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he said: "The Emperor desires the Minister of Marine to authorize the Captain of the frigate to communicate with the Commander of the English squadron, if extraordinary events should make that course necessary, both for the personal safety of His Majesty and to spare France the sorrow and the shame to see him taken from his last refuge, to be delivered to the mercies of his enemies. If in this situation the English cruiser prevents the frigates from leaving, you may dispose of the services of the Emperor as a General having no other thought than to be of service to his country." This was a further attempt to implicate France in his destiny. He wished for French official approval of his surrender to England, or in the alternative the command of French troops.

On the 3rd July, at 4 a.m., Napoleon went on to Rochefort, which he reached at 8 a.m. He was well received by the populace throughout the journey. He showed no sign of emotion now or at any time during these days. His followers sat silent and dejected in the carriage, and he said nothing. He occasionally took snuff from the box offered by Beker, upon which was a portrait of Marie Louise in ivory; once he examined the carving, and then returned it to Beker, without a word.

He was received by Bonnefoux, and was installed at the Prefecture. Crowds came to the windows calling for "L'Empereur," until he was at last prevailed upon to show himself and bow to the people, who greeted him with acclamations. Protected by the Aix batteries there lay at anchor the two frigates, the Saale, Captain Philibert, and the Méduse, Captain Ponée. They were victualled for four and a half months, and special preparations had been made for a table suitable for Napoleon and his followers. When they had all joined him there were sixty-four persons altogether in his suite.

A council of superior officers of the Marine was held, and their unanimous opinion was that it was impossible to escape

the vigilance of the English ships. Beker wrote to the Provisional Government on the next day, 4th July: "Immediately upon our arrival at Rochefort, the superior officers of the Marine declared that it was impossible to depart from the Aix roads so long as the English maintained so large a cruising squadron in sight of our ships." In a private letter Beker wrote that there was no possibility of escape so long as the English cruisers occupied all the outlets, and that he saw no favourable chance for the departure of the Emperor. All sorts of projects for escape were mooted, but Napoleon, while pretending to be interested, would not decide upon any of them. Amongst other plans it was proposed that he should be shut in a barrel, with holes for breathing, and placed on a neutral ship. There was nothing to prevent successful evasion by a subterfuge of that kind, but one cannot imagine the Emperor Napoleon stooping to such undignified procedure.

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There was now a period of complete inaction at Rochefort, for five days, from the 3rd to the 8th July. Beker says, a certain apathy had taken possession of the faculties of Napoleon." Probably he had been informed by Bonnefoux that the frigates had orders not to attempt to force a way against the British vessels. He had made up his mind to give himself up to the British ship, but put off the final act, partly from natural hesitation, partly to await a reply from Paris to his renewed offer of his services. There should have been no doubt about the answer, but he clung at straws. The delay was prejudicial to him, for his appeal to English magnanimity would have had better effect if made at once, while he could still assert that he had some semblance of freedom.

On the evening of the 7th Beker received the answer from the Commission of Government to his letter from Niort. "Napoleon must embark without delay. The success of our negotiations depends principally upon the certitude which the Allied Powers wish to have of his embarkation,

and you do not know to what extent the safety and tranquillity of the State are imperilled by these delays. . . . You must, therefore, employ every means of force which may be necessary, while at the same time preserving the respect which is due to Napoleon. As for the services he offers, our duty towards France, and our engagements with the Powers, do not permit us to accept them, and you must not trouble us with them any further. Finally, the Commission sees some inconvenience in Napoleon's communicating with the English squadron. It cannot accord the desired permission on that head."

The Government was afraid that Napoleon would place himself at the head of the Army; it wished him to embark on a French ship, but not to sail and so perhaps escape, for the Allies had declared that they would require additional guarantees from France in that event; on the other hand, the Government was unwilling to be officially concerned in Napoleon's project of going on a British ship.

In accordance with these orders Beker now pressed Napoleon to embark, and on the 8th July a move was at last made. At 4 p.m. Napoleon drove to the little port of Fouras, where the boats from the frigates were in attendance. As it was low tide, the boats could not come to the landingstage, and Napoleon stepped off the mainland of France, which he was never again to touch, on to the back of a sailor, who carried him to the boat. He was taken to the Saale, where he was received with all his honours.

On the 9th, a Sunday, Napoleon went ashore for a few hours on the island of Aix, where he was acclaimed by the troops with homage and enthusiasm. He inspected the works he had caused to be constructed for the protection of ships at anchor in the bay, he passed a regiment of marines in review, and received the officers; he was once more, and for the last time, the great Emperor. When he returned to the Saale he found that Beker had received fresh orders from Paris, dated the 6th July. Beker was to press Napoleon to

embark on one of the frigates, but-" If Napoleon should prefer to be taken immediately on board an English cruiser, or to England, the maritime Prefect will give him the means of doing so, upon his written demand, and in that case, an emissary with a flag of truce will at once be placed at his disposal." . . . "In no case is the commander of the vessel on which Napoleon may be, to disembark him on any point whatever of French territory, under pain of high treason.' The French ship was not to sail if there was any sign of British opposition.

Las Cases in the "Mémoires," published in 1818, writes of the situation: "The English cruisers were in view, and hovered day and night about the port of Rochefort. Every pass seemed guarded and closed. Besides, the winds were uniformly contrary. While, in this manner, every account which we received from the interior imperiously commanded us to hasten our departure, everything at sea concurred to render it impossible. In this extremity of embarrassment, the Emperor dispatched me to an English cruiser, as from my early emigration from France and residence in England, I possessed a knowledge of the English."

Napoleon had now obtained the authorization of the French Government; he knew, as Las Cases says, that he had no alternative but to communicate with the English, a project which he had long contemplated.

He dictated a letter, which was signed by Bertrand, asking the English Commander whether he had received the passports which were expected from London, and if not, whether he would oppose the departure of Napoleon for the United States, on a French frigate. Savary and Las Cases were sent with this letter early in the morning of the 10th July. Las Cases understood English, and was enjoined to keep that fact secret, in the hope of surprising any confidences that might be exchanged in his presence, by the English officers.

They were received on board the Bellerophon, seventy-four guns, by Captain Maitland. On 30th May, 1815, Maitland

[graphic][subsumed]

From H. Meyer's engraving after the painting by Samuel Woodford, R. A.

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