workman or the widow will not lose or squander the sum handed over as compensation for the accident and eventually become as dependent on poor-law relief as if the community had provided nothing at all. As a matter of fact there are always among the paupers in industrial districts thousands of such cases, and their number increases annually. (Goelitz Co. v. Industrial Board, supra.) While we think a fair consideration of the evidence shows that it is not for the best interests of this aged beneficiary that this money be paid to her in a lump sum to be used by her relatives in paying obligations due them from her, still we realize that that question is one peculiarly within the province of the Industrial Board and one to be determined by it under proper rules. sum. It is contended that plaintiff in error has waived the right to object to the payment of compensation in a lump When the petition for lump sum payment was filed, H. W. Clark, president of the H. W. Clark Company and son-in-law of Millie Moore, indicated in writing the willingness of plaintiff in error to pay compensation "commuted in accordance with section 9 of the Workmen's Compensation act, if so ordered by the Industrial Board." This socalled consent to a lump sum award was no more than a declaration that plaintiff in error would be bound by the laws of Illinois. Plaintiff in error is, however, willing to pay this compensation in a lump sum provided it is commuted in accordance with section 9 of the act. It becomes necessary, therefore, to determine the method of arriving at the present value of the compensation to which Millie Moore is entitled. Section 9 of the act says the commutation "shall be an amount which will equal the total sum of the probable future payments capitalized at their present value upon the basis of interest calculated at three percentum per annum, with annual rests." The board was required to determine the present value of the weekly compensation of $4.62 ex tending over a period of 444.44 weeks, or more than eight and a half years. Without taking into account the question of "probable future payments," the present value of $1920 capitalized upon the basis of interest calculated at three percentum per annum with annual rests, is, as determined by the board, $1755.26. The most serious question presented for our consideration is, What is meant by the phrase "probable future payments?" Chapter 131 of our statutes provides that all phrases and expressions in the statutes shall be liberally construed in order that the true intent and meaning of the legislature may be fully carried out. It is well settled that in construing any statute all the language shall be considered and such interpretation placed upon any word or phrase appearing therein as was within the manifest intention of the body which enacted the law. As a general rule, the words of a statute will be construed in their ordinary sense and with the meaning ordinarily attributed to them. (25 R. C. L. 988.) Where the wording of the statute is clear and admits of but one interpretation there is no need or occasion for construction of the statute and the court will give effect to its plain meaning. (Illinois Electric Co. v. Town of Cicero, 282 Ill. 468; People v. Stewart, 281 id. 365; Wall v. Pfanschmidt, 265 id. 180; Caminetti v. United States, 242 U. S. 470.) It seems clear that the expression "probable future payments" can mean but one thing, and that is, such payments as would ordinarily become payable in the natural course of events, taking into consideration the expectancy of the beneficiary,her age, her health, and other similar elements which would enter into that consideration. Except in cases where the beneficiary is of extreme age it would not be improbable to presume that the beneficiary would live longer than the period over which the payments extend, and so the probable future payments would amount, in such a case, to all the payments; but in the case at bar, when we consider the age of the beneficiary and her condition of health, can it be said that she will live eight and a half years? Plaintiff in error is not liable for compensation on account of this death after the death of the beneficiary, subject to the exception provided for in section 21 of the act. The order for a lump sum settlement in this case is against the interests of plaintiff in error, for the reason that it is improbable that the future payments will amount to the whole of the compensation in installments. If a lump sum settlement is insisted upon, plaintiff in error has the right to demand that commutation be made in accordance with section 9 of the act, which provides that it be equal to the total sum of the probable future payments. In determining the probable future payments the board should have received and considered evidence from which the fact could be reasonably determined, We hold that there is no evidence in this record on which to base the amount fixed by the board as the proper lump sum to be paid as compensation, and for that reason the cause must be remanded to the commission for further consideration. It is contended by defendants in error that this writ of error should be dismissed because application was not made to this court for leave to issue the writ in accordance with section 19 of the Compensation act, as amended and in force July 1, 1919. (Laws of 1919, p. 548.) Final judgment in this cause was entered in the circuit court May 16, 1919, and the record was properly brought to this court by writ of error, in accordance with the law then in force. George v. George, 250 Ill. 251. For the errors heretofore pointed out, the judgment is reversed and the cause is remanded to the circuit court of Coles county, with directions to set aside the finding of the Industrial Board and to remand the cause to the Industrial Commission for further proceedings consistent with the views herein expressed. Reversed and remanded, with directions. (No. 12376.-Reversed and remanded.) DOLLY BOEHME et al. Appellees, vs. EDWARD FRAASE et al. Appellants. Opinion filed February 18, 1920. I. SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE-evidence of oral contract to convey must be convincing. To justify a decree for the specific performance of an oral contract to convey real estate, the evidence must be clear, certain and convincing both of the making of the contract and of its terms. 2. PARTITION—when decree should not give share to heir who has conveyed her interest. A partition decree denying the prayer of a cross-bill for specific performance of an alleged agreement of all the heirs to convey their interests to two of them should not set off a share to one of the heirs who is admitted to have conveyed her interest according to the agreement and has stipulated before the master that she claims only her portion of the rent up to the date of the agreement and has withdrawn her offer to refund the consideration which was paid to her. 3. SAME-when heirs in possession should account for rents and profits. In a suit for the partition of farm land among heirs, those who have been in possession and farmed the land since the death of the ancestor should account to the other heirs for rents and profits, notwithstanding their farming has been unprofitable because they have been compelled to care for and feed their crops to stock belonging to the estate, as they should look to the administrator to pay them for this expense and not charge it to their co-tenants. APPEAL from the Circuit Court of Sangamon county; the Hon. FRANK W. BURTON, Judge, presiding.. CAREY E. BARNES, and JOHN S. SCHNEPP, for appellants. Mr. CHIEF JUSTICE DUNN delivered the opinion of the court: Henry Fraase owned two tracts of land in Sangamon county, one of 20 acres, the other of 21.54 acres. Mary Fraase, his wife, owned a tract of 50 acres adjoining Henry's 21.54-acre tract, and these two tracts were known as the home place. Henry died on December 23, 1909, and Mary on February 16, 1913, both intestate. Their heirs were their six children, Edward, Henry, John and Charles, Julia Kern and Dolly Boehme. On October 25, 1917, Dolly Boehme filed her bill for the partition of the home place, which she afterward amended to include the 20 acres also. The amended bill alleged that Julia Kern on February 5, 1915, entered into a parol agreement to sell her interest in all the land to Edward and Henry for $2000; that they had paid her that amount; that she was therefore only a trustee of the legal title for them; that the complainant, Charles and John were entitled each to onesixth of the real estate and Edward and Henry each to onefourth. All the other heirs were made defendants, all answered, and all except Charles filed cross-bills. The cause was referred to a master, and after a hearing upon exceptions to his report a decree was entered for the partition of all the real estate equally among the six heirs and for an accounting of rents and profits against Edward, Henry and John, and requiring Julia Kern to refund to Henry $2000, with interest. Edward and Henry have appealed. The answer and cross-bill of the appellants alleged that they had entered into an agreement with all the other heirs for the sale by all the others of their interests in the land to Edward and Henry for $2000 each; that the latter agreed with John that instead of the payment of $2000 the 20-acre tract should be deeded to him and he should pay them $133.333 an acre for 434 acres, which was the excess of the 20-acre tract over John's share in all the land; that the heirs all met in an attorney's office for the purpose of having the deeds drawn; that they were drawn and the deed to John was signed by all the heirs and that to the appellants by all but Dolly and Charles; that the appellants paid Julia $2000 and delivered to Dolly a certificate of deposit for that amount, which she accepted but after |