inventory of this property, and that the failure to do it does not defeat her right to recover on this policy, if she is otherwise entitled to recover." It was admitted upon the trial that this policy was a Michigan standard policy. It was issued for one year. Under this provision, the plaintiff should be allowed a reasonable time to make her inventory, if she did not have one, which may be inferable from the statement that she took none after her purchase in February, although she began one that she did not finish. If she had an inventory taken when she purchased, she should have cared for it as provided in the policy, and in such case it would have been unneces sary to take another before the fire, as that would have been a compliance with the terms of her policy. If the testimony showed that she had an inventory, the judge may not have erred in saying that it was unnecessary for her to take another. If not, it should have been left to the jury to say whether a reasonable time had elapsed, if the court could not have determined that fact from the undisputed evidence.

It being shown that the plaintiff had not complied with the conditions of her policy by filing proofs of loss, it remains to consider the question of estoppel. This claim is based on negotiations with the defendant's adjuster. She testified that he called upon her about a week after the fire. She stated what household furniture she lost, and he made a list until he said it was enough to cover the loss (i. e., $200), and that she need not give him more, and that as to the household furniture everything was satisfactory; that he wanted her to get bills, as far as possible, of her store goods; that she said she would as far as she could, but expected difficulty, as she usually paid cash. She testified, further, that he told her that, as soon as she notified him about getting things ready, he would meet her at Port Huron. She was to notify the local agents, and they him, and he would meet her at Port Huron and make a settlement. She did so,

and they put her off from week to week, saying they expected the adjuster there every day to settle it. She went to all who sold her goods, and they told her that, as she always paid cash for goods, they could not furnish bills; and she made a list of the goods in the store at the time of the fire, as near as she could remember, and took it to the local agents, and said she had her bills as far as she could get them, and what bills she didn't have she had proof for of the wholesale men where she bought them, and they told her that was all right, they expected the adjuster every day, and to keep the list until he came. She also caused one Atkins, of Port Huron, to write the adjuster or the company, and he received a reply from the adjuster, dated August 8, 1892, stating that he would adjust Mrs. Allen's loss as soon as she was ready to substantiate her claim in conformity with the conditions of her policy, and as soon as he should be informed to that effect he would go to Port Huron to give the matter his attention. One Jacob Stanzel testified that he was present at the interview with the adjuster at her request; that the adjuster made a list of furniture, and said she need not give any more,-that it was enough to cover the loss, that was all right; and that he afterwards said she would have to get bills of the goods as soon as she could, and she was to send or take the bills to the local agents, and they would write him, and he would send back word when they would come and settle. He also testified to the talk between her and the local agents. He said: "I heard them tell her that they had not heard from the adjuster, but they expected to hear every day or two, and they would write her just as soon as they heard, and she was to come down and settle the loss."

It is unnecessary to refer to the contradictory testimony offered by the defense. We find it unnecessary to discuss the question of the adjuster's authority to waive the proofs of loss, because this testimony fails to show

a waiver, if his authority were conceded. He left Mrs. Allen with the statement that she had better get those bills, and then he would see her again. He might have insisted on his proofs of loss then and there; but, whether he did or not, he might legitimately make other investigations, especially when it was developed that she had no inventory, or other means, beyond her mere recollection, of giving him evidence of the quantity and value of the goods destroyed. It may be that he was willing to consider and submit to his company the propriety of paying the loss, notwithstanding her failure to properly care for an inventory, without trying the question whether her failure to make the inventory at once or to file an existing one was a breach of the contract. Whatever his motive was, it does not import an intention to give her to understand that she need not make proofs of loss, and bind his company to accept any list that she might prepare. At the furthest, it was conditioned upon her getting bills, which she says that she did not get. Furthermore, under the decision in the case of Steele v. Insurance Co., 93 Mich. 81, she had at least ten months within which to make her proofs of loss. Within less than four weeks after the fire, the letter to Atkins, which was given to her, apprised her that this company was insisting upon proofs of loss, and she became sufficiently convinced of it to bring an action several months before the time within which she might furnish them expired. She was not misled for any length of time, if it can be said that the adjuster misled her, nor was she misled to her injury. She lost no riglit, was put in no worse position, suffered no injury, by reason of his promise to see her again when she obtained the bills. The alleged estoppel in this case must be tested by the rules applicable to estoppel, and we find the case wanting in its essential elements.

It is unnecessary to discuss the case further. Inasmuch as she brought her action and allowed a year to

106 MICH.--14

expire without furnishing any proofs of loss, there can be no recovery, and we have no alternative but to reverse the judgment. No new trial will be ordered.

The other Justices concurred.

1

BURT v. LONG.

1. RECORD ON APPEAL-FRIVOLOUS ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR. The practice of needlessly multiplying assignments of error is subject to criticism.

2. LOST LETTER-SECONDARY EVIDENCE.

Where a witness testifies that he has not seen a certain letter eince its receipt by him some 12 years previous, that his papers were afterwards destroyed by fire, except a few that he kept in a specified place, that he has searched for papers among those last mentioned, and that the one in question was not there, a sufficient foundation is laid for the introduction of parol evidence of the contents of the letter, although the witness further states that he has not made a search for that particular paper.

3. CROSS-EXAMINATION-DISCRETION OF TRIAL COURT.

The action of the trial court in limiting the extent of the cross-examination upon an unimportant matter, on the ground that too much time was being occupied thereby, will not call for a reversal.

4. IMPEACHMENT-CONTENTS OF LETTER-HARMLESS ERROR. An impeaching question regarding the contents of a letter written by the witness is properly excluded where the letter is in the possession of counsel propounding the question, and has not been submitted to the witness for inspection; nor can the rejection of such a question be said to have been prejudicial where the letter was subsequently produced, and shown to contain no such statements as imputed by counsel.

5. WITNESSES-ANIMUS-CUMULATIVE TESTIMONY.

The exclusion of a letter admissible only for the purpose of showing the animus of a witness is not prejudicial error where his hostility is already apparent from his testimony.

6. EVIDENCE-EXISTENCE OF CLAIM.

The fact that a letter, while stating that the writer is "hard up," makes no claim against the person to whom addressed, has no tendency to show that such person was not indebted to the writer, and it is properly excluded when offered for that purpose.

7. TRIAL-EXCLUSION OF QUESTION-REMEDY.

Error will not lie on the exclusion of a question as leading, where it is apparent that counsel could have elicited the facts desired by changing the form of the question.

8. INSTRUCTIONS TO JURY-ADMITTED FACT.

In instructing the jury, the court may properly assume a fact as admitted where it has been treated as such throughout the trial.

9. EVIDENCE-Contents of LETTER-COMPETENCY OF WITNESS. One at whose direction a letter was written by another, and who read it after it was written, is competent to testify as to its contents.

10. EVIDENCE-ADMISSIONS-REMOTENESS.

Evidence of statements expressive of a desire to adopt a child not then born is so remote as to be inadmissible upon the question of the existence of a contract claimed to have been made several months thereafter, whereby the person making such statements was to be compensated for the care of the child.

11. CONTRACT FOR SUPPORT OF CHILD-EFFECT OF ATTEMPTED ADOPTION.

In an action upon an express contract for services rendered in the care of a child, evidence that insufficient articles of adoption or apprenticeship were made to plaintiff's wife is admissible only as bearing upon the probability of the execution of the contract sued upon, and of plaintiff's reliance thereon.

12. REJECTION OF TESTIMONY-CURING ERROR.

Any error committed in rejecting testimony upon a branch of the case is cured where counsel are subsequently afforded ample opportunity to inquire into the subject.

13. EVIDENCE-MOTIVES OF WITNESS.

A witness is properly permitted to explain his reasons for his