICE FARMER delivered the opinion of the court:

This was a proceeding instituted by appellee in the circuit court of Cook county under the Land Registration act by filing an application to register title to a certain lot described which appellee claimed to own. Jacob Glos, among others, was made defendant to the application, because it was alleged he had a tax deed on the premises. Glos answered the petition, denying that appellee was the owner of the title and denying that his tax title was invalid. The application was referred to one of the examiners of titles, who heard the evidence and reported to the court that the applicant was the owner of the premises, and a decree was entered upon said report ordering the registration of the title and setting aside the tax deed. From that decree Jacob Glos prosecutes this appeal.

No complaint is made because of the finding that the tax title of the appellant was invalid, and no complaint is made by him on account of the amount found due and ordered to be paid to reimburse him for his purchase at the tax sale, subsequent taxes paid by him on the premises and interest on said amounts. The objection made to the decree and discussed in appellant's brief is, that appellee did not establish his title by the degree of proof required in such cases. This objection is based upon the claim that the evidence offered to prove appellee's title was incompetent and should not have been received.

Appellee offered in evidence certain abstracts and copies of abstracts in support of his claim of title. Appellant contends that there was no preliminary proof made that rendered them admissible under section 18 of the Land Registration act, which provides that the examiner may receive in evidence any abstract of title, or certified copy