the decision of the jury, as expressed in the special finding that there was no negligence on the part of the defendant or its employees. The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed. Judgment affirmed. THE PEOPLE ex rel. Edward G. Zilm, County Collector, Appellee, vs. JOHN DOE et al.-(THE CHICAGO, ROCK ISLAND AND PACIFIC RAILWAY COMPANY, Appellant.) Opinion filed December 17, 1912. 1. TAXES meaning of section 14 of Roads and Bridges act, as amended in 1911. The meaning of section 14 of the Roads and Bridges act of 1911 is, that in case the highway commissioners are of the opinion that a greater levy than that authorized by section 13 is needed for road and bridge purposes, and shall certify an additional levy, with the reason therefor, the additional levy may be made if the board of town auditors and the assessor consent thereto in writing; and their determination of the question whether the reason certified justifies the additional levy is final. 2. SAME what is a proper subject for an additional levy under section 14. The building of a concrete retaining wall and the widening of the traveled roadway constitute a legitimate purpose for making an additional levy under section 14 of the Roads and Bridges act, as amended in 1911; and section 15 of said act, authorizing a levy to pay damages for laying out, widening, altering or vacating roads, does not apply. 3. SAME additional levy under amended section 14 need not be for some unusual purpose. To justify an additional levy under section 14 of the Roads and Bridges act, as amended in 1911, the purpose therefor need not be an unusual or extraordinary one but may be for ordinary road and bridge purposes, provided the reason is certified by the highway commissioners and assented to, in writing, by the town auditors and the assessor. APPEAL from the County Court of LaSalle county; the Hon. W. H. HINEBAUGH, Judge, presiding. WILLIAM D. FULLERTON, and A. B. ENOCH, for appellant. WILLIAM M. SCANLAN, and JOHN J. MASSIEON, for appellee. Mr. JUSTICE COOKE delivered the opinion of the court: On application of the county collector, in the county court of LaSalle county, for judgment against the property of appellant for the delinquent road and bridge taxes of the towns of Utica and Peru, the objections of appellant were overruled and an order was entered for judgment and sale. From this order appellant has appealed. In each of the towns the commissioners levied a tax of thirty-six cents on the $100 valuation under section 13 of the Road and Bridge act, and in the town of Utica the board of highway commissioners, in addition thereto, filed their certificate, together with the written consent of the board of town auditors and the assessor, with the town clerk for an additional levy of twenty cents on the $100. This certificate stated that the additional levy was for the following purpose: "For a concrete wall on side of Crosiar hill and to widen the roadway. (Under section 14 of said chapter 121.)" In the town of Peru the board of highway commissioners filed their certificate, together with the written consent of the board of town auditors and the assessor, with the town clerk for an additional levy of twenty-five cents on the $100. This certificate stated that the additional levy was for "extending concrete retaining wall along bottom road in districts two (2) and three (3). (Under section 14 of said chapter 121.)" Appellant first contends that section 14 of the Road and Bridge act as it now stands is meaningless and void, and being void, the section as it stood prior to the amendment of 1911 is still in force. We have had occasion at this term to construe said section 14 as amended in 1911, and have held that while the amendment of the section. was awkwardly inserted, it is perfectly apparent that the meaning of the section as amended is, that in case the commissioners are of the opinion that a levy greater than that authorized by section 13 is needed, and shall certify an additional levy, together with the reasons therefor, such additional levy may be made if the board of town auditors and the assessor approve the same, and that whether the reasons justify the additional levy is left entirely to the discretion of the board of town auditors and the assessor, and their determination thereof is final. People v. DeKalb and Great Western Railroad Co. (ante, p. 290;) People v. Cairo, Vincennes and Chicago Railway Co. (ante, p. 286.), It is further contended that the additional levy for the town of Utica is void for the reason that it is sought to be made to pay for damages for widening a public highway, whereas assessments for the payment of damages for laying out, widening, altering or vacating roads are provided for otherwise by section 15 of the Road and Bridge act. It is apparent that this additional levy is not sought to be made to pay damages for widening the highway, but is simply for the purpose of building a retaining wall and widening the traveled roadway within the highway, and it was a legitimate purpose for the making of the levy. As to the additional levy in the town of Peru, it is objected that the reason given for making it discloses that the money is sought to be raised for ordinary road purposes. A levy for the building of a concrete retaining wall can hardly be said to be for ordinary road and bridge purposes, but even so, said section 14 as it now stands permits an additional levy for ordinary road and bridge purposes. The only requirement of that section is, that the commissioners shall certify the need of a greater levy, give the particular reason there for and secure the approval of the assessor and the town auditors. The judgment of the county court is affirmed. Judgment affirmed. THE PEOPLE ex rel. S. T. Carmody, County Collector, Appellee, vs. M. D. CHERRY et al. Appellants. Opinion filed December 17, 1912. I. SPECIAL TAXATION-requirements of statute must be strictly followed. In a proceeding for the collection of taxes, where the owner may be deprived of his property, the requirements of the statute must be strictly followed. 2. SAME-notice to property owners to build a sidewalk should not be sent before ordinance is in force. Where a sidewalk ordinance provides that it shall be in force "from and after its passage and publication," the thirty days' notice to property owners to build their walks should not be mailed until after the publication of the ordinance, even though the ordinance, in conformity with section 2 of the special Sidewalk act as amended in 1905, requires the property owners to build their walks within thirty days after the mailing of notice of the "passage" of the ordinance. APPEAL from the County Court of Macoupin county; the Hon. TRUMAN A. SNELL, Judge, presiding. RINAKER & RINAKER, for appellants. JAMES H. MURPHY, State's Attorney, and FRANK G. WOOD, City Attorney, (EDWARD C. KNOTTS, of counsel,) for appellee. Mr. JUSTICE CARTER delivered the opinion of the court: This is an appeal from a judgment of the county court of Macoupin county, entered on application of the county collector, for the sale of certain lots for failure to pay a special sidewalk tax. The city council of the city of Girard, in said county, passed an ordinance in August, 1911, for building a cement sidewalk in front of the property here in question. Section 3 of the ordinance provided' that the owners could relieve their property from the special tax provided to be levied for construction of the sidewalk, by constructing the same "within the space of thirty days after the mailing of notice by the city clerk of the passage of such ordinance,' etc. Section 7 of the ordinance provided that it should be "in force from and after its passage and publication," etc. The ordinance was signed by the mayor August 4, 1911. The proof shows that it was published August 10, 1911, and that the city clerk on August 8, 1911, mailed the only notice given to construct the sidewalk in question, this notice being dated August 5, 1911, and stating that August 4, 1911, the city council passed a certain ordinance (describing it) for the building of the sidewalk, and that the owners would have thirty days after the mailing of this notice for the construction of said walk. The walk was not constructed by the property owners and thereafter the city constructed it. This judgment was entered on the failure of the respective property owners to pay the special tax for the construction of said cement sidewalk, as provided by said ordinance. The only question that we find it necessary to decide is whether the notice sent out by the city clerk to the property owners complied with the ordinance and with the provisions of the special Sidewalk act of 1875. That act previous to an amendment in 1905 did not require a notice to be mailed to the owners of property. The only requirement then was under section 2, that said ordinance "shall be published as required by law for other ordinances for such city, town or village, and may require all owners of lots or parcels of land * * * to construct a sidewalk in front of their respective lots * * within thirty days after such publication," etc. (1 Starr & Cur. Stat. 1896,— 2d ed. p. 858.) This section was amended in 1905 so as to read: "Said ordinance may require all owners of lots. or parcels of land ** to construct a sidewalk in front of their respective lots or parcels of land * * within thirty days after the mailing of notice of the passage of such ordinance, addressed to the party who paid * |