at his death and that he intended them to have in money one-half the value of the 15-acre tract, which tract and the north 40 acres were to go to Mrs. Howe, but in our opinion the proof of what was said and done is not sufficient to authorize giving effect to that intention after his death. At one time he appears to have had deeds prepared dividing the farm between his two children, but what became of them is not shown by the proof. They were not delivered and were not found among his papers or in the possession of a depositary after his death. While complainant and her husband lived on the farm they paid the customary rent and Crawley paid the taxes. Not a great amount was spent for improvements on the farm during that time, but what was spent for that purpose was paid by Crawley. Most of the time, when not in Florida, he lived and boarded with his son and complainant. It was shown that he paid some money for his board, but how much he paid is not disclosed by the evidence. Some witnesses testified he was cross and disagreeable and that it was worth $25 or $30 per week to board and care for him, while others testified he was kindly dispositioned and agreeable and that board was worth $4 or $5 per week. The evidence does not show that complainant and her husband did anything in reliance upon the contract that would make it a fraud on them if it was not enforced or that they could not be adequately compensated unless it was enforced. Considering all the proof on the question of making the contract, what was done by the promisees in reliance upon it, the testimony of witnesses as to statements made by Crawley about what he intended to do with the farm, the letter written by Frank to his sister and statements made by him and his wife about leaving the farm, it cannot be said the evidence was so clear, definite and satisfactory as to warrant the decree. It may be that what Crawley said led complainant and her husband to expect they would get the home 40 and half the value in money of the 15-acre tract when he died, but something more than ཐ that is required to authorize enforcing the specific performance of an oral contract. The contract must be so clearly and satisfactorily proved as to leave no room for reasonable doubt and acts of performance proved sufficient in equity to take the case out of the operation of the Statute of Frauds. The court said in Barrett v. Geisinger, 148 Ill. 98: "The basis upon which the doctrine of partial performance rests is, that when a verbal contract has been made and one party has knowingly aided or permitted the other to go on and do acts in part performance of the agreement, in full reliance upon such agreement as a valid and binding contract, and which would not have been done without the agreement, and are of such nature as to change the relations of the parties and to prevent a restoration to their former condition or an adequate compensation for the loss by a judgment at law for damages, then it would be a virtual fraud in the first party to interpose the Statute of Frauds as a bar to the completion of the contract and thus secure for himself all the benefits of the acts already done in part performance, while the other party would not only lose all advantage from the bargain but would be left without adequate remedy for its failure or compensation for what he had done in pursuance of it. To prevent the success of such a palpable fraud, equity interposes under these circumstances and compels the entire completion of the contract by decreeing its specific execution." In Weir v. Weir, 287 Ill. 495, the court quoted from Story's Equity Jurisprudence: "Nothing is to be considered as a part performance which does not put a party in a situation which is a fraud upon him unless the agreement be fully performed." We regard the proof in this record as wholly insufficient to sustain the decree, and it is therefore reversed. Decree reversed. (No. 13039.-Reversed in part and remanded.) THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Defendant in Error, vs. HARVEY MARQUIS et al. Plaintiffs in Error. Opinion filed December 17, 1919–Rehearing denied Feb. 5, 1920. 1. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Search and Seizure act not invalid as giving preference to religious denominations. The Search and Seizure act of 1919, (Laws of 1919, p. 930,) by exempting from the prohibition of the act intoxicating liquors used for sacramental purposes, does not violate section 3 of article 2 of the constitution, which prohibits the giving of any preference to any religious denomination or mode of worship. 2. SAME-due process of law requires notice. Due process of law in the regular course of judicial proceedings requires notice to the defendant as a matter of right before his property can be condemned, and a law which purports to authorize condemnation without notice confers no authority and is no justification for judgment. against him, even though he had knowledge of the proceedings. 3. SAME when judgment in a summary hearing is not binding. A summary hearing of which no notice is required to be given to a person whose rights are affected, and a judgment upon such hearing, do not constitute due process of law, and the judgment is not binding on the person against whom it is rendered and confers no rights against him or his property. 4. SAME when property may be destroyed without a judicial proceeding. The right of executive officers to destroy property without a judicial proceeding is limited to nuisances per se, or to cases of imminent danger to the public health or safety, or to articles dangerous to public welfare the possession of which is prohibited by law; and the destruction must be limited to the necessity of each case, without wanton or unnecessary destruction.. 5. SAME-provision of Search and Seizure act for destruction of property is invalid. The provision of the Search and Seizure act authorizing the destruction, by order of the court, of intoxicating liquor and the vehicles used in transporting the same over the public highways, is unconstitutional because the act does not require notice to the owner of such property but only to the person in whose possession it is found; and the fact that the owners are actually given notice and appear and present their claims does not affect the constitutionality of such provision. FARMER and DUNCAN, JJ., dissenting. WRIT OF ERROR to the County Court of McHenry county; the Hon. C. P. BARNES, Judge, presiding. GEORGE REMUS, and E. V. ORVIS, for plaintiffs in error. EDWARD J. BRUNDAGE, Attorney General, VINCENT S. LUMLEY, State's Attorney, C. W. MIDDLEKAUFF, GEORGE C. DIXON, and CHARLES T. ALLEN, for the People. Mr. CHIEF JUSTICE DUNN delivered the opinion of the court: Harvey Marquis left Kenosha, Wisconsin, in the afternoon of August 26, 1919, for Chicago, driving an auto truck loaded with eleven barrels of bottled beer. He was advised not to go through Lake county for fear of being arrested but to go through McHenry county and it would be all right. Accordingly he chose a road through McHenry county, and while in that county after dark, having no lights, he drove off the road into a farmyard 100 or 200 feet from the road, stopped and went to sleep on the truck. Soon after he was awakened by a deputy sheriff, arrested and taken to Woodstock, the county seat, and placed in jail, the deputy sheriff putting the truck and its load under the care of a guard, who watched them until they were taken possession of by the sheriff. The next day the State's attorney filed an information in the county court against Marquis for violating the Search and Seizure act. On September 5 an amended information was filed charging the defendant with the transportation of intoxicating liquor over public highways, contrary to law, and after a trial, upon his plea of not guilty, he was convicted and sentenced to pay a fine of $50 and costs. On August 27, 1919, the State's attorney filed his complaint under oath, stating that he had reasonable cause to believe that intoxicating liquor was being transported in prohibition territory in a certain auto truck by H. Marquis and others named, and praying for a search warrant. The county judge issued a search warrant bearing the date of the previous day. The warrant was returned by the sheriff showing that he had seized eight and one-half barrels of bottles containing beer and one Diamond-T truck bearing Illinois license number 358408, and that he had arrested and held in custody H. Marquis, the driver of the truck on which the intoxicating liquor was being transported. September 5 an amended complaint was filed, which differed from the other only in stating that the intoxicating liquor was being unlawfully transported, and that the auto truck was in the town of Burton, in McHenry county, instead of in McHenry county. What is called an amended search warrant was issued conforming to the amended complaints. On the same day Bertha Siemon and the Siebold-Schaeffer Company, each claiming to be the owner of the auto truck, filed petitions praying for the delivery of the auto truck to the respective petitioners, and Robert A. Grace, claiming to be the owner of the beer, prayed for its delivery to him. The petitions were summarily heard by the court, which found that the truck was being used as a vehicle to transport illegally over the public highways in prohibition territory, beer containing more than one-half of one per cent, by volume, of alcohol; that the barrels containing the beer were not labeled or marked on the outside cover so as to plainly show the true name and address of the consignor and consignee, or the kind and quantity of liquor contained, or the purpose for which said liquor was to be used by the consignee, or the place where such liquor was to be used by the consignee; that the beer, at the time of its seizure, was in the truck and was being illegally transported over the highways. of McHenry county in prohibition territory, contrary to the provisions of the Search and Seizure law of the State, and said beer and truck were at the time in the possession of Harvey Marquis, the defendant, who was then driving the truck. The judgment of the court was that the auto |