truck and the beer be adjudged forfeited in accordance with the provisions of the Search and Seizure law, and it was ordered that the sheriff proceed forthwith to destroy them by taking them to a suitable place within two miles of the court house, thoroughly saturating them with oil of a highly inflammable character, and publicly burning and destroying them between the hours of ten o'clock in the morning and three o'clock in the afternoon, within five days of the date of the judgment. The defendant, Marquis, and the petitioners have sued out a writ of error to reverse the judgment of the county court.

It is contended that the evidence was insufficient to prove Marquis guilty beyond a reasonable doubt, because he had no knowledge of the contents of the barrels other than that indicated by the labels, which stated that the contents were non-intoxicating. He had driven the truck from Chicago to Kenosha with a load of store fixtures and household furniture, with directions from his employer to try to get a return load. While he was trying to get a load to haul back to Chicago he met Grace about two blocks from the Blatz brewery, who wanted him to take a load of barrels, which were labeled non-intoxicating, to Chicago. The barrels were labeled, “Blatz private stock; non-intoxicating." Grace had the truck taken to the brewery and loaded and brought back to Marquis. The barrels were not consigned to anyone. There was no agreement about the price for their transportation. Marquis was to take them to the office of his employer in Chicago and Grace was to call at the office and tell where they were to be taken. Marquis was told not to go through Lake county on account of the Zion City authorities but to go around through McHenry. The weight of the evidence is a question for the jury, and it is not surprising that they should have believed that the defendant was seeking to evade the law.

Various objections are urged against the constitutionality of the Search and Seizure act, on which the prosecu

tion is based. (Laws of 1919, p. 930.) It is argued with apparent earnestness that the statute violates that part of section 3 of article 2 of the constitution which prohibits the giving of any preference to any religious denomination or mode of worship because its prohibition does not extend to intoxicating liquors for sacramental purposes. It is said that some religious organizations use wine for such purposes and others do not, and that therefore the act gives a preference to those using wine and grants them a special privilege or immunity. The same, argument would apply to the intoxicating liquor used for medicinal, chemical, mechanical and manufacturing purposes, all of which are recognized as legitimate uses of intoxicating liquors. These, as well as sacramental uses, are expressly exempted from the prohibition of the act in question and are left to be controlled by such other restrictions and regulations as are or may be provided by the laws of the State or the United States. The manufacture, transportation and sale of intoxicating liquor for sacramental purposes are in no way interfered with by the act but are free to all persons and all religious denominations to the same extent as before the passage of the act. The right to use intoxicating liquors for such purposes exists in all. It is not a special privilege in those exercising the right because others who also have the right do not exercise it.

The most serious objection to the judgment questions the court's authority to order the destruction of the property. Marquis, who was transporting the beer, was not the owner of either the truck or the beer. He was a driver in the employ of the owner of the truck, the SieboldSchaeffer Company, a corporation engaged in the business of teaming and hauling. There is no evidence that the corporation had any notice of the character of the load which Marquis was hauling and which he had procured independently in Kenosha, or that it was a participant in the violation of the law. Bertha Siemon was the owner of a chat

tel mortgage for $600 on the truck. It was not legally acknowledged and had not been recorded, but the evidence shows that it was given for a valid debt and that it was valid between the parties. She was not shown to have had any knowledge of the unlawful use of the automobile. Grace, the other plaintiff in error, was the owner of the beer. He caused it to be loaded and shipped to Chicago. Under the Search and Seizure act all territory in Illinois was prohibition territory by virtue of the act of Congress called the War Prohibition law. No question was made about the operation of this law, and the transportation of the beer upon any highway in Illinois to Chicago was a violation of the Search and Seizure act, in which Grace participated.

Under section 16 of the Search and Seizure act all intoxicating liquor manufactured, kept for sale, used, disposed of or transported within prohibition territory in violation of any law of this State, with all vessels containing the same, and all implements, furniture and vehicles kept or used for any such purposes, are declared to be common nuisances and subject to seizure, confiscation and destruction in the manner provided by the act. This section and section 17 provide for the issuing of a search warrant upon complaint in writing verified by affidavit, and for its execution by the search of the place described in the warrant and the seizure of all intoxicating liquor there found, all vessels containing the same, and all implements, furniture and vehicles kept or used for the purpose of violating or with which to violate any law of the State. The warrant further requires the arrest of any and all persons in whose possession, the articles seized are found, and the bringing of them, together with the articles seized, before the officer issuing the warrant or some other judge or justice of the peace having cognizance of the case. Section 17 provides that any claimant shall be entitled to have his right of property in such liquor and other property tried in a summary manner before

the judge to whom the search warrant may have been returned but does not require any notice to be given. Section 18 provides that no intoxicating liquor or other property seized under the act shall be taken from the custody of the officer by writ of replevin or other process while any proceeding provided for in the act is pending, and that a final judgment of forfeiture of such intoxicating liquor or property shall be a bar to all suits for the recovery of the same or the value thereof, or for any damages arising by reason of the seizing or detention thereof. Section 19 requires the officer serving the search warrant to make and file an information against any person arrested, charging the violation of any of the provisions of any statute or municipal ordinance which may appear to have been committed by such person, and provides that the trial shall take place as speedily as possible and shall have preference over other cases. As soon as such complaint is disposed of, if it shall appear that the intoxicating liquor was manufactured, kept for sale, used, disposed of or transported in violation of any of the provisions of any statute or municipal ordinance, the same, with the vessels, implements, furniture and vehicles seized therewith, shall be adjudged forfeited and ordered forthwith destroyed in the manner the court may direct.

The act contains no provision for giving notice to any person except the person in whose possession the intoxicating liquor and vessels containing it, and all implements, furniture and vehicles kept or used for the purpose of violating or with which to violate any law of this State, are found. Upon conviction of the person in possession it requires all such intoxicating liquor and other property to be forthwith destroyed. If the defendant is not the owner of the property seized, no provision is made for notice to the owner or any person interested other than the defendant, but the property seized may be adjudged forfeited and ordered destroyed forthwith, without any reference to the interest of such owner or other person interested. The

property cannot be replevied or taken from the custody of the officer by any process, and the final judgment is declared a bar to all suits for the recovery of the property or its value or for any damages arising by reason of its seizure or detention, though if any claimant appears he may have his right of property tried in a summary manner.

Is it within the constitutional power of the legislature thus to authorize the destruction of property, without notice to the owner? It is true that in this case the plaintiffs in error did have knowledge of the proceeding, appeared and had a summary hearing of their claim of property, but the question of constitutional power does not depend upon what was done in the particular case but upon what the statute authorized to be done. Due process of law in the regular course of judicial proceedings requires notice to the defendant before he or his property can be condemned, as a matter of right and not of favor, and a law which purports to authorize condemnation without notice confers no authority and is no justification for a judgment against him, even though, as a matter of fact, it may happen that he had knowledge of the proceeding. In Security Trust and Safety Vault Co. v. Lexington, 203 U. S. 323, the court said: “If the statute did not provide for a notice in any form, it is not material that as a matter of grace or favor notice may have been given of the proposed assessment. It is not what notice uncalled for by the statute the tax-payer may have received in a particular case that is material, but the question is whether any notice is provided for by the statute.— Stuart v. Palmer, 74 N. Y. 183." In the case cited a statute purported to authorize an assessment upon the lands benefited of the cost of a local improvement but did not provide for notice to the owner. The court said: "It is not enough that the owners may by chance have notice or they may as a matter of favor have a hearing. The law must require notice to them and give them the right to a hearing and an opportunity to be heard. * * *The constitutional