pal code of the city of Chicago. Appellant was driving his automobile north on Elston avenue. He overtook a street car going the same direction. As the street car approached Lawrence avenue appellant turned his automobile to the left and passed the street car on that side while it was moving. There was at the time no south-bound traffic to interfere with passing on the left side of the street car. The facts are not in dispute. The appellant's defense was that the ordinance was invalid; that it is in conflict with the Motor Vehicle act; that it is an unreasonable limitation on the right to use the streets; that it unlawfully discriminates against drivers of motor vehicles, and is in violation of article 2 and section 22 of article 4 of our State constitution. The municipal court imposed a fine of five dollars and costs, and certified that the validity of a municipal ordinance was involved and the public interest required it to be passed upon by the Supreme Court, and an appeal was allowed and perfected to this court.

The ordinance is as follows:

"Sec. 2493. All vehicles shall keep as close to the righthand curb as safety and prudence shall permit, except when overtaking and passing another vehicle and except when running within the car tracks, as provided in section 2487 hereof. An overtaken vehicle must at all times be passed on its left side, except in the case of motor vehicles and motorcycles passing street cars or other vehicles when running within the car tracks. In such case such motor vehicle or motorcycle shall not turn to the left into the track reserved for street cars and vehicles moving in the opposite direction but shall pass to the right of such street car or vehicle so overtaken."

Counsel contend that section 12 of the Motor Vehicle act undertakes to regulate the use, operation and speed of motor vehicles in the State for the sake of uniformity and deprives the local municipal authorities of the power to

pass ordinances on those subjects. Ayres v. City of Chicago, 239 Ill. 237, and People v. Sargent, 254 id. 514, are cited as sustaining that position. The Ayres case was decided under the act of 1907 concerning motor vehicles. Among other provisions relating to the use of such vehicles it was provided that no city should have the power to make any ordinance limiting or restricting the “use or speed of motor vehicles," and it was held the purpose of the act was to take the place of all municipal ordinances regulating the equipment and operation of motor vehicles. The act of 1911, under which the Sargent case was decided, contained the same provision with reference to the power of a municipality to pass ordinances limiting the "use or speed of motor vehicles." That act also contained a provision that it was not to affect the power of a city to make and enforce reasonable traffic regulations, "except as to rate of speed," not inconsistent with other provisions of the act. The Ayres and Sargent cases were referred to and distinguished in City of Chicago v. Shaw Livery Co. 258 Ill. 409, which also dealt with the 1911 act. The Motor Vehicle act of 1917 provided that no ordinance should be passed by a municipality limiting or restricting "the speed" of motor vehicles. The words "use or," preceding the word "speed," are not in the present act, which also contains the provision that the power of municipal corporations to make and enforce reasonable traffic and other regulations, "except as to rates of speed," not inconsistent with the provisions of the act, is unaffected.

It is also contended the ordinance is in violation of sec

tion 16 of the Motor Vehicle act. That section provides that the operator of a motor vehicle overtaking on a public highway any horse or other draft animal or vehicle shall pass on the left side, and that the driver of the horse or other vehicle shall, on signal, turn to the right of the center of the beaten track on such highway, so as to allow free passage on the left. It is obvious this section was in

tended to apply only to country roads or streets on which there are no street cars. It would be impossible for a street car to turn to the right on being overtaken by a motor vehicle, and it would be unreasonable to construe "vehicles," as used in section 16, to embrace street cars running on rails. The ordinance here involved is purely a traffic regulation and is not prohibited by or in conflict with the Motor Vehicle act.

The other objections urged to the validity of the ordinance are not of such importance as to justify or require their discussion in detail. We consider them entirely without merit and that the ordinance involved is a sane and reasonable one, necessary for the protection of persons and traffic.

The judgment is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

(No. 12924.-Judgment affirmed.)

THE BOARD OF EDUCATION OF GLEN ELLYN TOWNSHIP HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT No. 87 et al. Appellants, vs. George Boger et al. Appellees.

Opinion filed December 17, 1919-Rehearing denied Feb. 5, 1920.

1. TAXES statute does not regard administrator as the "owner" of property omitted from assessment in lifetime of his intestate. Section 35 of the act for the assessment of property treats a claim for taxes on property omitted from assessment during the owner's lifetime as a claim against his estate and not as a claim against the administrator as owner of the property, as in the case of regular · taxes assessed after the appointment of the administrator.

2. SAME―omitted taxes of deceased owner of property are due at the place where he resided. Taxes on property assessed by the board of review as property omitted from assessment by the owner during the last years of his lifetime should be assessed in and collected for the school district in which such owner resided during those years and not in and for the school district where his administrator resides at the time the omitted assessment is made.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of DuPage county; the Hon. MAZZINI SLUSSER, Judge, presiding.

RICHARD F. LOCKE, and CHURCH & SHEPARD, (FRANK L. SHEPARD, of counsel,) for appellants.

CHARLES W. HADLEY, and GEO. W. THOMA, (Rathje & WESEMANN, C. C. CARNAHAN, and T. H. SLUSSER, of counsel,) for Alfred C. Hoy, administrator, appellee.

MICHAEL KROSs, and FELSENTHAL, WILSON & STRUCKMANN, (WILLIAM F. STRUCKMANN, of counsel,) for other appellees.

Mr. JUSTICE DUNCAN delivered the opinion of the court: Appellants, the Board of Education of Glen Ellyn Township High School District No. 87 and the Board of Education of School District No. 41 of the county of DuPage, filed a petition for mandamus in the circuit court of said county against the appellees, George Boger and others, members of the board of review of said county, Aaron A. Kuhn, county clerk, the directors of school district No. 38, and Alfred C. Hoy, administrator of the estate of William P. Cowan, deceased. Appellees filed a general demurrer to appellants' petition, which was sustained by the court and judgment thereon entered. That judgment is attacked by this appeal.

The facts stated in the petition and admitted by the demurrer are the following: William P. Cowan resided during the years 1914 to 1918, both inclusive, in school district No. 38, in said county, and continued to live therein up to his death, August 13, 1918. On September 9, 1918, Alfred C. Hoy, public administrator of said county, was by the county court of DuPage county appointed administrator of the estate of the deceased and took charge of the assets of his estate and has since continued to act as

such administrator, and on April 1, 1919, was residing in Glen Ellyn Township High School District No. 87 and school district No. 41 and in the village of Glen Ellyn, in said county. The local assessor made and entered the personal property assessment for the year 1919 against Hoy, as administrator aforesaid, at his residence, in the sum of $1,500,000 full value. That amount was reduced by the board of review to the sum of $1,325,000 full value. The board of review, during its session for the year 1919, found that Cowan had not listed for assessment certain personal property owned by him for the years 1914 to 1918, both inclusive, while he was so residing in school district No. 38, aforesaid. The board of review thereupon made and entered a personal property assessment against the personal property of Cowan, and assessed the same in the name of Alfred C. Hoy, as administrator of the deceased, upon credits and other personal property found by the board to be omitted from the assessment and taxation, as follows: For 1914, $575,000 full value, $191,667 assessed value; for 1915, $635,000 full value, $211,667 assessed value; for 1916, $875,000 full value, $291,667 assessed value; for 1917, $980,000 full value, $326,667 assessed value; for 1918, $1,220,000 full value, $406,667 assessed value. The board of review made and entered the assessment for back taxes from the property so omitted from taxation for said years in school district No. 38, after due notice to the administrator. Hoy does not, and never did, reside in school district No. 38, and Cowan never resided in Glen Ellyn Township High School District No. 87 or in school district No. 41. Appellees Boger, Senne and Reed constitute the board of review. Appellee Kuhn is the county clerk, and declared that he will follow the entry of said assessments for such omitted years in school district No. 38 and will extend the taxes thereon for said years in said district, and will not extend the assessments and the taxes for said years in Glen Ellyn Township High School District or school dis