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utilities is exercised by a series of distinct departments. State control of public health is divided between various boards with no effective means of coordination. Nor is there any official authority for harmonizing the work of the numerous educational agencies.

The division of the public service in some fields has even affected the authority of the State officials, provided by the Constitution, where in some cases unrelated functions are placed under the same official. The title of the Auditor of Public Accounts indicates that he should control the auditing of all public accounts in the State; but his authority in this field is limited; on the other hand, he has supervision over banks and building and loan

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associations, a function quite distinct from the audit of public accounts. So, too, the Attorney General should be the chief legal officer for all State offices and departments; but special counsel and attorneys have been provided for various departments, independent of the Attorney General and not subject to his control; while this officer has been given supervision over inheritance tax administration, which should be primarily a financial rather than a legal matter.

Scattered Offices.

The lack of correlation between different State offices is further indicated and emphasized by the physical location of their offices. Thirty State officials and commissions have offices in Chicago, at a cost for rent and other expenses of $72,000 a year. These offices are scattered in different buildings, even in the case of departments whose functions are most closely related to each other. The present arrangements cause an unnecessary expenditure of funds for offices, reduce the efficiency of the State service in their dealings with each other, and add greatly to the inconvenience of the general public in transacting business with these offices.

No Standards of Compensation.

Under existing legislation the compensation of State officers lacks any approach to uniformity on the basis of work done. Not only are there

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boards and officials who receive no salary, others paid on a per diem basis, and still others paid a fixed salary; but within each of these classes there is no attempt to adjust the compensation to the time given to the public service or to the duties performed. The State Food Commissioner and the Chief Inspector of Private Employment Agencies each receive $3,600 a year; while the more important offices of Secretary of the State Board of Health and Chief Factory Inspector receive only $3,500 and $3,000. The Commissioners of Labor each receive $150 a year; while the members of the Board of Arbitration each receive $1,500 a year, and the members of the State Board of Pardons $3,500 a year. Inspectors in different departments doing a similar type of work receive salaries ranging from $1,200 in one department to $1,800 in another. The same variations in compensation for similar work exist for subordinate positions, where the salaries are specified in the appropriation acts.

Overlapping Functions.

Even where there is no direct duplication of work, the present laws frequently give powers to several departments under which each employ agents for purposes which could be more efficiently and economically performed by one agent at the same time. Thus the inspectors of the State Board of Health, the State Food Commissioner and the Chief Factory Inspector may each visit the same place for different purposes, and perhaps give conflicting orders; while a single thorough inspection for all of these offices would be more effective and less expensive.

Irregularity of Reports.

One source of confusion in the operation of the numerous State offices, boards and commissions is the complete absence of uniformity or regularity as to their reports. Most officers are required to report to the Governor; but in several cases reports are made directly to the General Assembly, and in some cases no authority is specified. There seems to be no rule followed in requiring reports to be made annually or biennially or at other intervals. Reports are required to be made by some authority in every month in the year except April; and cover widely varying periods of time.

The separate publication of reports for each minor office and the lack of central control over the printing of such reports adds much to the expense of printing, which now amounts to over $500,000 for the biennium. A large proportion of this could be saved by a more concentrated organization and control over the official reports.

Ineffective Supervision.

As a result of the absence of any systematic organization of related services, there is no effective supervision and control over the various State offices, boards and commissions. It is true that the greater number of these are under the nominal supervision of the Governor, through his power of appointment and removal. But the very number of separate offices makes impossible the exercise of any adequate control. To a very large extent each authority is left to determine its own action; conflict of authority between two or more offices is often possible; and if harmony and cooperation is secured it is by voluntary compromise rather than by the advice or decision of a superior authority. Under the present arrangements too many independent authorities have power to make expenditures subject to no effective centralized control or responsibility. This situation necessarily leads to waste and extravagence.

At the same time, the number of matters necessarily brought to the attention of the Governor-owing to the absence of intermediate supervising officers-has burdened him with such a mass of details that he has been unable to exercise adequate supervision over such matters, while the very volume of such business brought to his attention takes time from more important questions of general policy.

Moreover a number of the important departments and services are not even under this limited supervision of the Governor. This is true of the officers provided for by the Constitution; and also of a number of boards chosen by election or by other methods, as the State Board of Equalization, the Trustees of the University of Illinois, and the State Board of Agriculture.

In the case of the constitutional officers this lack of control extends not only to their primary functions, but also to other unrelated powers and duties imposed on them by statute.

No Budget System.

One of the most serious defects arising from the lack or correlation and effective supervision over the subordinate authorities is the absence of any satisfactory budget of estimates as a basis for appropriations. The need for improvement in this respect was indicated in the Act of the last General Assembly creating the Legislative Reference Bureau, which imposed on that bureau the duty of compiling estimates of appropriations. Under the procedure which has hitherto been followed, appropriations have been based in the main upon estimates and requests made by the head of each office, bureau or board, most of which officials have not been charged with a sufficient degree of responsibility to make them careful and sparing in their requests. The General Assembly has been compelled to act upon these requests without sufficient time, means or opportunity for adequate investigation. The result has been that unnecessary appropriations have been made in some cases; while in other cases needed funds for important public services have not been provided.

The State Constitution, in Article V, paragraph 7, provides that the Governor at the commencement of each regular session of the General Assembly shall "present estimates of the amount of money required to be raised by taxation for all purposes." So far as your committee is aware, no Governor has heretofore ever complied with this important constitutional duty. The failure to do so has undoubtely been due in the main to the fact that the executive authorities as organized have not afforded the Governor the facilities needed to perform this duty. Just as the number of minor offices and boards under his nominal supervision prevents any effective control over their action; so too it prevents any adequate examination of their requests for appropriations on which the Governor can base his recommendations.

The compilation of estimates for appropriations requested to be prepared by the Legislative Reference Bureau is a step in the right direction; but this can hardly be considered an entirely satisfactory budget system.

In the opinion of the committee, the constitutional provision referred to above contemplates that the Governor shall present to the General Assembly a detailed budget of appropriations recommended by him for the ensuing biennium, together with an estimate of the revenues of the State from sources other than direct taxation during the biennium, and a statement as to the amount to be met by taxation. The careful preparation of such a budget would be a potent factor in securing economy and efficiency throughout the executive departments. But to make this possible requires not only new methods of preparing and analyzing estimates, but also extensive reorganization and consolidation of the executive departments, so that the estimates from each group of related services may be based on adequate consideration by competent officials. A new Governor will not be able to present such a budget at the beginning of the regular session of the General Assembly; but he could do so probably by March 1.

Imperfect Accounts.

As a result largely of the absence of a proper budgetary system, the accounts of most of the various State authorities are entirely inadequate. The accounts kept by the Auditor of Public Accounts cover all that is required by law, and appear to be carefully administered; but they are limited to records of cash transactions and to keeping disbursements within the authorized appropriations. There is no record for the State as a whole or for most of the State offices of estimated revenues or outstanding obligations; and no attempt at preparing a balance sheet of assets and liabilities. Accounts and financial statements even for similar institutions and offices (such as the penitentiaries) are so radically different that comparison and deductions are impossible. Without an adequate system of accounting along similar lines there can be no effective control over appropriations or expenditures.

Inadequate Advice on Legislation.

With the existing lack of efficient executive organization, both the Governor and the General Assembly fail to receive proper information and advice as to needed legislation. The Constitution provides that the Governor shall recommend to the General Assembly such measures as he shall deem expedient. But no machinery has been provided by which the recommendations and proposals for legislation from the numerous list of officers, boards and commissions can be carefully weighed and sifted by officials charged with responsibility over a large field of administration. Conflicting measures are often proposed by different State authorities; and many proposals are presented from outside sources both on subjects within and without the jurisdiction of existing executive officials. As a result there is no harmonious legislative policy even formulated; and the measures enacted not only lack coherence, but at times acts are passed at the same session which contain directly contradictory provisions. There is clear need for an executive organization which will make possible a well defined administration program of legislation.

Another result of the present methods of legislation has been the creation of many new and independent authorities, at an increased expense to the State, where in many cases the work might have been more efficiently and economically organized in connection with some existing agency. For example, a Fish Commission was established in 1879, and a separate office of Game Commissioner in 1889. In 1913, these two authorities were consolidated under the Game and Fish Conservation Commission; and the appropriations for this body were $50,000 less than those made two years before for the two separate authorities.

Irresponsible Government.

Finally under the present arrangements while the general public is deluged with printed reports, it fails to receive reliable information in digestible form as to the conduct of the State administration, and is unable to locate definite responsibility for negligence or misconduct in public business. Public opinion usually considers the Governor responsible for the conduct of the State government; but with the lack of effective executive control over the subordinate officials this opinion is not fully justified. At the same time, the popular conception of the Governor's responsibility, in the opinion of this committee, is based on a sound and just principle; and the machinery of State administration should be so organized as to enable this conception to be adequately realized.

In Illinois.

TENDENCIES TOWARDS CONCENTRATION.

During the past few years several laws have been enacted in Illinois which show some realization of the need for a more efficient organization of State administration and suggest the lines on which a more comprehensive readjustment may be brought about.

Of special significance was the reorganization in the management of the State charitable institutions, which consolidated one of the largest and most important branches of State work under the Board of Administration. Under the former methods when each of the seventeen institutions was under a separate board of trustees, the lack of effective organization and supervision resulted in waste and inefficiency in the management of the institutions, and in constant rivalry between the several institutions, while neither the Governor nor the General Assembly had the information or means to exercise adequate control.

By the Act of 1909, all of the charitable institutions were organized in a single department under the Board of Administration directly responsible to the Governor. The experience under this system has clearly demonstrated its greater efficiency and economy in the administration of these institutions. In the first year, there was a saving of $250,000; and even with increasing prices the expenses for the four years under this system show a reduction of $400,000 from the per capita cost for the last year under the former methods. This concentrated organization has not only enabled the Governor

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