that heartless calculation, that indifference to all but self, that could think of holding any one in slavery, on any consideration, whatever might be his color, or however degraded he might be. We seem to be quite ignorant how much the great men of that time opposed slavery. It is a fact which we seem to overlook, that all the great men of that time were abolitionists. They all held the same, or nearly the same, views of slavery that modern abolitionists do.

What position then did the constitution proposed by such men assume towards slavery? I have already said that the word 'slave,' or 'slavery,' does not occur in that instrument. I now say, that there is not a word there that would not have an appropriate meaning, if there had been no slaves in the land. There are but three passages that have any direct bearing upon slavery; and no one who did not know that there were slaves in the country when the constitution was adopted, would ever infer from the instrument itself that there were any. This studious omission of the word 'slave,' and of any exclusive reference to the slaves, is to my mind most significant of the views and expectations of the framers of the constitution.

The first passage that can have any reference to slaves, is in art. 1, sec. 2, clause 3d: where it is said, that representatives and direct taxes shall be apportioned to the number. of the inhabitants of the states, which shall be determined by adding to the whole number of free persons, including those bound to service for a term of years, and excluding the Indians, "three fifths of all other persons." These six words, 'three fifths of all other persons,' refer doubtless to the slaves. But if one did not know that we had slaves, from another source, he could not infer from this language that we had any.

The next clause is in art. 1, sec. 9, first clause: where it is declared that congress shall not have the power to prohibit the importation of "such persons as the states now think proper to admit," before 1808.

The next reference to slaves is in art. 4, sec. 2, third clause: which provides for the sending back "all persons held to service or labor" in one state who may have escaped into another.

I cannot forbear remarking again upon the delicacy with which the framers of the constitution treated the subject of slavery. Those noble men could not speak the word 'slave' without a blush at the thought of their inconsistency, so long as slavery continued in our country. They very delicately avoided offending the freemen of our country, by using the word 'slave,' as though there were any slaves in this land of liberty, in the bond of union between the states.

They had not the shame-faced impudence to ask the people to consign one part of their inhabitants to hopeless slavery, by that very instrument by which they secured their own freedom and the protection of the laws. They wished to do no such thing. Yet it is said that the constistitution guarantees the perpetuation of slavery,—that the men who fought, and bled, and prayed to God for their own freedom, consigned other men to slavery. Had such a proposition been made to the veterans of '76 they would have remonstrated with a vehemence that would have made our rock-ribbed mountains ring with their reverberations.

Yet the constitution did recognize slavery. This is an astonishing fact, and calls for an explanation. I offer the following:

When the convention met at Philadelphia, to frame a constitution, the necessity of something of the kind, by which the federal government could be more consolidated and efficient than it was under the old confederacy, was most pressing. Slavery existed, and the south felt that they could not emancipate all of their slaves immediately. Therefore it was necessary, if they would have any constitution, to adopt one that should tolerate slavery, for a while at least. The patriots of that age thought that by so modifying the constitution as to tolerate slavery, they should by no means perpetuate it, or retard its entire abolition, while they should secure the adoption of a federal constitution. A constitution that required immediate emancipation would not be received, and they could do nothing, by recommending such an one, to hasten the abolition of slavery. Under these circumstances they did the best they could, as they thought, and recommended the constitution that was adopted, and under which we live.

But there is evidence sufficient to prove to my mind that there was an implied promise on the part of the southern states, that, if we would adopt a constitution tolerating slavery, they would immediately take measures which should result in the emancipation of every slave, “at a period not remote." I give an outline of the testimony. I have already referred to the general expectation among the framers of the constitution, and all the distinguished men of that day, that the happy event would soon come. I quote from the discussions in the conventions of the different states, held about that time, and partly for the purpose of discussing and adopting the constitution that had been recommended to them.

Mr. Iredell, of N. Carolina, afterwards Judge of the Supreme Court of the U. S. said, "When the entire abolition of slavery takes place, it will be an event pleasing to every generous mind and every friend of human nature." Here it is clearly shown that he expected that slavery would be entirely abolished. Judge Wilson, of Pennsylvania, one of the framers of the constitution, afterwards Judge of the Supreme Court of the U. S. said, that he "considered the clause relating to the slave trade as laying the foundation for banishing slavery out of this country. Yet the lapse of a few years and congress will have the power to exterminate slavery within our borders."

Mr. Tyler, of Virginia, when opposing that clause which forbids. congress to prohibit the foreign slave trade before 1808, said, "My earnest desire is that it shall be handed down to posterity that I opposed this wicked clause." Mr. Johnson said, "The principle of emancipation has begun since the revolution. Let us do what we will, it will come round." Judge Dawes, of Mass. said, "Slavery has received a mortal wound." General Heath said, "Slavery was confined to the states now existing; it could not be extended. By their ordinance congress has declared that the new states should be republican states and hold no slaves."

These are quotations from the discussions in the conventions of the states, and show clearly what was the expectation. We have seen that this expectation was not confined to the northern states. It prevailed at the south. I give one more quotation still more explicit. In

the Virginia convention of 1787, Mr. Mason, author of the Virginia constitution, said, "The augmentation of the slaves weakens the states, and such a trade is diabolical in itself and disgraceful to mankind. As much as I value a union of all the states, I would not admit the southern states" (S. Carolina and Georgia) "into the union unless they agree to a discontinuance of this disgraceful trade;" and 'a discontinuance of this disgraceful trade' was regarded as a ' mortal wound to slavery,' the beginning of a course of measures to result in the "banishing slavery out of this country."

If, then, the south encouraged such an expectation for the purpose of securing the adoption of the constitution as it now is, does it not amount to an implied promise that they would take measures to bring about the expected emancipation? Yet they have done directly the contrary to this. Now they have the impudence to come forward and say, that it is a breach of faith to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia and the Territories. It is infringing upon their rights for us to talk about emancipation. We have no right to interfere. Shall we be duped by such things?

But let us look a little more minutely at the relation which the constitution sustains to the slave. I profess no great skill in the legal science, but I will undertake to prove before any impartial court, that the slave laws in the southern states are unconstitutional, and that the slave has by the constitution a right to his freedom. "In the language of the supreme court, 'There are acts which the general or state legislatures cannot do, without exceeding their authorities. There are certain vital principles in our free republican government which will determine and over-rule an apparent and flagrant abuse of legislative power; as, to authorize manifest injustice by positive law, to take away that security for personal liberty or private property for the protection whereof the government was established. An act of the legislature contrary to the great first principles of the social compact cannot be considered a rightful exercise of legislative authority.' Ely Moore's speech in the House of Representatives, Feb. 4, 1839.

Here, I ask, are not the supreme court obliged, by this decision of theirs, to set aside, as unconstitutional, any law which upholds human slavery? or is human slavery no 'manifest injustice?' and does it not take away the 'security for personal liberty?' According to this decision, is not any law that acknowledges, or is founded upon the right of property in human beings, unconstitutional?

It is declared in the preamble to the constitution, that it was adopted to establish justice," "to ensure domestic tranquility," "to promote the general welfare," "and to secure the blessings of liberty." But every law which has been enacted against the slave has done directly contrary to this. The laws of the southern states have made the condition of the slave a great deal worse, while they have done nothing to benefit his condition since this declaration.

Instead of establishing justice,' the slave laws have established injustice and oppression. Instead of 'ensuring domestic tranquility,' they have increased ten fold the fear of servile insurrection, and the

peril of living in the slave holding states.

Instead of promoting the general welfare,' they have ground the black man into the dust, and subjected him to merciless cruelty. How has the constitution secured the blessings of liberty to one fifth of the people, who are now in chains? How has it secured the right of petition, and the freedom of discussion? How does it secure the blessings of liberty to any one who goes to the south, believing slavery to be a sin? Let those who have suffered by the Lynch law answer.

But if the constitution recognizes slaves at all, it recognizes them as persons, as men. Yes; if the constitution recognizes slaves at all, then it recognizes them as persons, and stands upon the ground, that all men or persons are born free and equal, and that they have certain inherent rights, which no legislation can deprive them of, such as life, liberty and property. If, then, the constitution recognizes slaves as persons, it does thereby secure to them all the rights of persons,— among which are a right to life, liberty, and the, pursuit of happiness; and every law that makes the case of the slave worse than that of a town pauper, or an apprentice bound out by indenture, is unconstitutional.

If, on the other hand, the constitution does not recognize the slavery of a portion of the inhabitants of the country, then by the constitution and by natural right, they may demand their freedom, and we must grant it.

The constitution recognizes slaves as persons, but the southern slave laws deny that the slave is a person, and make him a thing, a chattel personal, in direct contradiction of the words of the constitution. Slavery, as it exists now, is a different thing from what it was in 1788. The southern people have changed its character, and thereby forfeited all the right to its protection, which they could once have claimed under the constitution. If, then, the constitution protected the slavery of 1788, it certainly does not that of 1838.

But there is a stronger argument yet. The Constitution, art. 1, sect. 9, clause 2, says, "The privilege of the writ habeas corpus shall not be suspended unless when in cases of rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it." The constitution does not define what is the habeas corpus, and in all such cases the rule is to adopt the definition of the English common law. I give it as stated by Chancellor Kent, one of the best authorities upon the subject. Let us then look at the case and see what is the writ habeas corpus. "Every restraint upon a man's liberty is, in the eye of the law, imprisonment." Kent, vol. 2, p. 26. Therefore the slave, in the eye of the law, is held in imprisonment by his master. "All persons"-and the constitution calls slaves persons" restrained of their liberty under any pretence whatever are entitled to prosecute the writ" habeas corpus, "unless they be detained, (1) by process from any court, or judge of the United States, having exclusive jurisdiction in the case; (2) or by final judgment, or decree, or execution thereon, of any competent tribunal of civil or criminal jurisdiction, other than in the case of a commitment for an alleged contempt." Kent, vol. 2, p. 29. Here, then, it is

It

declared by the constitution, that any person, black or white, who is restrained of his liberty, unless he be kept in prison awaiting a trial, or kept for the execution of the sentence of the court, has a right to the privilege of the habeas corpus writ. Hence any person who is a friend to the slave may apply to any court, having authority to issue this writ, and the court must issue it against the slave-holder, to come into court and show by what right he holds his slave. The slave-holder will say he holds him by the law of the state in which he lives. will then be shown to the court that these very slave laws are a suspension of the privilege of the habeas corpus writ, which the constitution says shall not be suspended. A person who has sued out the writ habeas corpus "is to be remanded to imprisonment if he was detained; (1) by process of any court of the United States having exclusive jurisdiction; (2) by virtue of a final decree, or judgment, or process thereon; (3) or for contempt specially and plainly charged ;' otherwise he is to be set free. The slave is not detained by any court waiting his trial; he is not held for the execution of any sentence of a competent court of civil or criminal jurisdiction; nor for any contempt specially and plainly charged; therefore, by the privilege of the habeas corpus, he must be set free. It will be shown, further, that in the English courts, slaves can and actually have claimed the privilege of the habeas corpus writ, and it has been decided that they are entitled to their freedom by the privilege of that writ. Here, then, the American constitution has established a law by which slaves have actually claimed and received their liberty in England. It is not very probable, however, that any American court would grant the writ to the slave, or decide in his favor, especially in a slave-holding district.

I admit that I do not suppose that the framers of the constitution intended to secure the privilege of the habeas corpus to the slaves. The fact is, they did not think of making any constitutional provision for them in any way. It did not occur to them that any could be needed. There was such a universal expectation that the moral sentiment would induce all men to do what they could to hasten the emancipation of the slaves, that no one entertained a doubt that it would soon come. The framers of the constitution therefore avoided, so far as possible, any reference to the foul stain upon the nation's character, -and so deeply did they feel the evil of slavery themselves, that they did not suppose any provision in the constitution could be necessary to bind men, much less to give them leave to secure the blessings of liberty to all. So, when we speak of congress having the power to abolish slavery in the District of Columbia, and the Territories, and to prohibit the internal slave trade, we do not suppose that the framers of the constitution thought, or intended to give congress the special power to do these things. They did not give that power intentionally, for the best of reasons. They supposed that slavery would be abolished by other means, so that there never could be an occasion for the exercise of such a power, if it were given.

But their expectation has failed. Slavery is not abolished. Shall not congress have every power and the slave every privilege, that the