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made. His disapproval of a bill is communicated to the house in which it originated, with his reasons; and it is there reconsidered, and may be again passed over the veto by such vote as the constitution prescribes.?
People v. Hatch, 19 Ill. 283. An act apportioning the representatives was passed by the legislature and transmitted to the governor, who signed his approval thereon by mistake, supposing at the time that he was subscribing one of several other bills then lying before him, and claiming his official attention; his private secretary thereupon reported the bill to the legislature as approved, not by the special direction of the governor, nor with his knowledge or special assent, but merely in his usual routine of customary duty, the governor not being conscious that he had placed his signature to the bill until after information was brought to him of its having been reported approved; whereupon be sent a message to the speaker of the house to which it was reported, stating that it had been inadvertently signed and not approved, and on the same day completed a veto message of the bill which was partially written at the time of signing his approval, and transmitted it to the house where the bill originated, having first erased his signature and approval. It was held that the bill had not become a law. It had never passed out of the governor's possession after it was received by him until after he had erased his signature and approval, and the court was of opinion that it did not pass from his control until it had become a law by the lapse of ten days under the constitution, or by his depositing it with his approval in the office of the secretary of state. It had long been the practice of the gove ernor to report, formerly through the secretary of state, but recently through his private secretary, to the house where bills originated, his approval of them; but this was only a matter of formal courtesy, and not a proceeding necessary to the making or imparting vitality to the law. By it no act could become a law which without it would not be a law. Had the governor returned the bill itself to the house, with his message of approval, it would have passed beyond his control, and the approval could not bave been retracted, unless the bill had been withdrawn by consent of the house; and the same result would have followed bis filing the bill with the secretary of state with his approval subscribed.
The Constitution of Indiana provides, art. 5, § 14, that, “ if any bill shall not be returned by the governor within three days, Sundays excepted, after it shall have been presented to him, it shall be a law without his signature, unless the general adjournment shall prevent its return; in which case it shall be a law unless the governor, within five days next after the adjournment, shall file such bill with his objections thereto, in the office of the secretary of state," &c. Under this provision it was held where the governor, on the day of the final adjournment of the legislature, and after the adjournment, filed a bill received that day, in the office of the secretary of state, without approval or objections thereto, it thereby became a law, and he could not file objections afterwards. Tarlton v. Peggs, 18 Ind. 24.
? A bill which, as approved and signed, differs in important particulars from the one signed, is no law. Jones v. Hutchinson, 43 Ala. 721. If the governor sends back a bill which has been submitted to him, stating
* Other Powers of the Governor.
The power of the governor as a branch of the legislative department is almost exclusively confined to the approval of bills. As executive, he communicates to the two houses information concerning the condition of the State, and may recommend measures to their consideration, but he cannot originate or introduce bills. He may convene the legislature in extra session whenever extraordinary occasion seems to have arisen ; but their powers when convened are not confined to a consideration of the subjects to which their attention is called by his proclamation or his message, and they may legislate on any subject as at the regular sessions. An exception to this statement exists in those States where, by the express terms of the constitution, it is provided that when convened in extra session the legislature shall consider no subject except that for which they were specially called together, or which may
that he cannot act upon it because of some supposed informality in its passage, this is in effect an objection to the bill, and it can only become a law by further action of the legislature, even though the governor may have been mistaken as to the supposed informality.. Birdsall v. Carrick, 3 Nev. 154.
In practice the veto power, although very great and exceedingly important in this country, is obsolete in Great Britain, and no king now ventures to resort to it. As the Ministry must at all times be in accord with the House of Commons, - except where the responsibility is taken of dissolving the Parliament and appealing to the people, – it must follow that any bill which the two houses have passed must be approved by the monarch. The approval has become a matter of course, and the governing power in Great Britain is substantially in the House of Commons. 1 Bl. Com. 181-5, and notes.
The Constitution of Iowa, art. 4, § 11, provides that the governor “may, on extraordinary occasions, convene the General Assembly by proclamation, and shall state to both houses, when assembled, the purpose for which they have been convened.” It was held in Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa, 82, that the General Assembly, when thus convened, were not confined in their legislation to the purposes specified in the message. • When lawfully convened, whether in virtue of the provision in the constitution or the governor's proclamation, it is the • General Assembly of the State, in which the full and exclusive legislative authority of the State is vested. Where its business at such session is not restricted by some constitutional provision, the General Assembly may enact any law at a special or extra session that it might at a regular session. Its powers, not being derived from the governor's proclamation, are not confined to the special purpose for which it may have been convened by him."
have been submitted to them by special message of the governor.1
When Acts are to take Effect. The old rule was that statutes, unless otherwise ordered, took
effect from the first day of the session on which they were [* 156] passed ;2 * but this rule was purely arbitrary, based upon
no good reason, and frequently working very serious injustice. The present rule is that an act takes effect from the time when the formalities of enactment are actually complete under the constitution, unless it is otherwise ordered, or unless there is some constitutional or statutory rule on the subject which prescribes otherwise. By the Constitution of Mississippi,8 “no law of a general nature, unless otherwise provided, shall be enforced until sixty days after the passage thereof." By the Constitution of Illinois, no act of the General Assembly shall take effect until the first day of July next after its passage, unless in case of emergency (which emergency shall be expressed in the preamble or body of the act) the General Assembly shall, by a vote of two-thirds of all the members elected to each house, otherwise direct. By the Constitution of Michigan, no public act shall take effect, or be in force, until the expiration of ninety days from the end of the session at which the same is passed, unless the legislature shall otherwise direct by a two-thirds vote of the members elected to each house. These and similar provisions are designed to secure, as far as possible, the public promulgation of the law before parties are bound to take notice of and act under it, and to obviate the injustice of a rule which should compel parties at their peril to know and obey a law of which, in the nature of things, they could not possibly have heard ; they give to all parties the full constitutional period in which to become acquainted with the terms of the statutes which
· Provisions to this effect will be found in the Constitutions of Illinois, Michigan, Missouri, and Nevada; perhaps in some others.
? 1 Lev. 91 ; Latless v. Holmes, 4 T. R. 660. This is changed by 33 Geo. III. c. 13, by which statutes since passed take effect from the day when they receive the royal assent, unless otherwise ordered therein. Where an act is to take effect from and after its passage, it will do so, even though not promulgated in the official journal. Thomas v. Scott, 23 La. An. 689. And its effect covers the whole day of its approval. Wood v. Fort, 42 Ala. 641. 3 Art. 7, § 6. • Art. 3, § 23.
5 Art. 4, § 20.
are passed, except when the legislature has otherwise directed; and no one is bound to govern his conduct by the new law until that period has elapsed. And the fact that, by the terms of the statute, something is to be done under it before the expiration of the constitutional period for it to take effect, will not amount to a legislative direction that the act shall take effect at that time, if the act itself is silent as to the period when it shall go into operation.?
* The Constitution of Indiana provides.3 that “no act [* 157] shall take effect until the same shall have been published and circulated in the several counties of this State, by authority, except in case of emergency; which emergency shall be declared in the preamble, or in the body of the law.” Unless the emergency is thus declared, it is plain that the act cannot take earlier effect. But the courts will not inquire too nicely into the mode of publication. If the laws are distributed in bound volumes, in a manner and shape not substantially contrary to the statute on that subject, and by the proper authority, it will be held sufficient, notwithstanding a failure to comply with some of the directory provisions of the statute on the subject of publication."
· Price v. Hopkin, 13 Mich. 318. See, however, Smith v. Morrison, 22 Pick. 430; Stine v. Bennett, 13 Minn. 153. Where a law has failed to take effect for want of publication, all parties are chargeable with notice of that fact. Clark 0. Janesville, 10 Wis. 136.
• Supervisors of Iroquois Co. v. Keady, 34 III. 293. An act for the removal of a county seat provided for taking the vote of the electors of the county upon it on the 17th of March, 1863, at which time the legislature had not adjourned. It was not expressly declared in the act at what time it should take effect, and it was therefore held that it would not take effect until sixty days from the end of the session, and a vote of the electors taken on the 17th of March was void. And it was also held in this case, and in Wheeler v. Chubbuck, 16 Ill. 361, that “the direction must be made in a clear, distinct, and unequivocal provision, and could not be helped out by any sort of intendment or implication,” and that the act must all take effect at once, and not by piecemeal. ; Art. 4, § 28.
Carpenter v. Montgomery, 7 Blackf. 415; Hendrickson v. Hendrickson, 7 Ind. 13; Mark v. State, 15 Ind. 98. The legislature must necessarily in these cases be judge of the existence of the emergency. Carpenter v. Montgomery, supra. The Constitution of Tennessee provides that “No law of a general nature shall take effect until forty days after its passage, unless the same, or the caption, shall state that the public welfare requires that it should take effect sooner." Art. 1, § 20.
5 State o. Bailey, 16 Ind. 46. See further, as to this constitutional provision, Jones 0. Cavins, 4 Ind. 305.
The Constitution of Wisconsin, on the other hand, provides 1 that “no general law shall be in force until published ”; thus leaving the time when it should take effect to depend, not alone upon the legislative direction, but upon the further fact of publication. But what shall be the mode of publication seems to be left to the legislative determination. It has been held, however, that a general law was to be regarded as published although printed in the volume of private laws, instead of the volume of public laws as the statute of the State would require. But an unauthorized publication — as, for example, of an act for the incorporation of a city in two local papers instead of the State
paper — is no publication in the constitutional sense.3 [* 158] * The Constitution of Iowa provides that “no law of the
General Assembly, passed at a regular session, of a public nature, shall take effect until the fourth day of July next after the passage thereof.
Laws passed at a special session shall take effect ninety days after the adjournment of the General Assembly by which they were passed. If the General Assembly shall deem any law of immediate importance, they may provide that the same shall take effect by publication in newspapers in the State.”' 4 Under this section it is not competent for the legislature to confer upon the governor the discretionary power which the constitution gives to that body, to fix an earlier day for the law to take effect.5
| Art. 7, § 21.
? Matter of Boyle, 9 Wis. 264. Under this provision it has been decided that a law establishing a municipal court in a city is a general law. Matter of Boyle, supra. See Eitel v. State, 33 Ind. 201. Also a statute for the removal of a county seat. State v. Lean, 9 Wis. 279. Also a statute incorporating a municipality, or authorizing it to issue bonds in aid of a railroad. Clark v. Janesville, 10 Wis. 136. And see Scott v. Clark, 1 Iowa, 70.
3 Clark v. Janesville, 10 Wis. 136. See; further, Mills v. Jefferson, 20 Wis. 50.
4 Art. 3, § 26.