nominal damages as a trespasser. Chambers v. Bedell, 2 Watts & Sergeant, 225.

-

2 (Intoxication.) Trespass for injury to plaintiff's person. Plaintiff and defendant were in a public bar room; defendant fell against a stove, and by his fall caused a vessel of hot water to upset, and the plaintiff was scalded. Held, if the fall of the defendant was a mere accident, brought about without any default or negligence, or any improper conduct on his part, he would not be responsible to the plaintiff for the injury; but if the fall was the effect of intoxication from drinking to excess, the defendant was liable. Sullivan v. Murphy, 2 Miles, 298. TRUST. (Devise to trustees of successors.) Where an estate is devised to certain trustees and their successors, the limitation over to 'he successors is void. Miles v. Fisher, 1 Wilcox, 1. TRUSTEE. (Conveyance by.) A deed of conveyance by a trustee, in whom is vested a legal title, transfers such title to the grantee, upon which he may maintain ejectment for the land conveyed; and a stranger to the trust, and one who claims adversely to it, cannot set up as a defence, a violation of the rights of the cestui que trust in such conveyance. M'Henry v. M' Call, 10 Watts, 455.

UNITED STATES. (Conflict of Laws.) In a case of doubtful solution, involving a question of conflict between a statute of the state and of the United States, the supreme court of Pennsylvania will so decide as that the judgment may come in review before the highest judicial tribunal, the supreme court of the United States, without the expression of their own opinion, which might conclude the party. Hopkins v. Stockton, 2 Watts & Sergeant, 163.

USURY. (Collection fees.) An agreement to pay five per cent. as collection fees, in addition to the legal rate of interest for money loaned, is against public policy, and void. State of Ohio v. Taylor and others, 1 Wilcox, 378.

VARIANCE. (Official bond.) A variance between a statutory

bond and the requisitions of the law, is fatal only when the condition would impose a greater burden on the obligor than the law allows. Commonwealth v. Laub, 1 Watts & Sergeant, 261.

VENDOR AND PURCHASER. (Rescission.) Where a vendee seeks to rescind for want of title in the vendor, he must restore to the vendor all he received, and place him back in his original situation. Brown v. Witter, 1 Wilcox, 142.

2. (Same.) If the sale of a chattel be absolute, with a warranty of soundness, and there be no consent by the vendor to take it back, the vendee cannot rescind the contract, but is put to his action on the warranty, unless the vendor knew of its unsound. ness, and the vendee gave him reasonable notice of it. Kase v. John, 10 Watts, 107.

3. (Defective title.) Where goods have been sold and delivered, and the purchaser has not been molested in the enjoyment of the property, and no other claimant has appeared, the purchaser is bound to fulfil his contract, and cannot defend himself against an action for the price, by showing how the vendor obtained his title, and that the title is defective. Kennebec Log Driving Co. v. Burrill, 6 Shepley, 314.

4. (Innocent purchaser.) An innocent purchaser of goods for a valuable consideration from a fraudulent vendee, in possession thereof, obtains a good title against the creditors of the fraudulent vendor. Neal v. Williams, 6 Shepley, 391. VERDICT. (Inquiry of jury.) After a verdict is read in court,

and before it is affirmed, the presiding judge may rightfully inquire of the jury, upon what principles their verdict is founded. Smith v. Putney, 6 Shepley, 87.

WAYS. (Public river frozen over.) All have a lawful right to travel on a public river upon the ice; and if any one cuts holes through the ice upon or near the place where there has been a winter way for twenty years, he is liable to the payment of all damages sustained thereby by those travelling upon such way without carelessness or fault on their part. French v. Camp, 6 Shepley, 433.

WILL. (Made in another State.) A will made in another state, valid in the place where made, but not in the forms required by the laws of Ohio, passes no property in Ohio, under the act of 1831. Aliter, under the acts of 1805 and 1840. Meese and wife v. Keefe and others, 1 Wilcox, 362.

ness.

2. (Signing.) Under the act of the 8th of April, 1833, in Pennsylvania, a will must be signed by the person making the same at the end thereof, unless prevented from signing it, or from directing another to sign it, by the extremity of last sickSemble, that a long standing and continued infirmity, as a chronic disease, would not be such extremity. The deceased, by reason of an infirmity of the hands of some standing, was unable to write, but directed others to sign his will for him, who refused so to do from misapprehension of the law. Held, that such refusal with a continued exertion at each opportunity to have the will signed, was not a compliance with the provisions of the act. Stricker v. Groves, 5 Wharton, 386. 3. (Beneficial interest in.) One cannot take a beneficial interest under a will, and afterwards set up any right or claim of his own, if otherwise legal and well founded, which shall defeat or prevent the full operation of every part of the will. Patten, 6 Shepley, 42.

Weeks v.

WITNESS. (Religious belief.) One who believes in the exist ence of God, and that an oath is binding on the conscience, is a competent witness, though he does not believe in a future state of rewards and punishments. cox, 121.

Brock v. Milligan, 1 Wil

2. (Pilot.) In an action for the loss of a steamboat by the owners against the insurers, the pilot at the wheel is a competent witness to prove the loss. Vairin v. Canal Ins. Co. 1 Wilcox, 223. 3. (Jurors.) Jurors are not competent witnesses to impeach their own verdict. Hulet v. Barnett, 459.

4. (Competency of bailor.) In an action against a warehouseman or forwarding merchant, to recover the value of a lost trunk, the plaintiff is a competent witness to prove the contents of it; but this rule is limited and controlled by circumstances respecting the nature of the contents. It will only extend to such articles as are ordinarily necessary for the convenience and use of a traveller. Clark & Co. v. Spense, 10 Watts, 335. In such action the law will not intend negligence on the part of the bailee, who will be presumed to have acted according to

his trust until the contrary is shown. But to throw the burthen of proof on the bailor, it is necessary that the bailee should show clearly how the goods were lost. Ib.

5. (Partner.) In an action against partners, upon a note signed with the name of the firm after it was dissolved, the one who signed being willing to testify, and having been first released by the plaintiff from any other action on the note, is a competent witness. Whitehead v. The Bank of Pittsburgh, 2 Watts & Sergeant, 172.

6. (Liability.) An indirect and contingent liability of a witness is not sufficient to exclude his testimony on the ground of interest; it affects only his credibility. Irvine v. Lumbermen's Bank, 2 Watts & Sergeant, 190.

7. (Passenger in stage coach.) In an action by a passenger against a stage-owner to recover the value of a trunk and its contents cut and carried away from the stage, the plaintiff is not a competent witness to prove that there was money in the trunk, or the amount. David v. Moore, 2 Watts & Sergeant, 230. 8. (Religious belief.) The true test of a witness's competency on the ground of his religious principles is, whether he believes in the existence of a God who will punish him if he swear falsely; and within this rule are comprehended those who believe future punishments not to be eternal. Cubbison v. M' Creary,

2 Watts & Sergeant, 262. WORK AND LABOR. (Performance.) If a contract requires the performance of an entire work by one party, yet if the other party dispense with the performance of portions of it, the plaintiff may recover in an action on the contract, the sum he is entitled to for the work actually done. Wilhelm v. Caul, 2 Watts & Sergeant, 26.

2. (Same.) An action upon a written contract to recover the price of certain labor and services performed, will not be defeated by proof that the plaintiff failed in some slight particulars in his performance, if it appear that he acted with a bona fide intention of fulfilling his whole contract, and the other contracting party received the fruit of his labor as performed. Preston v. Finney, 2 Watts & Sergeant, 53.

CRITICAL NOTICES.

1.

The Magistrate's Criminal Law: A Practical Treatise on the Jurisdiction, Duty, and Authority of Justices of the Peace, in the State of New York, in Criminal Cases. Containing also a Summary of the Law relative to Crimes and Punishments, with an Appendix of Forms of Proceedings. By OLIVER L. BarBOUR, Counsellor at Law. Albany: Wm. and A. Gould and Co.; and by Gould, Banks and Co., New York. 1841.

THE author of this work is already favorably known to the profession, both in New York and elsewhere, by the Equity Digest, published some two or three years since, by him, in conjunction with Mr. Harrington. The present is a work, altogether higher in its pretensions, more elaborate in its structure, and of more difficult performance, than any mere digest can well be supposed to be. Indeed, we hardly know of any work, in the language, (setting aside Burn's Justice,) designed for the use of the criminal magistrate, of so great extent and so carefully prepared, as this of Mr. Barbour. The only one we think of, at this moment, that deserves to be mentioned in connection with it, is that of the late lamented professor Davis, of Virginia. With such a guide as this, justices of the peace in New York, cannot fail to find their labors greatly lightened; and, where the preliminary proceedings are properly conducted in criminal cases, the duties of the higher courts, for the punishment of crimes, are rendered comparatively easy and plain.