this record that these letter-heads were in general use; that the lettering on the office in Springfield also indicated that the office was the western sales office of the company; that these facts, in connection with the requirement of the statute that the principal office of an Illinois corporation should be in this State, would fully justify any reasonable man in assuming that the person in charge of that office had full .control and management of the business of sales for appellee. There is no evidence in any way tending to show that appellant's agent knew that the agent at Springfield was in any way limited in his authority as to any business transactions that he should enter into on behalf of appellee. Another fact which tends strongly to justify this conclusion is that appellant wrote the first letter with reference to this order to William E. Dee, president, at the Springfield office, and this letter was answered there by Matthew M. Dee, who accepted the order here in dispute. Whether an agent has express authority to do a certain thing is a question of fact for the jury, but whether an implied authority arises from a certain state of facts is a question of law which should not be submitted to the jury by an instruction. Doggett v. Greene, 254 Ill. 134.

We think the evidence in this record was of such a nature on the question of the extent of Matthew M. Dee's agency that the contract here under consideration should have been submitted to the jury and that the trial court erred in giving a peremptory instruction to find for appellee. The question whether or not appellee, by its acts after the acceptance of this order by Matthew M. Dee, ratified his acts need not be here decided, in view of the fact that the case must be reversed on other grounds.

The judgments of the Appellate and circuit courts will be reversed and the cause remanded to the circuit court for further proceedings in harmony with the views herein stated. Reversed and remanded.

(No. 13037.-Judgment affirmed.)

THE KEE & CHAPELL DAIRY COMPANY, Appellee, vs. THE PENNSYLVANIA COMPANY, Appellant.

Opinion filed February 18, 1920.

I. APPEALS AND ERRORS—when denial of motion to find for defendant presents question of law for Supreme Court. In suits at law the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming that of the trial court conclusively settles all controverted questions of fact, but where the question whether there is any evidence tending to prove the plaintiff's case is properly preserved in the trial court by a motion to find for the defendant, a denial of the motion, followed by a judgment for the plaintiff, presents a question of law which may be reviewed by the Supreme Court.

2. SAME when the Supreme Court will presume that the Appellate Court considered evidence of title in third person in action of replevin. In an action of replevin under the Municipal Court act, evidence of property in a third person is equivalent to a plea to that effect by the defendant; and the Supreme Court, in determining the correctness of the judgment of the Appellate Court affirming the trial court's judgment for the plaintiff, will presume that the Appellate Court considered all the evidence on the question of the plaintiff's title, including the evidence tending to show title in the third person.

3. REPLEVIN-effect of plea of property in a third person-burden of proof. In an action of replevin a plea of property in a third person does not raise a new issue but is a matter of inducement to the formal traverse of the right of property in the plaintiff, which is the real issue in the suit and which must be proved by plaintiff.

4. SAME-third person cannot take advantage of judgment for defendant. Where the defendant in a replevin suit pleads property in a third person, the third person, who is neither a party to the suit nor a privy of the defendant, cannot take advantage of a judgment for the defendant.

5. SAME—when demand is not necessary. Demand is necessary where the defendant comes into possession of the goods rightfully, but a demand is not necessary where the circumstances show that it would have been unavailing.

6. PRACTICE the evidence determines the issues in fourth-class action under Municipal Court act. In an action of the fourth class under the Municipal Court act no pleadings are required and the issues must be determined from the evidence submitted at the trial.

7. SAME motion to find for defendant amounts to demurrer to the plaintiff's evidence. In an action of the fourth class under the Municipal Court act, a motion to find for the defendant at the close of the plaintiff's evidence and renewed at the close of all the evidence amounts to a demurrer to the plaintiff's evidence, and raises a question of law whether the evidence for the plaintiff, when considered to be true and with the inferences which may be legitimately drawn therefrom, fairly tends to support the cause of action of the plaintiff.

APPEAL from the Appellate Court for the First District; heard in that court on writ of error to the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. EDMUND K. JARECKI, Judge, presiding.

WILLIAM J. STAPLETON, and EPSTEIN & FEIWELL, for appellant.

LEVINSON. & HOFFMAN, (ARISTA B. WILLIAMS, and L. LOEWENSTEIN, of counsel,) for appellee.

Mr. JUSTICE STONE delivered the opinion of the court:

This case is brought to this court on a certificate of importance and appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District, there heard on writ of error to the municipal court of Chicago.

The plaintiff, the Kee & Chapell Dairy Company, a corporation of Chicago, on March 17, 1918, began an action of replevin against the defendant, the Pennsylvania Company, a railroad corporation, to re-possess itself, as owner, of 2000 milk bottles delivered by Ziff & Berman to the defendant, as a common carrier, at Chicago, for shipment to St. Louis, Missouri, to their order. At the hearing in the municipal court without a jury the court entered judgment in favor of the plaintiff, that it have and retain possession of the property replevied, with one cent damages and costs against the defendant. At the close of the plaintiff's evidence, and again at the close of all the evidence, the defendant entered its motion for a finding for it, and tendered

a finding to that effect, which was marked "refused" by the trial court. No other propositions of law were submitted to the trial court by appellant.

This action was brought in the municipal court of Chicago under section 2 of "An act in relation to a municipal court in the city of Chicago," approved May 18, 1905, in force July 1, 1905, as a fourth-class claim. No pleadings are required in that court in this class of cases other than the affidavit, bond and writ of replevin, as provided by the statute. The issues, therefore, must be determined from the nature and character of the evidence submitted at the trial.

It is contended by the appellant in this court that the motion at the close of all the evidence to find the issues joined for the defendant presents a proposition of law to be reviewed by this court and opens for review the entire record. It is contended by the appellee that all of the questions involved in this case are questions of fact, and for that reason there is nothing for review by this court.

The theory of the defendant (appellant in this court) is that these bottles, or a large portion of them, were acquired from dumping grounds in the city of Chicago; that the bottles had been abandoned, after which they found their way to these dumping grounds; that they were the property of Ziff & Berman, a firm of junk dealers, and not appellee's property. On the other hand, it is urged by the appellee, and found by the trial court and by the Appellate Court, that the bottles were originally purchased by the plaintiff and through neglect or carelessness or willful act of its patrons the bottles in question were lost and were not abandoned by the owner; that the bottles were marked, "Property of Kee & Chapell Dairy Company," for purposes of identification; that plaintiff and other dealers in milk had a system of collection and exchange of lost bottles bearing this and other inscriptions; that customers were paid for the return of the bottles, and that such charge was not made with the idea of a sale of the same.

Appellant contends here that the Appellate Court and trial court erred in assuming that the rights of Ziff & Berman were not directly before the court for adjudication, and it urges that the opinion of the Appellate Court shows that court did not pass upon the rights of Ziff & Berman. We have frequently held that our inquiry in cases from the Appellate Court on appeal or writ of error can only be whether or not there was error committed in rendering the judgment appealed from, and in cases at law this inquiry is confined to errors of law. While this court will look into the opinion of the Appellate Court to determine whether that court predicated its judgment solely on an erroneous conception of law, (Foster v. Graff, 287 Ill. 559,) what that court may assign as reasons for its judgment is not a matter of concern here, where our duty is to determine the correctness of such judgment. (Pennsylvania Co. v. Versten, 140 Ill. 637; First Nat. Bank v. Miller, 235 id. 135; Berry v. Turner, 279 id. 338; Stanton v. Chicago City Railway Co. 283 id. 256.) It is evident from the record that the question of title in Ziff & Berman was before both the trial and Appellate Courts on the evidence submitted. There were no written pleadings in the case, and the evidence, therefore, may be examined to determine the issues. Evidence of property in Ziff & Berman was equivalent, here, to a plea by the defendant of property in a third person. This defense was taken and urged by appellant in both the trial and Appellate Courts. Under a plea of property in a third person in an action of replevin, with a denial of right of property in the plaintiff, the only issuable fact is the right of property in the plaintiff. The plea of property in the defendant or a third person is a matter of inducement to the formal traverse of the right of property in the plaintiff. Under such plea the plaintiff must recover on the strength of his own title and the burden of 'proof is on him. Such plea does not raise a new issue. (Anderson v. Talcott, 1 Gilm. 365; Chandler v. Lincoln,