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it can be avoided by any reasonable hypothesis. (Village of Ridgway v. Gallatin County, 181 Ill. 521; Village of East Springfield v. City of Springfield, 238 id. 534.) Section 10 of article 10 of the constitution provides that the salary of the county treasurer, and all his necessary clerk hire, stationery, fuel and other expenses, shall be paid only out of, and in no instance shall exceed, the fees actually collected by him. It is hardly conceivable that the legislature would add materially to the duties of the county treasurer and at the same time take from the county treasurer the only means available to him to pay the necessary cost of performing the duties. Statutes which relate to the same thing or to the same subject or object are in pari materia although they were enacted at different times. It is a fundamental rule of statutory construction that not only should the intention of the law-makers be deduced from a view of the whole statute and of its every material part, but statutes in pari materia should be construed together. This rule applies with peculiar force to statutes that are contemporaneous, as were the amendment to the Township Organization act which abolished the office of town collector and the amendment to the Revenue act here under consideration. Being contemporaneous and in pari materia they are to be construed together as if they were one statute. (Devous v. Gallatin County, 244 Ill. 40.) And so section 243 of the Revenue act and section 21 of the Fees and Salaries act, being in pari materia, must be construed together and effect must be given to both. The provision in section 243 that “all such taxes collected shall be paid over in full,” means that the county collector shall pay over the full amount collected, less his commission allowed by said section 21 of the Fees and Salaries act. People v. Wiltshire, 92 Ill. 260. The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
(No. 12982.-Judgment affirmed.) THE PUBLIC SERVICE COMPANY OF NORTHERN ILLINOIS, Appellee, vs. ALBERT J. Martin et al. Appellants.
Opinion filed February 18, 1920. This case is controlled by the decision in Public Service Co. v. Recktenwald, 290 Ill. 314.
APPEAL from the County Court of Lake county; the Hon. Perry L. PERSONS, Judge, presiding.
E. V. Orvis, (C. T. HEYDECKER, of counsel,) for appellants.
ISHAM, LINCOLN & BEALE, (WILLIAM A. Morrow, and CYRUS H. ADAMS, JR., of counsel,) for appellee.
Mr. Justice Duncan delivered the opinion of the court:
The Public Service Company of Northern Illinois, appellee, filed a petition in the county court of Lake county to condemn certain lands required for the extension of its transmission line. Appellants, with others, as owners of certain tracts of land described in the petition and sought to be condemned, were made. defendants. All of the defendants, including appellants, filed joint and several motions to dismiss the petition, limiting their appearance for that special purpose. These motions were denied. All of the defendants, including appellants, then entered their general appearance and filed cross-petitions alleging damages to lands not taken. On trials had, judgments of condemnation and fixing compensation for lands taken were rendered against all of said defendants. Appellants have prosecuted this separate appeal from the judgment rendered against them.
The grounds relied upon for a reversal of the judgment by appellants are that appellee had no right to exercise the right of eminent domain, and that sections 50 and 59 of the act providing for the regulation of public utilities are void because in contravention of section 13 of article 4 of the constitution. The same questions were raised by the appeal and assignments of error in Public Service Co. v. Recktenwald, 290 Ill. 314, and the briefs and arguments in that case are identical with the briefs and arguments in this case. The decision in that case is decisive of the questions raised in this case, and for the reasons therein given the judgment of the county court in this case is affirmed.
(No. 12761.— Judgment affirmed.) THE WALLDREN EXPRESS AND VAN COMPANY, Plaintiff in
Error, vs. FRED KRUG, Defendant in Error.
Opinion filed February 18, 1920.
1. NEGLIGENCE-on motion to direct a verdict, evidence for opposite party must be taken as true. On a motion to direct a verdict the most favorable evidence for the party against whom the motion is made must be accepted as true and must be given the most favorable interpretation which it will bear.
2. SAME—when same degree of care is required of a minor as of an adult. The same degree of care to protect himself from injury by the traffic in a public street is required of a minor as of an adult where the minor is old enough to know the character of the traffic in the street in question and the danger from automobiles and other vehicles.
3. SAME—when ordinance to prevent playing in public streets will not be considered on question of contributory negligence. If the declaration alleges that the defendant wantonly and recklessly ran its automobile into the plaintiff, who was playing ball in a public street, the question whether an ordinance of the city prohibited such a game will not be considered on the issue of contributory negligence, where there is evidence requiring the submission to the jury of the question of wanton negligence by the defendant.
4. Sams—when contributory negligence of plaintiff is not material. If the facts shown by the evidence establish the truth of the
allegation that the defendant carelessly, recklessly and wantonly ran its automobile upon and against the plaintiff, the contributory negligence of the plaintiff does not relieve the defendant from liability for its wanton negligence.
5. SAME—when question of wantonness of defendant's negligence is for the jury. Where there is any evidence in the record fairly tending to show such a gross want of care on the part of the defendant as indicates a willful disregard of consequences or a willingness to inflict injury, whether the negligent conduct of the defendant amounts to wantonness is a question of fact to be determined by the jury.
6. Same—when the negligence amounts to constructive or legal willfulness. An intentional disregard by one person of a known duty necessary to the safety of the person or property of another and an entire absence of care for the person or property of others, such as exhibits a conscious indifference to consequences, make a case of constructive or legal willfulness such as charges the person whose duty it was to exercise care with the consequences of willful injury.
7. SAME_Words "wanton," "wantonly” and “wantonness," and "willful," "willfully” and “willfulness," are synonymous. In cases involving negligence, the words "wanton," "wantonly" and "wantonness," and "willful," "willfully" and "willfulness," are used to express the same general idea.
8. SAME-what is implied in a charge of wantonness. A charge of wantonness implies an act intentionally done in disregard of another's rights and not a mere negligent omission of duty, and where the declaration contains such a charge it is not error to refuse to instruct the jury that there can be no recovery for willful or wanton negligence on the ground that the declaration does not use the word “willful.”
9. TRIAL—when it is not error to overrule motion to continue because of prejudicial evidence which was stricken. Where the plaintiff was hit by an automobile truck while he was playing ball in a public street and a witness is asked at the trial what he saw the truck do, and answers that it came near striking another boy before it reached the block where the game was in progress, (which answer was stricken upon objection,) it is not error to overrule a motion to continue the cause on the ground that the prejudicial effect of the answer could not be cured by striking it out.
WRIT OF ERROR to the Appellate Court for the First District;—heard in that court on appeal from the Superior Court of Cook county; the Hon. M. L. McKINLEY, Judge, presiding
Express Co. v. Krug
JOHN A. BLOOMINGSTON, for plaintiff in error.
Quin O'Brien, for defendant in error.
Mr. Chief Justice Dunn delivered the opinion of the court:
Fred Krug, a boy just under fifteen years old, while playing ball in a street in the city of Chicago was run over by an automobile truck of the Walldren Express and Van Company and was seriously injured and permanently crippled. He recovered a judgment for $12,500 damages, which the Appellate Court affirmed, and a writ of certiorari was allowed to review the record. The plaintiff in error claims a reversal on the grounds that the court should have directed a verdict for the defendant; that the court erred in giving and refusing instructions; that the plaintiff's counsel made improper argument to the jury, and that the court should have continued the case because of the admission of improper evidence, which striking out would not cure.
The accident occurred on March 31, 1916, at or immediately after sunset, about a quarter past six. Fred Krug and half a dozen other boys were playing ball in Thomas street, which runs east and west, in the block between Western avenue on the east and Campbell avenue on the west. In the game of scrub which they were playing there were two batters, a pitcher, catcher, first baseman and left and right fielders. They were playing all the bases, but the second and third were unguarded. The home plate was the brush part of a broom in the center of the street, about in the middle of the block. Second base was a flattened tin can in the center of the street 67 feet further west. First and third bases were sewer covers on the north and south sides of the street, respectively, about half-way between home and second. The street was paved with asphalt, 30 feet wide, and the neighborhood was a thickly-built-up residential district. Fred Krug was one of the batters. The other