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intent of this provision of the constitution was, to prevent the union, in the same act, of incongruous matters, and of objects having no connection, no relation. And with this it was designed to prevent surprise in legislation, by having matter of one nature embraced in a bill whose title expressed another.”i And similar expressions will be found in many other reported cases. It may therefore be assumed as settled that the purpose of these provisions was: first, to prevent hodge podge, or “log-rolling" legislation ; second, to prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature,
by means of provisions in bills of which the titles [* 144] * gave no intimation, and which might therefore be over
looked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and, third, to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subjects of legislation that are being considered, in order that they may have opportunity of being heard thereon, by petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire.
2. The particularity required in stating the object. The general purpose of these provisions is accomplished: when a law bas but one general object, which is fairly indicated by its title. To require every end and means necessary or convenient for the accomplishment of this general object to be provided for by a separate act relating to that alone, would not only be unreasonable, but would actually render legislation impossible. It has accordingly been held that the title of an act to establish a police government for the city of Detroit," was not objectionable for its generality, and that all matters properly connected with the establishment and efficiency of such a government, including taxation for its support, and courts for the examination and trial of offenders, might constitutionally be included in the bill under this general title. Under any different ruling it was said, “ the police government of a city could not be organized without a distinct act for each specific duty to be devolved upon it, and these could not be passed until a multitude of other statutes had taken
1 State v. County Judge of Davis Co., 2 Iowa, 282.
• See Conner v. Mayor, &c., of New York, 5 N. Y. 293; Davis v. State, 7 Md. 151. The Supreme Court of Indiana also understand the provision in the constitution of that State to be designed, among other things, to assist in the codification of the laws. Indiana Central Railroad Co. v. Potts, 7 Ind. 685; Hingle v. State, 24 Ind. 28.
the same duties from other officers before performing them. And these several statutes, fragmentary as they must necessarily be, would often fail of the intended object, from the inherent difficulty in expressing the legislative will when restricted to such narrow bounds." The generality of a title is therefore no objection to it, so long as it is not made a cover to legislation incongruous in itself, and which by no fair intendment can be considered as having a necessary or proper connection. The legislature must determine for itself how broad and comprehensive shall be the object of a statute, and how much particularity shall be employed in the title in defining it. One thing, however, is very
plain ; that the use of the words “ other purposes,” which [* 145] has heretofore been so common in the title to acts, with a
' People v. Mahaney, 13 Mich. 495. See also Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa, 82, and Whiting v. Mount Pleasant, 11 Iowa, 482; Bright v. McCulloch, 27 Ind. 223; Mayor, &c., of Annapolis v. State, 30 Md. 112 ; State v. Union, 33 N. J. 354; Humboldt County v. Churchill Co. Commissioners, 6 Nev. 30.
· Indiana Central Railroad Co. v. Potts, 7 Ind. 681 ; People v. Briggs, 50 N. Y. 553.
3 In State v. Powers, 14 Ind. 195, an act came under consideration, the title to wbich was,
“ An act to amend the first section of an act entitled An act concerning licenses to vend foreign merchandise, to exbibit any caravan, menagerie, circus, rope and wire dancing puppet-shows, and legerdemain,' approved June 15, 1852, and for the encouragement of agriculture, and concerning the licensing of stock and exchange brokers.” It was held that the subject of the act was licenses, and that it was not unconstitutional as containing more than one subject. But it was held also that, as the licenses which it author zed and required were specified in the title, the act could embrace no others, and consequently a provision in the act requiring concerts to be licensed was void. In State v. County Judge of Davis County, 2 Iowa, 280, the act in question was entitled “ An act in relation to certain State roads therein named.” It contained sixty-six sections, in which it established some forty-six roads, vacated some, and provided for the re-location of others. The court sustained the act. “ The object of an act may be broader or narrower, more or less extensive; and the broader it is, the more particulars will it embrace. . . . There is undoubtedly great objection to uniting so many particulars in one act, but so long as they are of the same nature, and come legitimately under one general determination or object, we cannot say that the act is unconstitutional.” P. 284. Upon this subject see Indiana Central Railroad Co. v. Potts, 7 Ind. 684, where it is considered at length. Also Brewster v. Syracuse, 19 N. Y. 116; Hall v. Bunte, 20 Ind. 304; People v. McCallum, 1 Neb. 182. An act entitled “ An act fixing the time and mode of electing State printer, defining his duties, fixing compensation, and repealing all laws coming in conflict with this act,” was, sustained in Walker v. Dunham, 17 Ind. 483.
view to cover any and every thing, whether connected with the main purpose indicated by the title or not, can no longer be of any avail where these provisions exist. As was said by the Supreme Court of New York in a case where these words had been made use of in the title to a local bill : “ The words ' for other purposes' must be laid out of consideration. They express nothing, and amount to nothing as a compliance with this constitutional requirement. Nothing which the act could not embrace without them can be brought in by their aid.” 1
3. What is embraced by the title. The repeal of a statute on a given subject, it is held, is properly connected with the subjectmatter of a new statute on the same subject; and therefore a repealing section in the new statute is valid, notwithstanding
the title is silent on that subject. So an act to incorpo[* 146] rate a railroad * company, it has been held, may authorize
counties to subscribe to its stock, or otherwise aid the construction of the road. So an act to incorporate the Firemen's Benevolent Association may lawfully include under this title provisions for levying a tax upon the income of foreign insurance companies, at the place of its location, for the benefit of the corporation. So an act to provide a homestead for widows and children was held valid, though what it provided for was the pecuniary means
| Town of Fishkill v. Fishkill and Beekman Plank Road Co., 22 Barb. 642. See, to the same effect, Ryerson v. Utley, 16 Mich. 269; St. Louis v. Tiefel, 42 Mo. 578. An act entitled “ An act to repeal certain acts therein named," is void. People v. Mellen, 32 III. 181. An act, having for its sole object to legalize certain proceedings of the Common Council of Janesville, but entitled merely “ An act to legalize and authorize the assessment of street improvements and assessments," was held not to express the subject, because failing to specify the locality. Durkee v. Janesville, 26 Wis. 697.
2 Gabbert v. Railroad Co., 11 Ind. 365. The constitution under which this decision was made required the law to contain but one subject, and matters properly connected therewith ; but the same decision was made under the New York Constitution, which omits the words here italicized; and it may well be doubted whether the legal effect of the provision is varied by the addition of those words. See Guilford v. Cornell, 18 Barb. 640.
Supervisors, &c. v. People, 25 Ill. 181. So a provision for the costs on appeal from a justice, is properly connected with the subject of an act entitled of “the election and qualification of justices of the peace, and defining their jurisdiction, powers, and duties in civil cases." Robinson v. Skipworth, 23 Ind. 311. • Firemen's Association v. Lounsbury, 21 Ill. 511.
sufficient to purchase a homestead.1 So an act "to regulate proceedings in the county court" was held to properly embrace a provision giving an appeal to the District Court, and regulating the proceedings therein on the appeal.2 So an act entitled " an act for the more uniform doing of township business" may properly provide for the organization of townships. So it is held that the changing of the boundaries of existing counties is a matter properly connected with the subject of forming new counties out of those existing. So a provision for the organization and sitting of courts in new counties is properly connected with the subject of the formation of such counties, and may be included in "an act to authorize the formation of new counties, and to change county boundaries." "5 Many other cases are referred to in the note which will further illustrate the views of the courts upon this subject. There has been a general disposition to construe the constitutional provision liberally, rather than to embarrass legislation by a construction whose strictness is unnecessary to the accomplishment of the beneficial purposes for which it has been adopted.
1 Succession of Lanzetti, 9 La. An. 329. Murphey v. Menard, 11 Texas, 673.
3 Clinton v. Draper, 14 Ind. 295.
Haggard v. Hawkins, 14 Ind. 299. And see Duncombe v. Prindle, 12 Iowa, 1.
5 Brandon v. State, 16 Ind. 197. In this case, and also in State v. Bowers, 14 Ind. 198, it was held that if the title to an original act is sufficient to embrace the matters covered by the provisions of an act amendatory thereof, it is unnecessary to inquire whether the title of an amendatory act would, of itself, be sufficient. And see Morford v. Unger, 8 Iowa, 82.
Green v. Mayor, &c., R. M. Charlt. 368; Martin v. Broach, 6 Geo. 21; Protho v. Orr, 12 Geo. 36; Wheeler v. State, 23 Geo. 9; Hill Commissioners, 22 Geo. 203; Jones v. Columbus, 25 Geo. 610; Denham v. Holeman, 26 Geo. 182; Cannon v. Hemphill, 7 Texas, 184; Battle v. Howard, 13 Texas, 345; Robinson v. State, 15 Texas, 311; Conner v. Mayor, &c., of New York, 2 Sandf. 355, and 5 N. Y. 285; Fishkill v. Plank Road Co., 22 Barb. 634; Brewster v. Syracuse, 19 N. Y. 116; People v. McCann, 16 N. Y. 58; Williams v. People, 24 N. Y. 405; People v. Lawrence, 36 Barb. 177; Sharp v. Mayor, &c., of New York, 31 Barb. 572; Davis v. State, 7 Md. 51; Keller v. State, 11 Md. 525; Parkinson v. State, 14 Md. 184; Bossier v. Steele, 13 La. An. 433; Læfon v. Dufoe, 9 La. An. 329; State v. Harrison, 11 La. An. 722; Williams v. Payson, 14 La. An. 7; Fletcher v. Oliver, 25 Ark. 298; Mewherter v. Price, 11 Ind. 199; Gabbert v. Railroad Co., ib. 365; Railroad Co. v. Whiteneck, 8 Ind. 217; Wilkins v. Miller, 9 Ind. 100; Foley v. State, ib. 363; Gillespie v. State, ib. 380; Henry v. Henry, 13 Ind. 250; Igoe v. State, 14 Ind. 239; Haggard v. Hawkins,
* 4. The effect if the title embrace more than one object. Perhaps in those States where this constitutional provision
ib. 299; Reed v. State, 12 Ind. 641 ; Sturgeon v. Hitchens, 22 Ind. 107; Lauer v. State, ib. 461; Central Plank Road Co. v. Hannaman, ib. 48+; Gifford v. Railroad Co., 2 Stockt. 171; Johnson v. Higgins, 3 Met. (Ky.) 566; Chiles v. Drake, 2 Met. (Ky.) 146; Louisville, &c., Co. v. Ballard, ib. 165; Phillips v. Covington, &c., Co., ib. 219; Cbiles v. Monroe, 4 Met. (Ky.) 72; Commonwealth v. Dewey, 15 Grat. 1; Whiting v. Mount Pleasant, 11 Iowa, 482; Tuttle v. Strout, 7 Minn. 465; Supervisors, &c. v. Heenan, 2 Minn. 330; Railroad Co. v. Gregory, 15 Ill. 20; People v. Mellen, 32 III. 181; Cutlip v. Sheriff, 3 W. Va. 588; McAunich v. Mississippi, &c. R.R. Co., 20 Iowa, 338; State v. Gut, 13 Minn. 3+1 ; People v. Allen, 42 N.Y. 404; State v. Miller, 45 Mo. 495.
In Davis v. Woolnough, 9 Iowa, 104, an act entitled “ An act for revising and consolidating the laws incorporating the city of Dubuque, and to establish a city court therein,” was held to express by its title but one object, which was, the revising and consolidating the laws incorporating the city; and the city court, not being an unusual tribunal in such a municipality, might be provided for by the act, whether mentioned in the title or not. “An act to enable the supervisors of the city and county of New York to raise money by tax," provided for raising money to pay judgments then existing, and also any thereafter to be recovered; and it also contained the further provision, that whenever the controller of the city should have reason to believe that any judgment then of record or thereafter obtained bad been obtained by collusion, or was founded in fraud, he should take the proper and necessary means to open and reverse the same, &c. This provision was held constitutional, as properly connected with the subject indicated by the title, and necessary to confine the payments of the tax to the objects for which the moneys were intended to be raised. Sharp v. Mayor, &c., of New York, 31 Barb. 572. In O'Leary v. Cook Co., 28 Ill. 534, it was held that a clause in an act incorporating a college, prohibiting the sale of ardent spirits within a stance of four miles, was so germane to the primary object of the charter as to be properly included within it. By the first section of " an act for the relief of the creditors of the Lockport and Niagara Falls Railroad Company,” it was made the duty of the president of the corporation, or one of the directors to be appointed by the president, to advertise and sell the real and personal estate, including the franchise of the company, at public auction to the highest bidder. It was then declared that the sale should be absolute, and that it should vest in the purchaser or purchasers of the property, real or personal, of the company, all the franchise, rights, and privileges of the corporation, as fully and as absolutely as the same were then possessed by the company. The money arising from the sale, after paying costs, was to be applied, first, to the payment of a certain judgment, and then to other liens according to priority; and the surplus, if any, was to be divided ratably among the other creditors, and then if there should be an overplus, it was to be divided ratably among the then stockholders. By the second section of the act, it was declared that the purchaser or purchasers should have the right to sell and distribute stock to the full amount which was authorized by the act of incorporation, and