(No. 12410.-Reversed in part and remanded.) CATHERINE CHRISTENE BULLARD, Appellant, vs. HENRY P. SUEDMEIER et al. Appellees.

Opinion filed February 18, 1920.

1. DEEDS-what constitutes complete delivery of deed in escrow. Where a grantor delivers a deed to a third person to be delivered to the grantee upon the death of the grantor, and surrenders all control over the deed and any right to reclaim it, the delivery is complete, and the deed takes effect, not at the death of the grantor but immediately upon delivery to the third person.

2. SAME when deeds are not testamentary in character. Deeds which contain a provision that they shall not take effect during the lifetime of the grantor and of his wife are not testamentary in character if delivered, but they operate as present conveyances of remainders after the death of the grantor and his wife and require no intermediate estate to support the remainders.

3. SAME-difference between an exception and a reservation in a deed. An exception in a deed withholds from its operation some part or parcel of the thing which but for the exception would pass by the general description to the grantee, but a reservation is the creation of some new right issuing out of the thing granted and which did not exist before as an independent right in behalf of the grantor and not of a stranger.

4. SAME-effect of a provision that deeds shall not take effect during lifetime of grantor and his wife. Where a grantor divides his property by deeds to each of his children, each deed containing a provision that the conveyance shall not take effect during the lifetime of the grantor and of his wife, and delivers the deeds to a third person with directions to deliver them at the grantor's death to the respective grantees, the grantor has an estate for his own life and the life of his wife or an estate pur autre vie, but his wife has no life estate, and where she survives him the grantor dies intestate as to the estate pur autre vie.

5. SAME statutes of descent do not change character of an estate as fixed by common law. The rules governing the descent and devise of property are statutory, but the statutes have not changed the rules of the common law as to the quality or character of property nor made that an estate of inheritance which before was not.

6. SAME estate pur autre vie is not an estate of inheritance and wife has no dower therein. Where the effect of provisions in deeds

to the grantor's children is that there remains in the grantor an estate for his own life and that of his wife, the grantor's estate for the life of his wife is an estate pur autre vie and is not an estate of inheritance in which his widow would be entitled to dower.

7. SAME-common law rule as to disposition of estate pur autre vie before death of cestui que vie is not recognized. The doctrine of the common law that the property in which there is an estate pur autre vie is a mere derelict, belonging to no one after the death of the tenant pur autre vie and before the death of the cestui que vie, has never been recognized in Illinois.

8. SAME when the estate pur autre vie must be administered as intestate personal property. Where a grantor, after dividing his property by deeds to each of his children, continues to hold an estate for his own life and for the life of his wife, the estate pur autre vie or for the life of the wife where she survives the grantor becomes intestate property, and as it is not an estate of inheritance it is not subject to partition among the heirs and must be administered and distributed as intestate personal property.

APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Logan county; the Hon. T. M. HARRIS, Judge, presiding.

BEACH & TRAPP, for appellant.

JAMES E. MILLER, and C. EVERETT SMITH, for appellees.

Mr. JUSTICE CARTWRIGHT delivered the opinion of the

court:

On September 5, 1913, Christian Suedmeier was the owner of 400 acres of farm land, a timber lot and two city lots in Mt. Pulaski, all in Logan county. He had three sons and five daughters, all of whom were adults and married. He had formed a plan to divide the 400 acres among his children, and on that day he and his wife, Anna Margarete Suedmeier, executed eight statutory warranty deeds, conveying to each of his children except his daughter Catherine Christene Bullard a remainder in 50 acres in fee simple and conveying to her a life estate with remainder to her brothers and sisters. Each deed contained this provi

sion: "This conveyance shall not take effect during the lifetime of the grantors, Christian Suedmeier and Anna Margarete Suedmeier." Suedmeier delivered the deeds to his attorney, George J. Smith, and directed him to deliver them at his death to the respective grantees. Smith put the deeds in an envelope, on which he wrote, "These deeds are to be held until after the death of Christian Suedmeier, when the enclosed deeds are to be delivered to the respective grantees named in the respective deeds." He placed this envelope in a large manila envelope, on which was written, "Hold for safe keeping," and after keeping the deeds for a time in his safe he placed them in a bank for safe keeping. Suedmeier died on February 11, 1917, and thereupon Smith delivered the deeds to the respective grantees. Suedmeier was survived by his widow, Anna Margarete, and his eight children, who were his heirs-at-law. Appellant, Catherine Christene Bullard, and three of her sisters, Wilhelmina Magdalena Schafer, Eva Catherine Cloves and Mary Phillipena Vetter, as heirs-at-law, filed their bill in the circuit court of Logan county for the partition of the 400 acres and also the two city lots and the tract of timber land not included in the deeds, alleging that Christian Suedmeier died seized in fee of all said real estate, which had descended to his heirs-at-law; that the widow was entitled to a homestead in one of the city lots and dower in all the real estate. The defendants were the widow and other heirs-at-law. Wilhelmina Magdalena Schafer, Eva Catherine Cloves and Mary Phillipena Vetter withdrew as complainants and were made defendants by amendment of the bill. Answers were filed and the cause referred to the master in chancery to take and report the evidence. The master took the evidence and reported the same, and the chancellor, upon a hearing and consideration thereof, found that the deeds were delivered and took effect as conveyances but subject to the provision above quoted that they should not take effect during the lifetime of the

grantors, Christian Suedmeier and Anna Margarete Suedmeier; that the complainant was entitled to partition of the two city lots and the timber land, but that the heirs-at-law had no other right, title or interest in the 400 acres than that conveyed to them by the deeds, and that the widow was entitled to the use and occupation, rents and profits of the 400 acres during her lifetime. The decree awarded homestead to the widow in one of the city lots and dower in the land not described in the deeds and denied partition of the 400 acres. From that decree this appeal was prosecuted.

The appellant contends (1) that the deeds were void for want of delivery; (2) that because by their express terms they were not to take effect until after the death of both grantors they were testamentary in character and not executed according to the Statute of Wills; (3) that if the deeds were effective to pass title to the grantees there was no reservation in any of them to the widow, Anna Margarete Suedmeier, and that she is neither entitled to a life. estate nor any other interest.

When a grantor makes a deed and places it in the hands of a third person to be delivered to the grantee upon the death of the grantor, and the grantor surrenders all control and dominion over the deed and retains no right to reclaim it, such act constitutes a complete and valid delivery, and the deed takes effect, not at the death of the grantor, but immediately upon being delivered to the third person. (Bryan v. Wash, 2 Gilm. 557; Cline v. Jones, 111 Ill. 563; Shults v. Shults, 159 id. 654; Latimer v. Latimer, 174 id. 418; German-American Nat. Bank v. Martin, 277 id. 629.) The delivery of the deeds by Christian Suedmeier was unconditional, and he surrendered all control and dominion over them and all right to reclaim them, with the evident intent that the deeds should be operative to convey titles to take effect in possession after the deaths of the grantor and his wife. The finding of the chancellor that the deeds were delivered is correct.

The provision fixing the time when the grantees were to come into the actual enjoyment and possession of their land did not make the deeds testamentary in character. (Harshbarger v. Carroll, 163 Ill. 636; Bowler v. Bowler, 176 id. 541; Venters v. Wickens, 224 id. 569; White v. Willard, 232 id. 464; Hathaway v. Cook, 258 id. 92; Hudson v. Hudson, 287 id. 286.) The deeds operated as present conveyances of remainders after the death of the grantor and his wife and required no intermediate estate to support the remainder. Shackelton v. Sebree, 86 Ill. 616; Bowler v. Bowler, supra; Harshbarger v. Carroll, supra.

Having disposed of the first and second propositions of counsel for the appellant, the remaining question is, what interest in the 400 acres passed at the death of Christian Suedmeier, and to whom? The provision of the deeds was that they should not take effect during the lifetime of the grantors, Christian Suedmeier and Anna Margarete Suedmeier. By that provision the estate which Christian Suedmeier then had remained in him during his natural life and a further estate during the life of his wife, if she should survive him. An exception in a deed withholds from its operation some part or parcel of the thing which but for the exception would pass by the general description to the grantee, but a reservation is the creation of some new right issuing out of the thing granted and which did not exist before as an independent right in behalf of the grantor and not of a stranger. (Gould v. Howe, 131 Ill. 490; Sheppard's Touchstone, 78.) Christian Suedmeier could not reserve something for his own life out of an estate which was not granted until after his death. It was implied in Douglas v. West, 140 Ill. 455, and stated as the law in White v. Willard, supra, that a grantor may reserve to himself and wife an estate during their natural lives, which will continue during the life of the survivor, and under that rule, if Christian Suedmeier had done so by express words his widow would have had a life estate