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the name of Judson College were the acts of the old corporation under a new name, then the note and trust deed in question in the case were executed by the old corporation under the new name and it should be as much bound by it as if it had been done under the proper legal name. The court likened the case to a change of name by an individual, and said that if an individual should change his name without authority of law, or even against law, and give notes and execute deeds, they would be obligatory upon him and as effective in law as if all had been done in his proper name. The Farmers Grain and Feed Company continued in existence with the same stockholders, officers and agents and carried on the same business as before but under an unauthorized name. It was not relieved from liability on the contracts made in the name of the Chicago Grains and Feed Company, and that being so, the defendant was not liable. The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed. Judgment affirmed.

(No. 12877.-Judgment affirmed.)

THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ILLINOIS, Defendant in Error, vs. MARTIN KRAUSE, Plaintiff in Error.

Opinion filed December 17, 1919-Rehearing denied Feb. 4, 1920.

I. CRIMINAL LAW-when an information charging violation of the Medical Practice act is sufficient. An information charging a violation of the provision of the Medical Practice act requiring a license to treat human ailments without medicine or operative surgery is sufficient which charges the offense substantially in the language of the statute and describes the particular act of the defendant relied upon as constituting such violation, specifying the time, place, name of person treated and the method of treatment.

2. SAME when refusal of instructions is not ground for reversal. If the defendant is clearly guilty of the offense charged and no other verdict could properly have been reached under the evidence, the refusal of certain instructions is not ground for reversal even though they might properly have been given.

3. SAME-instructions not supported by the evidence need not be given. Instructions not supported by the evidence need not be given in a criminal case even though they state correct propositions of law.

4. SAME what is not treatment by mental or spiritual means. Treatment by rubbing and manipulating the limbs and body of a patient is not treatment by mental or spiritual means, even though the practitioner claims to heal through the influence of the spirits by laying hands on the patient and asking the Deity to make the patient well. (People v. Gordon, 194 Ill. 560, and People v. Kane, 288 id. 235, followed.)

WRIT OF ERROR to the Second Branch Appellate Court for the First District;-heard in that court on writ of error to the Municipal Court of Chicago; the Hon. JOHN RICHARDSON, Judge, presiding.

ALONZO M. GRIFFEN, for plaintiff in error.

EDWARD J. BRUNDAGE, Attorney General, MACLAY HOYNE, State's Attorney, ALBert D. RodenBERG, and EDWARD E. WILSON, for the People.

Mr. JUSTICE THOMPSON delivered the opinion of the

court:

Plaintiff in error was convicted in the municipal court of Chicago of a violation of the Medical Practice act of Illinois. The judgment of the municipal court was affirmed by the Appellate Court, and this writ of error is prosecuted to review the decision of that court.

It is insisted that the municipal court erred in denying the motion to quash the information and in refusing to give certain instructions offered by plaintiff in error. The information, omitting the formal parts, charged "that Martin Krause, late of the said city of Chicago, heretofore, to-wit, on the 10th day of December, A. D. 1917, at the city of Chicago, aforesaid, not being then licensed to treat human ailments without the use of drugs or medicines and without operative surgery, did at the place and on the date afore

said treat human ailments without the use of drugs or medi-. cines and without operative surgery; that at the place and on the date aforesaid the said Martin Krause did treat one Miss Morley by rubbing and by laying on of the hands and otherwise manipulating upon the person of said Miss Morley, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided and against the peace and dignity of the People of the State of Illinois."

Section 2 of the Medical Practice act provides: "No person shall practice

*

any system or method of treating human ailments without the use of drugs or medicines and without operative surgery,

* without a

license so to do." Section 20 of the act provides: "Any person shall be regarded as practicing medicine or treating human ailments, within the meaning of this act, who shall treat or profess to treat, operate on or prescribe for any physical ailment or any physical injury to or deformity of another," excepting therefrom, among others, "the treatment of the sick or suffering by mental or spiritual means without the use of any drug or material remedy."

The information is not subject to the objections urged. The statute itself clearly defines the offense, and the information charges the offense substantially in the language of the statute and is therefore sufficient. (People v. Schreiber, 250 Ill. 345.) The offense was stated plainly enough to be readily understood by the jury, and it informed the defendant of the offense with which he was charged so that he could properly prepare his defense. This is all the law requires. (Glover v. People, 204 Ill. 170; People v. Green, 276 id. 346; People v. Robertson, 284 id. 620.) It was not necessary for the information to negative the exceptions. Kettles v. People, 221 Ill. 221; People v. Butler, 268 id. 635.

The record shows that two women inspectors employed by the city of Chicago called at defendant's place of business and found him treating an old man; that defendant's

wife gave Miss Morley a reading, telling her, among other things, that she was suffering from lung trouble; that Miss Morley told her that she did not think she had that trouble but if the reader had told her that she had stomach trouble she might have believed her; that defendant's wife then said it made no difference what her trouble was, her husband would give her a treatment which would cure her; that the inspectors then went out into the room where defendant was and found him treating a woman; that defendant invited Miss Morley to sit down on a chair and remove her coat and hat; that the defendant placed her feet and put her hands on her knees; that he then manipulated her shoulders and her back; that he put his hand on her forehead and put his head to her back and listened; that he continued this treatment for fifteen minutes and then inquired if she did not feel better; that he charged her fifty cents for the treatment; that she was suffering from no ailment when she was treated by defendant; that defendant had in his window a sign calling himself a spiritualist, but that he said nothing to her about spirits.

Plaintiff in error contends that he heals through the influence of the spirits; that he lays his hands on the patient and asks the Deity to make the sick person well and that he gave such a treatment to Miss Morley, and that therefore he comes within the exception to the statute and is not required to have a license. That the contentions of plaintiff in error cannot be sustained is our holding in People v. Gordon, 194 Ill. 560, and in People v. Kane, 288 id. 235. The reasons for our conclusion are fully set forth in those opinions and it would serve no good purpose to re-state them here.

This conclusion disposes of the contention that the court erred in refusing certain instructions. Even if it be conceded that the instructions stated correct propositions of law, they were not supported by the evidence in this case. Furthermore, it would not justify a reversal of the case even

if it be conceded that they might properly have been given, because the defendant was clearly guilty of the act charged and no other verdict could be reached under the evidence in this record. People v. Cleminson, 250 Ill. 135; People v. Murphy, 276 id. 304.

The judgment of the Appellate Court is affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

(No. 12863.-Judgment affirmed.)

THE BAY BOTTOMS DRAINAGE DISTRICT, Defendant in Error, vs. ALENA STOKES et al. Plaintiffs in Error. Opinion filed December 17, 1919-Rehearing denied Feb. 4, 1920.

1. DRAINAGE amendment of 1915 to section 37 of Levee act authorizes an assessment for obligations already incurred. The amendment of 1915 to section 37 of the Levee act, providing for the levying of an assessment for the completion of work as originally planned, authorizes an assessment to pay for obligations already incurred.

2. SAME-due process of law is complied with by public hearing before authorities in charge of assessment. Due process of law does not necessarily mean that the property owner must have a hearing in court, but the constitutional provision for due process of law is complied with in a drainage proceeding if the property owner is allowed a hearing before the public authorities in charge of levying the assessment, even though no hearing is allowed before the courts.

3. SAME amendment of 1915 to section 37 of Levee act is not unconstitutional. The amendment of 1915 to section 37 of the Levee act, authorizing the levying of an additional assessment for obligations already incurred by a drainage district, is not contrary to the provisions of the State and Federal constitutions as to due process of law.

WRIT OF ERROR to the County Court of Pope county; the Hon. B. F. ANDERSON, Judge, presiding.

CHARLES DURFEE, (W. S. HORTON, and C. E. FEIRICH, of counsel,) for plaintiffs in error.

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