172 Ill. 535, the court quoted with approval from Beckwith v. Carroll, 56 Ala. 12: "When it becomes the duty of a court of equity to take property under its own charge through a receiver, the property becomes chargeable with the necessary expenses incurred in taking care of and sav.ing it, including the allowance to the receiver for his services. He is the officer and agent of the court and not of the parties, and it is a right of the court, essential to its own efficiency in the protection of things so situated, to keep them under its control until such expenses and allowances are paid or secured to be paid." The court also quoted High on Receivers to the same effect. This court in the Knickerbocker case said, in substance, the object of appointing a receiver is to preserve the property for the benefit of all interested, which sometimes requires continuing a business; and it was further said the court had the right, which should be exercised with great caution, to make the expense of the business chargeable upon the corpus of the property when the income was not sufficient to pay it. The court further said such powers were ordinarily exercised in cases of railroad companies, yet the same rules apply in other cases under like circumstances. This is sustained also in Makeel v. Hotchkiss, 190 Ill. 311, and Town of Vandalia v. St. Louis, Vandalia and Terre Haute Railroad Co. 209 id. 73. The property here involved was untenantable and producing no income. The court determined it was for the best interests of all parties that it be completed. The owners were unable to complete it, and that could only be done through the appointment of a receiver with power to complete the building, and he could only do that by borrowing money for that purpose.

Under the facts and circumstances of this case we are of opinion the trust deed of Peter P. Kransz securing the receiver's certificates should have been made a first lien and the claims of defendants in error should have been made second liens.

The judgment of the Appellate Court and the decree of the circuit court are reversed and the cause remanded to the circuit court, with directions to enter a decree in accordance with the views expressed in this opinion. Reversed and remanded, with directions.

(No. 12580.-Reversed in part and remanded.)

THE PEOPLE ex rel. George E. Little, County Collector, Appellant, vs. THE ST. LOUIS MERCHANTS BRIDGE ComPANY, Appellee.

Opinion filed December 17, 1919-Rehearing denied Feb. 4, 1920.

1. TAXES what may be considered by board of review in estimating value of railroad bridge. Where all the capital stock of a bridge company is owned by the railroads using the bridge, which is operated on a cost basis for the benefit of said railroads and has no market value, in assessing the tangible property of the bridge company the assessor and the board of review will not be limited to the actual value of the material of which the bridge is composed but may take into consideration their own knowledge of the situation and compare the value and earning power of the bridge with the valuation of other property of the same character.

2. SAME-mere fact of over-valuation will not establish fraud. The mere fact of over-valuation will not establish fraud, but the valuation may be so excessive and made under such circumstances as to justify the conclusion that it was not honestly made and was known to be excessive.

3. SAME when assessment of capital stock and franchise of a bridge company above tangible property is proper. Where all the capital stock of a bridge company is owned by the railroad companies using the bridge on a cost basis for their own benefit, the fact that no dividends were paid and that there were no earnings above interest, taxes and repairs is not conclusive that the capital stock and franchise have no substantial value in excess of the tangible property, and, in the absence of evidence of the value of the service of the bridge to the beneficial owners, an assessment on a valuation of the capital stock, including the franchise, fixed by the State Board of Equalization on its own investigation is proper.

4. SAME-presumption is in favor of assessment by board of equalization. Until the contrary is shown, the Supreme Court is bound to presume that the State Board of Equalization acted upon sufficient information to justify its assessment.

5. SAME-when suspension of rule by board of equalization is not fraudulent. The State Board of Equalization does not act arbitrarily in suspending its rule as to the time of hearing the reports of its committees, which it has adopted for the convenience of the members of the board and which is not a rule regarding the valuation of property, and an assessment made upon the hearing of the reports of committees after the suspension of said rule by a vote in accordance with other rules of the board does not show that the board did not exercise its judgment nor that the assessment was fraudulently made.

6. SAME-tax on capital stock is personal property tax. A tax on the capital stock of a corporation is a personal property tax.

7. SAME-when objection to sale of real estate for capital stock tax is properly sustained. Under section 255 of the Revenue act a tax on personal property cannot be charged against real property except in case of removals or where the tax cannot be made out of personal property, and where the town collector's book does not show any notation of the reason for failure to collect a capital stock tax as required by section 170 of said act, an objection to the county collector's application for the sale of the real property of the corporation is properly sustained.

8. SAME collector seeking judgment against real property for personal property tax must designate particular real property to be charged. Under section 183 of the Revenue act a county collector who seeks a judgment for the sale of real property to pay a personal property tax must select some particular tract of real property to be charged with the delinquent personal property tax and designate such tract in his application and advertisement for judgment and sale, and the statute is not complied with where there is no statement that a personal property tax is to be charged on any of the real property.

APPEAL from the County Court of Madison county; the Hon. OTTO W. LONGENECKER, Judge, presiding.

EDWARD J. BRUNDAGE, Attorney General, and JOSEPH P. STREUBER, State's Attorney, for appellant.

KRAMER, KRAMER & CAMPBELL, (T. M. PIERCE, of counsel,) for appellee.

Mr. CHIEF JUSTICE DUNN delivered the opinion of the

court:

In 1916 the board of review of Madison county increased the assessment of the tangible property of the St. Louis Merchants Bridge Company from $700,005, at which it had been fixed by the board of review in 1915, to $1,560,000. The bridge company paid the tax on the original assessment but objected to the excess on the ground that the increase was not based upon any reasonable theory of valuation, but was unjust, arbitrary and unreasonable and so grossly excessive as to be fraudulent and an unjust and unlawful discrimination against the objector's property. The objection was sustained by the county court, but the judgment was reversed for error in refusing a change of venue and the cause was remanded. (People v. St. Louis Merchants Bridge Co. 282 Ill. 408.) In 1917 the State Board of Equalization assessed the capital stock, including the franchise, of the St. Louis Merchants Bridge Company, and upon an application by the collector of Madison county for an order of sale the company objected to the payment of the tax extended on such assessment because it was arbitrarily, fraudulently and unlawfully made in violation of the rules of the board and was so grossly excessive as to be fraudulent. The part of the tax of 1916 objected to amounts to $16,192.57, the bridge company having paid $13,190.43, and the tax of 1917 in dispute amounted to $43,020.01. After the remandment of the first case a stipulation was entered into for the consolidation of the two cases. They were heard together and separate judgments were entered sustaining the objection and denying judgment, from which the People have appealed.

The tangible property assessed in 1916 consisted of that part of the bridge of the appellee extending across the Mississippi river from Venice, in Madison county, to St. Louis, east of the middle of the river, together with the approach to the east end, including 23.33 acres of land. The St. Louis

Merchants Bridge Company is an Illinois corporation, with an authorized capital stock of $2,000,000, of which $1,500,000 has been issued. Its bridge was completed in 1890 and was paid for by a bond issue of $2,000,000. One-half of the bridge and its approach are in Illinois. The full value of the property of the company in Illinois was assessed in 1903 and in 1907 at $600,000. In 1909 and 1910 750 feet of timber trestle was replaced with steel and the assessment was increased $50,000. In 1911 the supervisor of assessments raised the assessed value of the property to $1,500,000, but because the increase in the assessment was made without notice to the company it was held invalid. (St. Louis Merchants Bridge Co. v. Eisele, 263 Ill. 50.) In 1915 the supervisor again assessed the property at $1,500,000, but the board of review reduced the assessment to $700,005. In 1916, after notice to the company and a hearing, the board of review increased this amount to $1,560,000, and it is this increase which is objected to.

On the hearing before the board of review the bridge company introduced the evidence of engineers to show that the bridge and approaches, under normal conditions of material and labor value, could be reproduced for $2,000,000, and that since its construction it had suffered a depreciation amounting to twenty per cent of its value, leaving in Illinois a value of $800,000, in addition to the value of tracks, amounting to $40,000, and real estate valued at $46,660. It was shown that in the assessment of property generally the value was fixed at seventy per cent of the actual value, and this proportion of the full value of the bridge company's property would amount to $620,662, which the appellee contends is the proper full valuation of its property for taxation. The assessor for Venice township from 1911 to 1916, and the county treasurer and supervisor of assessments of Madison county, also testified on that hearing as to their investigations upon which their assessments had been made. All the evidence heard by the board of review