ESSAY I. DECLINE OF THE KINGLY POWER. 2 299 conquered the Thyreatis from Argos, and thus extended her dominion 9 29. It was the boast of Sparta that her form of government underwent no material alteration from its original foundation by Lycurgus till after the close of the Peloponnesian struggle. And this boast was so far just, that she certainly continued during the period indicated remarkably free from those sudden and complete revolutions which afflicted almost every other Greek state. It was not possible, however, that she should escape altogether the silent and gradual alterations which the hand of time imperceptibly works; and accordingly we observe in her history that little by little the original constitution was modified, and that finally a state of things was introduced almost as different from that which Lycurgus designed, as if the government had at some time or other been changed by violence. Lycurgus preserved not only the forms but the essential spirit of the ancient monarchy. His Sparta was to be governed by her kings. Before the commencement of the Persian war, the kings had sunk into mere cyphers-they "reigned but did not govern." Honour and dignity were theirs, but power was lodged in a different quarter. The principal kingly functions are found to have been transferred to the Ephors, who were the true rulers of the Spartan state during the time of which Herodotus and Thucydides treat. The Ephors in Herodotus receive embassies, direct the march and give the command of armies, issue their orders to the kings,' act as their judges and condemn or absolve them, accompany them abroad as a check,' interfere in their domestic concerns in all respects have the real management of affairs, while the king is a nonentity, possessing little more political power than a senator," and obliged to have recourse to the Ephors before he can force a foreigner to quit the town." In Thucydides the Ephors recall the kings from abroad "-imprison them and even put them to death"-act as presidents of the assembly, though the king is present "-conduct the foreign affairs of the country 10-and control the monarch on foreign expeditions by means of a body of coun. 10 Tyrtæus, Fr. 2; 11. 5-6. 7 Ibid. v. 39-40.. 10 Ibid. v. 39-41. 5 Herod. ix. 7. 8 Ibid. vi. 82. before Ephors. "The only real superiority which the king possessed over a Senator in Sparta, seems to have been the double vote (Herod. vi. 57, ad fin.), which itself was probably nothing more than a casting vote (see note ad loc.). 12 Herod. iii. 148. Compare, however, the case of Aristagoras (vi. 50), whom the same king sends away without consulting the Ephors. 13 Thucyd. i. 131. 14 Ibid. and i. 134. 15 Ibid. i. 87. έπεψήφιζεν αὐτός (ὁ Σθενελαΐδας), ἔφορος ὤν. 16 Ibid. v. 36. vi. 88, viii. 6 and 12. Remark also that while the Ephors' names are essential to a treaty those of the kings are not (v. 19 and 24). The kings, how. ever, still have a superior dignity, and when they sign, sign before the Ephors. 300 CONTINUED RISE OF THE EPHORS. APP. BOOK V. cillors." It is clear that by a slow and silent process of continual usurpation the Ephors had, by the time of Thucydides, completely superseded the kings as the directors of affairs at Sparta; while the kings' military pre-eminence which was the last of their prerogatives that remained to them-had begun to be viewed with jealous eyes, and was already in danger of passing from them.18 If it be asked how this gradual change was brought about-what inherent strength there was in the Ephoralty enabling it to make and maintain these usurpations the answer is to be found, first of all in the fact that the Ephors were annually elected by the whole mass of Spartan citizens, and thus felt themselves the representatives of the nation; and, secondly, in the misconduct of the kings on various occasions," which caused them to be regarded with continually increasing distrust. The Ephors, it is probable, first assumed royal functions during the Messenian wars, when in the absence of both kings from the city it would naturally fall to them to convoke the assembly and the senate, to receive embassies and reply to them, to send out troops, and in fact to take the chief conduct of public affairs. They were able to establish themselves above the kings by means of their general right of supervision and correction of offenders, which entitled them to summon the kings themselves before their tribunal,' to censure and to fine them; and especially by their power of intermeddling with the king's domestic concerns, under pretence of watching over the purity of the race of Hercules, with which the existence of Sparta was supposed to be bound up. The humiliating subjection in which the kings were thus 17 Thucyd. v. 63. 2 18 It appears that, as early as B. c. 479, Ephors accompanied the king (or rather the regent) on a military expedition (Herod. ix. 76). They do not, however, appear then to have exercised any actual control. The next instance is in B. C. 445, when Cleandridas, the father of Gylippus, accompanied Plistoanax, as councillor, in his invasion of Attica (Plut. Vit. Pericl. c. 22). The fact that Pericles regarded him as the special person to bribe, would indicate that he possessed a large share of the chief authority. The appointment of ten councillors to control Agis (B. C. 418) is the next step. Finally, before B. c. 403, it became the regular custom to send out two Ephors with the king when he proceeded on foreign service (Xen. Hell. II. iv. § 36). 19 The kings of both houses misconducted themselves about the time of the Persian and Peloponnesian wars. Cleomenes was discovered to have bribed the oracle, and having fallen into disgrace, plotted an Arcadian rising (Herod. vi. 74). Pausanias was willing to have betrayed Greece to Persia (Thucyd. i. 128-131). Plistoanax, his son, was tempted by a bribe to forego the opportunity of conquering Athens (Thucyd. i. 114, and v. 16). He also bribed the oracle to obtain his recall. Of the other house, Leotychidas took a bribe from the Thessalians (Herod. vi. 72). and Agis was strongly suspected of having had similar dealings with the Argives (Thucyd. v. 63). It was urged in later times that the constitutional power of the ephors was not above that of the kings because the latter were not bound to attend to the first or second summons of the former (Plut. Vit. Cleomen. c. 10); but the fact that they were bound to obey the third summons is the really important point. Their power of fining the king appears in Thucyd. v. 63, and is, of course, included in the general statement of Xenophon—ἱκανοὶ μὲν εἰσιν οἱ ἔφοροι) ζημιοῦν ὃν ἂν Bouλwvraι (Rep. Lac. viii. 4). 2 Herod. v. 89-41. ESSAY I. DIMINUTION OF CITIZENS. 301 kept, led naturally to their entertaining from time to time treasonable projects, and the discovery of these projects favoured the further advance of the Ephors, who in transferring to themselves the royal prerogatives seemed to be adding to the security of the commonwealth. 30. Another gradual change in the Spartan state-and one which ultimately destroyed the Lycurgean constitution-was effected by the working of regulations which Lycurgus had himself instituted. The perpetual diminution in the number of citizens, which is to be traced throughout Spartan history,' arose in part from the infanticide which he enjoined, in part perhaps from the restraints which he placed upon the free intercourse of young married persons, but chiefly from the disqualification under which he laid all those whose means did not allow them to furnish from their estates the necessary quotas for the syssitia, which acted as a discouragement to marriage, and gradually reduced, not only the number of the full citizens, but that of the whole Dorian body to a mere handful in the population of the city. An exclusive possession of political rights, which (according to Greek ideas) was fairly enough enjoyed by a Demus of some 10,000 men controlling an adult male population of 50,000 or 60,000, became intolerable, when its holders had dwindled to a few hundreds, and were scarcely a visible element among the inhabitants," or an appreciable item in the strength of the country. The general disaffection which arose from this disproportion, first showed itself at the time of the conspiracy of Cinadon, B. c. 397, which was with difficulty suppressed.' It afterwards caused Perioci as well as Helots to 8 6 9 The original number of the full Spartan citizens was, according to one account, 10,000 (Ar. Pol. ii. 6). In the division of territory, ascribed by some to Lycurgus, by others to Polydorus (Plut. Vit. Lycurg. c. 8), they are estimated at 9000. Demaratus (B. C. 480), describing their numbers to Xerxes, and probably exaggerating a little, laid them at 8000 (Herod. vii. 234). If the 5000 sent to Platea were, as is generally supposed, τà dúo μépn (comp. Thucyd. ii. 10), they would have amounted really at that time to 7500. After this they rapidly diminished. Not more than 700 Spartans were engaged at Leuctra (Xen. Hell. VI. iv. § 15). Isocrates probably gives the number in his own time, when (Panath. p. 286, C.), he estimates the original conquerors at 2000 (see Clinton, F. H. i. p. 498, note p). This would be about B. C. 350. Aristotle (about B. c. 330) declares that they did not amount to 1000 (ovde xíλioi tò mλñdos av, Pol. ii. 6). Eighty years later, in B. C. 244, the whole number was 700 (Plut. Vit. Agid. c. 5). 4 Polybius notes that in his time three or four Spartan brothers had often the same wife (Collect. Vet. Script. vol. ii. p. 384), the truth being, probably, that only the eldest brother could afford to marry (see Müller's Dorians, vol. ii. p. 205, E. T., and Grote's Greece, vol. ii. p. 536, note 1). It is the whole Spartiate body which is in the reign of Agis 700. Of these not more than 100 were full citizens (Plut. Vit. Agid. 1. s. c.). "See Clinton on the Population of Ancient Greece, F. H. vol. ii. Appendix, ch. 22, pp. 491–505. 8 Xen. Hellen. III. iii. § 5. Thirty Spartans only accompanied Agesilaus into Asia (Xen. Hellen. III. iv. §§ 2-3). The same number went with Agesipolis to the Olynthiac war (ibid. V. iii. 8. The 700 who fought at Leuctra are an unusually large contingent for the time. Xen. Hellen. III. iii. §§ 8-11. 302 DESTRUCTION OF LYCURGEAN CONSTITUTION. APP. Book V 1 join with the Thebans in their invasion of Sparta. Finally it robbed the community of all real national spirit, producing a state of internal struggle and disunion which took away from Sparta all her influence in Greece, and tempted the young and enthusiastic Agis to his great experiment-fatal at once to himself and to what remained of the Lycurgean system. 2 1 Xen. Hellen. VI. v. § 25; Ages. ii. 24. 2 Plut. Vit. Agid. c. 5, et seqq. ESSAY II. EARLY HISTORY OF ATHENS. 303 ESSAY II. ON THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE ATHENIANS. 1. Obscurity of early Athenian history. 2. Primitive inhabitants of Attica unwarlike. 3. Causes of her weakness-no central authority-Pelasgic blood. 4. First appearance of the Athenians in history-stories of Melanthus and Codrus. 5. Blank in the external history. 6. Ionian migration conducted by sons of Codrus. 7. Internal history. 8. Early tribes-Teleontes, Hopletes, Ægicoreis, and Argadeis. 9. Clans and phratries-importance of this division. 10. Trittyes and Naucraries. 11. Political distribution of the people-Eupatrida, Geomori, and Demiurgi. 12. First period of the aristocracy from Codrus to Alcmæon, B. c. 1050-752. 13. Second period-from Alcmeon to Eryxias-B. c. 752-684-rapid advance. 14. Mode in which the usurpations were made-substitution of the Eupatrid assembly for the old Agora. 15. Power of the old Senate. 16. Full establishment of oligarchy, B. C. 684. 17. First appearance of the democratical spirit-legislation of Draco. 18. Revolt of Cylon, crushed. 19. Sacrilege committed-wide-spread discontent. 20. Solon chosen as mediator-his proceedings. 21. Date of his archonship. 22. His recovery of Salamis. 23. His connexion with the Sacred War. 24. His legislation the Seisachtheia and debasement of the currency. 25. Prospective measures. 26. Constitutional changes-introduction of the four classes, Pentacosiomedimni, Hippeis, Zeugita, and Thetes. 27. Arrangement of burthens-income tax-military service. 28. Pro-Bouleutic council. 29. Importance of these changesDicasteries. 30. Solon the true founder of the democracy. 31. Solon confined citizenship to the tribes. 32. Laws of Solon-(i.) Penalties for crimes—(ii.) Stimulus to population-(iii.) Law against political neutrality. 33. Results of his legislation-time of repose-revival of discontent-Solon leaves Athens. appearance of the old parties-Pedieis, &c.—return of Solon-his courage. Tyranny of Pisistratus. 34. Re 35. 1. THE early history of Athens is involved in even greater obscurity than that of Sparta, owing to the comparative isolation and seclusion, which were the consequence of its geographical position, and of the character of its soil. Lying, as Attica did, completely out of the path of the armies which proceeded from Northern Greece to the Peloponnese by way of the Isthmus or the Straits of Rhium, and possessing little to tempt the cupidity of conquerors, it scarcely came into contact with the other nations of Greece till just before the Persian War, and is consequently almost unheard of through the opening scenes of the Hellenic drama. No doubt this security might have tended with some races to foster a great power, which would have forced itself into notice by aggressions upon others; but the primitive Athenians appear to have been an unwarlike people, who were quite content to be left to themselves, and had no thought of engaging in foreign enterprises. The genius of the nation was from the first towards luxury and towards the arts; when they engaged in war, it was forced upon them, and for many centuries they were content to repel the aggressions which, at long intervals, were made upon their independence. 1 Compare Thucyd. i. 2. τὴν γοῦν Ἀττικὴν ἐκ τοῦ ἐπὶ πλεῖστον διὰ τὸ λε πτόγεων ἀστασίαστον οὖσαν ἄνθρωποι ἄκουν οἱ αὐτοὶ ἀεί. 1 |