Εικόνες σελίδας
PDF
Ηλεκτρ. έκδοση

of every moral obligation was punished in the sequel both by France and England. Spain as an enemy at sea we at once wished for on account of her wealth, and despised for her want of skill; the exclusion of our ships from her ports was compensated by the capture of her valuable South-American and West-India trade; but when her fleets came to be united to those of France, they formed a mass, before which even the courage and talent of Sir John Jervis was compelled to retreat. This state of things however did not long continue; and if for a short period we quitted the Mediterranean, it was only to return with redoubled force, and to add fresh laurels to the naval and military fame of Great Britain.

Corsica was held only by the power of the sword, and the French were hourly on the alert to wrest it from us. The armies or the influence of the republic now covered Italy from the Alps to Otranto; the King of Sardinia trembled; Naples was at their command; and the Grand Duke of Tuscany had nothing left but submission: in short there was no port in the Mediterranean which the English might safely enter nearer than Gibraltar, the distance from which and the difficulty of procuring supplies, with the want of every necessary for a fleet, together with the selfish and mercenary cunning of the Barbary powers, rendered the situation of commanderin-chief in those seas one of great ardour and difficulty.

Government however had no hesitation in selecting

Vice-admiral Sir John Jervis, K. B. for this important service he had recently returned from the West Indies, where he had, in conjunction with Lieutenantgeneral Sir Charles Grey, conducted a successful campaign against the French Caribee islands, and compelled them to submit to the British dominion. Never had the station of an admiral required a greater display of talent, and never perhaps were the king and country more ably, zealously, or honourably, served and defended.

Sir John Jervis hoisted his flag on board the Lively of thirty-two guns, commanded by the Right Honourable Lord Garlies, now Earl of Galloway, and sailed in the month of December, 1795. The Rear-admirals Waldegrave and Mann sailed about the same time, to put themselves under his command; their flags were in the Barfleur and Windsor Castle, of ninetyeight guns each: the Commander-in-chief reached the island of Corsica early in January, and the duties and anxieties of his situation commenced before the Lively had let go her anchor in Myrtillobay.

We should hope no apology would be here necessary for introducing the letters of Sir John Jervis, afterward Earl of St. Vincent; they illustrate, in the clearest and most perspicuous manner, the real state of politics in that part of the world: the plans and operations of the republican armies are concisely noticed; the weakness and imbecility of the Italian princes and states are exposed; the policy pursued towards the Barbary powers, by which they were

induced to assist us; the violation of the neutrality by both belligerents; the strength and the wants of the British fleet; and the mismanagement and inattention, in some departments of the state, in not forwarding the supplies of stores. The foresight of the Admiral in providing for the most distant contingencies, and his retreat down the Mediterranean from Corsica with the Smyrna fleet in tow, sufficiently display his zeal and ability. The ardent wish he breathes throughout for the honour of his country, and the peace of the world; the alleviation of the horrors of war whenever it lay in his power; attention to the sick, to prisoners, and, generally, to the unfortunate; the weight of responsibility, and the disregard of all personal consideration; his enmity on all occasions to the corrupt application of the public money; his acuteness in discerning, and judgment in rewarding talent; his orders to pursué the enemy, and the selection of men to execute them; the husbanding of his resources; the bold and determined attack on the Spanish fleet, with scarcely half their numerical force; and within three months after, of the suppression of a dangerous mutiny in his fleet-these and many other important considerations will shew the character of the man, and hold him up as an example to future ages "of public virtue and of private worth."

[blocks in formation]

CHAP. IV.

Political retrospect and reflections in 1797, and acquisitions of France-Destruction of the balance of power-Success of General Bonaparte-Depression of the allies-Threats of invasion-Losses of France by sea-Stability of British government-Refusal to admit Dutch property into Britain free of duty-Failure of negotiations-Causes assigned- French and Dutch discontented-Dutch deceived by French directory-Russia and England-Treaty of commerce-Politics of Rome-Battle of Arcola-Successes and battles on the Rhine-Neutrality of Prussia-Surrender of Mantua-Austria compelled to make peace and resign Belgium-Observations on the state of England-Mutiny in Sir Roger Curtis's squadron-Summary of British naval force in 1797-Farther negotiations for peace-Lord Malmsbury at Lisle-Proposals -Rejected-Farther successes of British navy-Capture and loss of the Dorade:

WE

E are now arrived at an important period in the war of the revolution: the commencement of the year 1797 was an era which afforded a boundless field for political speculation. Great Britain had by her arms and her councils attained an eminence whence the politician and the philosopher might take a view of the effects produced and likely to follow from the contest in which we were unfortunately engaged.

That the power, the resources, and the courage, of the French had baffled all calculation has been shewn; her aggrandizement, and the proportional depression of her neighbours, had become matter of serious alarm: if we had gone to war solely for

the purpose of shutting up the Scheldt, the object had most completely failed; and if for the purpose of combating the hydra of faction and irreligion, our hopes were almost equally disappointed. If the acquisitions of France, after the successful campaigns of 1794 and 1795, could not be contemplated without dismay, what shall we say of the rapid progress of the French armies on the Rhine and in Italy during the two succeeding years? what had become of the balance of power which, from the reign of Elizabeth, had been the fondly cherished object of every British cabinet? That wise political arrangement was now annihilated, without much prospect of its restoration, and while France acquired fresh vigour and resources from the very war in which she was engaged, the energy of the continental powers gradually subsided and Britain left alone, was loading herself with a debt which was likely to produce the most serious evils to posterity. To sum up in a few words the vast advantages which General Bonaparte, at the head of his victorious legions, had gained for France, we copy the words of an able political writer:-*

"Never had the exploits of this celebrated warrior and his companions in arms been exceeded. In the course of a year they had been victorious in no less than eighty-four engagements, fourteen of which were pitched battles; exclusive of the slain, they had taken one hundred thousand pri

* Dodsley's Annual Register, 1797, page 85.

« ΠροηγούμενηΣυνέχεια »