assessing the capital stock clearly demonstrate that the State Board of Equalization did not exercise its judgment but fixed the value of the stock arbitrarily at such an excessive amount as was fraudulent. Rule 25 is not a rule made with reference to the valuation of property but one made for the convenience of the members of the board in the disposition of its business. Another rule provided for the suspension of the rules at any time upon a two-thirds vote of the members present. The motion suspending rule 25 was voted for by all the twenty-two members present, the board consisting of twenty-six members, and the report was adopted by the same vote. The railroad and capital stock committees each consisted of seven members and the matter of the appellee's assessment was heard at a joint meeting of the committees. While there was no consideration of this report or of the appellee's assessment after the report was presented to the full board, the appellee had had an opportunity for a hearing and had presented its claims to the committees, constituting a majority of the board. It is to be presumed that the rules were suspended because the members of the board had sufficient information themselves and desired to take immediate action. The rule was for their convenience and not to secure any right to the appellee, which had had its hearing. It was suspended in accordance with the rules, and the action of the board in immediately adopting the report cannot be regarded, for that reason, as arbitrary.

The statute requires the State Board of Equalization to fix the value of the capital stock, including franchise, of corporations. The report of the capital stock committee fixed the "full value of capital stock and franchise" at $4,600,ooo, the "assessed value of capital stock and franchise" at $1,533,335, and the "net assessment of capital stock, including franchise," after deducting tangible property, at $600,000. The appellee insists that this shows that the value of the franchise was added to the value of the capi

tal stock, which includes all property, and thereby the value of the franchise was made to appear twice in the total. This argument is based entirely upon the use of the word "and" instead of "including," in the first two items just mentioned, and in our judgment is without force.

A tax on the capital stock of a corporation is a personal property tax. (Parsons v. East St. Louis Gas Light and Coke Co. 108 Ill. 380; Belleville Nail Co. v. People, 98 id. 399; Cooper v. Corbin, 105 id. 224.) Section 255 of the Revenue act provides that the tax on personal property can not be charged against real property except in case of removals or where the tax cannot be made out of personal property. One of these conditions must be shown before judgment can be rendered against the real estate. (Schaeffer v. People, 60 Ill. 179; Mt. Carmel Light and Water Co. v. People, 166 id. 199; People v. Scheifley, 252 id. 486.) Section 170 of the Revenue act provides that if any town or district collector shall be unable to collect any tax upon personal property charged in the tax book, by reason of the removal or insolvency of the person to whom said tax is charged or on account of any errors in the tax book, he shall, at the time of returning his book to the county collector, note in writing opposite the name of each person charged with such tax the cause of failure to collect the same, and shall make oath that the cause of delinquency or error noted is true and correct and that such sums remain due and unpaid and that he has used due diligence to collect the same, which affidavit shall be entered upon said collector's book and be signed by the town or district collector. The bill of exceptions contains no evidence of any attempt to comply with this section. The common law record contains a recital that a motion by the People was made and allowed for leave to correct the collector's return, and an affidavit, purporting to have been made by the town collector, stating that there is no personal property of the appellee in Venice township out of which the delinquent tax

can be collected. No amendment of the return was made, and no return, original or amended, was offered in evidence. There was no evidence of any notation in the town collector's book of the reason for failure to collect the capital stock tax.

Section 183 of the Revenue act provides that when it becomes necessary to charge the tax on personal property against real property the collector shall select some particular tract or lots of real property owned by the person owing such personal property tax, and in his advertisement for judgment and sale shall designate the particular tract or lots of real property against which such personal property tax is charged, and in the list filed for judgment the same facts shall be shown, and the court shall take cognizance thereof and give judgment against such tract or lots of real property for such personal property tax. There was no statement in the application for judgment or the advertisement that the collector would seek to charge any personal property tax on any real property, but the application was for a judgment and order of sale against land, town lots and personal property upon which the collector had been unable to collect the taxes, special assessments, interest and costs due and charged thereon. The facts shown in this record are insufficient to show that the assessment of capital stock was fraudulently made, but for the reason that the record will not sustain a judgment against the real estate for a personal property tax the objection to the capital stock tax was properly sustained.

The judgment will be reversed as to the tax of 1916 and affirmed as to the tax of 1917 and the cause will be remanded, with directions to overrule the objection to the 1916 tax.

Reversed in part and remanded, with directions.

(No. 12963-Decree reversed.)

BELLE CRAWLEY, Admx. Appellee, vs. MINNIE HOWE,

Appellant.

Opinion filed December 17, 1919-Rehearing denied Feb. 5, 1920.

I. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE—basis for equitable relief on ground of part performance. To authorize equitable relief on the ground of part performance of an alleged oral contract to convey land, the acts relied upon as part performance must be such that the alleged promisee would suffer injury amounting to fraud if the Statute of Frauds were allowed to be interposed as a defense to the bill for specific performance.

2. SAME-proof of alleged contract and of the acts of part performance must be clear. While in the case of an alleged oral contract by a father to convey land to his son, with whom he was residing on the land, it is not necessary to prove exclusive possession by the son or the making of lasting and valuable improvements, yet it is essential that the contract itself and the acts relied upon as part performance be established by clear and satisfactory evidence, and it is not sufficient to show, merely, that the father intended the son to have the land at the father's death.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Douglas county; the Hon. FRANK H. BOGGS, Judge, presiding.

S. S. DUHAMEL, JOHN H. CHADWICK, and P. M. MOORE, for appellant.

DOBBINS & DOBBINS, and W. THOMAS COLEMAN, for appellee.

Mr. JUSTICE FARMER delivered the opinion of the court: This is an appeal from a decree granting certain relief to complainant in a bill filed by Belle Crawley, individually and as administratrix of the estate of Frank Crawley, deceased, against Minnie Howe, individually and as administratrix of the estate of Thomas Crawley, deceased.

Thomas Crawley was the owner of 95 acres of land in Douglas county,-an 80-acre tract, and a 15-acre tract lying east of and adjoining the north 40 of the 80. The

residence and buildings were on the south 40 of the 80acre tract. He had been a widower for many years. He had two children,-Minnie Howe and Frank Crawley. Both were married but neither had any children. Frank Crawley died in August, 1917, leaving a widow, Belle Crawley, surviving him. Thomas Crawley died in May, 1918, leaving his daughter, Minnie Howe, his only heir surviving him. Afterwards Belle Crawley, individually and as administratrix of her deceased husband, filed the bill in this case to enforce the specific performance of a contract alleged to have been made between Thomas Crawley, Frank Crawley and Belle Crawley in 1912, by virtue of which it is claimed Belle and Frank Crawley became the equitable owners of a certain interest in land of Thomas Crawley and entitled to possession thereof at his death. Frank Crawley at the time of his death, and his wife, Belle Crawley, were living on the farm of Thomas Crawley and farming it as tenants, and he had a room in the residence and was living with his son. Frank had, previous to 1909, occupied and cultivated the farm several years, during which time his father lived in the house with him. About the year 1909 he moved to Tuscola, where he lived and conducted a meat shop about two years. He then moved to the Wheatley farm, in the same county. That was a farm of 350 acres and was leased by the owner to William Smith and Harry Smith, brothers of Belle Crawley. By some arrangement between Frank Crawley and the Smiths, Frank moved into the residence on the farm, farmed or helped farm part of the land, and his wife kept house for the three men, her brothers both being single men. Belle Crawley and her husband, now deceased, were living on the Wheatley farm in 1912, when the bill alleges Thomas Crawley came there and told his son and his wife he desired them to move to his farm, rent and care for it, and allow him, Crawley, to board with them. The bill alleges complainant and her husband declined to accept the proposition, and that subsequently Craw