or not- and never was man more libelled by the race of scribblers, from Whitehead and Churchill to Junius and Sheridan, than lord Rosslyn-many instances remain to prove that he was exceedingly liberal to members of his own profession, and to scholars in distress. He sent that amiable lawyer Fearne, when in embarrassed circumstances, a present of a hundred guineas, and concealed the gift of a like sum to poor Hargrave, the learned editor of CokeLittleton, under the name of loan. The ex-chancellor of France, Barretin, on his emigrating to England from the terrors of the Revolution, was supported at his brother chancellor's expense. An excessive disregard of money is said to have been a prevalent defect in his character, and, it is added, that his generosity proved a bane, for want of prudence. He is represented to have been always in pecuniary difficulties, and has been unjustly suspected of gambling by those who knew that the state carriage was sometimes missing, and could not find, in improvidence and absence of forethought merely, sufficient cause for his distress. It is a curious proof of the luxurious wants of society, and the exactions which they require, that during the present century the heads of the church and the law, notwithstanding their ample endowments, should have been subjected to the indignities of embarrassed fortune, without any marked expensive habits of their own.

Such is a short but honest notice of the career of earl Rosslyn-eminent in public, engaging in social, and amiable in private life. It may excite surprise, that the memory of a man should not be held in higher regard, who swayed the house of commons as an orator during the most eloquent period of its annals, who confirmed the national councils by his wisdom in several emergencies of difficulty and danger; and, presiding over courts of law or equity for the long term of twenty-one years, by his impassive temper, learning, and deportment, conferred dignity even

on the highest office of a judge. The reason of the general disesteem, into which his name has drifted, will be found to be the want of good faith and absence of political rectitude, which marred the features of his character. He might have been, in the proud eulogy of bishop Lowth, summo in loco vir summus; he was content with the situation summo in loco, without the character. He might have trod the broad and open path of honor as a consistent statesman - he preferred the by-roads to a court, and wound his way through them with the cleverness of a trickster. His failings and their punishment should read a memorable lesson to public men. Having many of the essential elements of greatness, he rose to the highest elevation of rank without being duly honored, and diffused pleasure in society without winning esteem.

ART. II. THE CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY OF JUVENILE OFFENDERS, IN CONNECTION WITH SUITABLE HOUSES OF RESCUE AND REFORMATION.

[By C. J. A. Mittermaier, professor of law, at Heidelberg.]

THE criminal responsibility of juvenile offenders may be considered under several aspects: I. So far as a period is fixed up to which the law never presumes the responsibility to be well founded, so that, on no condition, can punishment be inflicted on one who has not reached this period, namely, the twelfth year; II. So far as from a certain age up to a certain period of years (that is, from the twelfth to the sixteenth year) the law presumes nothing in regard to crimes committed by such persons, but requires that the judge, in every single instance, shall first decide the preliminary question whether the person accused possesses the maturity and cultivation of mind necessary for responsibility; III. So far

as even with those who have passed the age designated by the foregoing consideration, the law never presumes complete maturity, but considers the juvenile offender as one whose responsibility is lessened; IV. So far as even with those offenders who are already older, but still under age, the law allows mitigation in regard to certain punishments. I. The necessity of fixing by law a period from which responsibility shall begin cannot be denied, when we consider, that, in the great majority of cases in which young persons, that is, before the completion of the twelfth year, commit offences, criminal responsibility cannot be presumed, judging from experience as well as considering the condition of the mental and physical development of such persons; that a minute criminal trial for the purpose of convicting the guilty person of the offence would be obnoxious in many respects; and that it would be very difficult to decide in regard to the criminal responsibility, as it is not easy to put oneself in the child's state of mind and judge accurately of its criminal intent. Besides the feelings' of the people would be offended, if they were to see a court of justice which should be vigilant only in prosecuting real crimes, occupied with cases which appear to every unprejudiced mind as mere puerile pranks of children, who would be better left to domestic discipline. It is, therefore, generally acknowledged, even in countries where legislation has not yet established such a period,' that it is necessary to fix upon a period from which criminal responsibility is to commence; but the great difference, in establishing this period, is surprising. While, on the other hand, the

2

1 Kitka, in the Journal: the Jurist, edited by Wildner, Vienna, 1840, Vol. iii. p. 10.

Kitka, in the Archives of criminal law, 1834, p. 121; Ionge van Ellemeet Diss. de minore ætate noxium et pœnam tollente. Trajecti, 1831.

3 Hellie, Theorie du Code pénal, Vol. ii. p. 158, 166; Rossi, Traite de droit pénal, Vol. ii. p. 156.

code of Bavaria excludes from responsibility only children under the age of eight years, that of Wurtemberg children under ten years, and those of Baden, Saxony and Hanover, children under twelve years old; the code of Brunswick adopts the rule that children under fourteen years old cannot be punished. This age is also adopted by the code of Austria in regard to crimes, though, in regard to offences against police regulations, children under ten years of age only are held non-responsible.' Interesting discussions on this question are to be found in the debates of the chambers of Baden, Hesse and Holland. In the second chamber of Baden, the proposition was made that criminal responsibility should first commence with the fourteenth year.

In the second chamber in Baden, the proposition was made that the criminal responsibility should first begin with the fourteenth year; in the chamber in Hesse,' the committee of the second chamber had already proposed to adopt this period, but both chambers adopted by a majority the proposition of the original outline, to declare the twelfth year as the age when criminal responsibility should commence. No doubt there are important reasons for adopting the fourteenth year as the age of responsibility. For the whole matter seems to depend partly upon this, that the legislator select a year, which in the great majority of cases, is the one in which a young man has attained the requisites for responsibility, and partly that this period is one which appears like an era in life. This seems to be the fourteenth year, when the child leaves school, and, by admission to the Lord's

Bavarian Code, art. 121; Code of Wurtemberg, 95; of Saxony, sec. 66; Projected code of Baden, art. 74; Code of Hanover, sec. 83; of Brunswick, sec. 30; of Austria on police-offences, part ii. sec. 4.

* Verhandlungen, Protokollheft, V. p. 201.

Report of Committee, p. 93; Debates of second chamber, session 134,

p. 39.

Also, the motives for the code of Brunswick, p. 20.

supper, has attained its necessary religious education, and when at the same time, it attains its physical development through the puberty which commences in this year and which has, as is known, great influence upon the mind. The fourteenth year recommends itself also by the consideration that the punishment of persons under fourteen bears more the character of chastisement, and should be more calculated for the correction of the juvenile offender, and that, for the attainment of this purpose, very little can be done in our institutions for punishment. On the other hand, still more important reasons influence the legislator to fix the twelfth year as the period up to which no criminal responsibility can be presumed. In our circumstances of living, physical maturity takes place, soon after the twelfth, especially with children in cities; children of this age are brought more into social relations, and, in the country, they leave their parental homes, to work for their livelihood, and, by this means, they obtain more opportunity to obtain the knowledge of good and evil. Moreover we must rely also upon the innate moral feeling which is already more cultivated in a child after the age of ten, and still more developed by religious instruction and education, and which, in many crimes, for instance in theft, teaches the unlawfulness of certain actions. Experience shows, that, among persons between twelve and fourteen years, especially in large cities, there are precocious offenders corrupted frequently by bad education, seduction, and opportunity, who are fully aware of the unlawfulness (wickedness) of their actions. If now we adopt first the fourteenth year as the age of responsibility, too many of such persons, early corrupted, are declared as not responsible by means of a legal presumption; it is made impossible for the judge, to decide on the responsibility, though it be shown ever so clearly by the circumstances of the particular case; and the juvenile offender, whose early maturity in the path of vice is manifest, is pro