property to be subsequently acquired conveys no title to such property when acquired, which is valid against the mortgagor or his voluntary assignee unless after acquisition, possession of such property is given to the mortgagee or taken by him under the mortgage. Williams v. Briggs; Cook v. Corthell.

2. When mortgagee obtains title.-Although a mortgage of personal property to be subsequently acquired is in itself ineffectual to vest in the mortgagee a legal title to the property, yet if after acquisition by the mortgagor the mortgagee by delivery from, or by consent of, the mortgagor, takes possession of the property, under the mortgage conveyance, the title to the property both in law and equity vests in the mortgagee without further conveyance or bill of sale. Cook v. Corthell.

FIRE INSURANCE.

Mistake in policy: effect of: evidence.-The E. Company issued a policy to C., payable in case of loss to G., for $1,000, with permission for $6,250 other insurance, and providing that if the insured, or any other person interested, should have other insurance on the property not assented to in writing, and mentioned in or indorsed on the policy, then the policy should be void. There was $8,000 other insurance procured, and the E. Company, after loss, denied its liability for this reason. G., in an action against the E. Company, offered to prove that he gave notice to the E. Company of $8,000 other insurance; that the company consented to the amount, and thereupon wrote its policy with permission for $6,250; that neither C. nor G. noticed the variance till after the loss; and that the insertion of $6,250, instead of $8,000, was a blunder of the E. Company. Held, that the evidence was admissible to defeat the defense of the E. Company by way of estoppel. Greene v. Equitable Fire and Mar. Ins. Co.

OPTION OF PURCHASER.

1. A personal privilege only not transmissible.-W. conveyed to E. an undivided half part of two lots of land, and subsequently received from E. a bond in a penal sum of $4,000, giving W. the privilege at any time at his option, within seven years from the date of the bond, to purchase the whole of said two estates for $8,000, provided that on such purchase E. should be by W. exonerated from all liabilities and losses past or future of a firm whereof E. was a member. W. died without having availed himself of the option, and more than three years before the expiration of the time prescribed. E. became his administrator. The widow and children of W. filed a bill against E., charging fraudulent concealment of the bond. E. produced the bond, denying in his answer the charges of the bill, whereupon the complainants asked leave to amend the bill by a prayer that E.'s title to the estates in question might be declared that of a mortgagee for $8,000; that the estates might be sold to satisfy E.'s claim, and that an account might be ordered. Held, that the option of purchase given to W. by the bond was neither a chose in action nor a transmissible right of property, but a personal privilege in W., and that on his death E. was freed from the bond. Held, further, that a purchase under the option by the administrator of W. must, if made, be for and in the name of W.'s heirs; but as this might change the succession to W.'s property, W.'s administrator could not be allowed the option given W. Newton v. Newton.

SUNDAY.

1. Damages dependent upon illegal contract not recov

erable.-A statute being in force and providing that "every person who shall do or exercise any labor or business, or work of his ordinary calling, * * * on the first day of the week, or suffer the same to be done * * * by his children, servant, or apprentices, works of necessity and charity only excepted, shall be fined not exceeding " * * * . S., a liverystable keeper, let, in his ordinary business, a horse and carriage to be driven for pleasure to a particular place. The hirer drove them to a different place, and returned them damaged, whereupon S. brought trover against the hirer. Held, affirming Whelden v. Chappel, 8 R. I. 230, that the action would not lie. Where a plaintiff's cause of action arises from a violation of law on his part the suit cannot be sustained, and it is immaterial whether the violation of law appears from the plaintiff's direct evidence or is elicited from him by legitimate cross-examination. Smith v. Rollins.

TRADE-MARK.

1. Use by manufacturer of his own name.-A. C. & Co., being the successors by purchase of Stillman & Co., woolen manufacturers, continued to use "Stillman & Co." as a trade-mark on their ticket for goods. Latimer, Stillman & Co., the lessees of a mill formerly used by Stillman & Co., known both as the "Stillman Mill" and as the "Seventh Day Mill," also used "Stillman & Co." as a trade-mark. On a petition for injunction, brought by A. C. & Co. against Latimer, Stillman & Co., to prevent their so using the words "Stillman & Co.," it appearing that no deception could be charged on either complainants or respondents, and that no person of the old firm of Stillman & Co. was a member of the firm of A. C. & Co. Held, that the injunction could not be granted. Held, further, that a manufacturer has the right to label his goods with his own name or that of his mill, if no fraudulent purpose is intended. Carmichel v. Latimer. 2. Assignment of trade-mark.- Query, if a trademark, whose reputation depends on the excellence of the manufacture, or the skill and honesty of the manufacturer, can be legally assigned. Ib.

3. Continuance of firm name.-Query, if the English practice of retaining a firm name, when no original partner remains, is generally recognized in American law. Ib.

RECENT ENGLISH DECISIONS.

EASEMENT.

Common: right of lord of manor to grant leases for brickmaking: evidence of custom of manor: approvement against common of pasture.- In the year 1751 and afterward, leases of clay-pits on Chobham Common had been granted by the lord of the manor of which the common was parcel, for the purpose of making bricks. Such clay-pits covered 15 out of the 4,500 acres of the common. The tenants of the manor, and also the parishioners of Chobham, had, from a time before living memory, exercised rights of common of pasture, turbary, and estovers, which the user of the clay-pits did not interfere with. The plaintiffs, being freeholders of lands and enjoying rights of common, turbary, and estovers, over Chobham Common, sued the lord and one of his lessees for disturbance of common by means of the clay-pits. Held, that the lord could not grant the leases of the clay-pits except under a custom, but that the granting of the leases was sufficient evidence of the custom. Q. B. D.,

Feb. 5, 1877. Lascelles v. Onslow, 36 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 459.

INNKEEPER.

Duty to provide entertainment: inn: traveler: reasonable excuse. The defendant was the proprietor of a hotel. Attached to the hotel and under the same roof and license, but entered by a separate door from the street, was a refreshment bar in which persons casually passing by obtained refreshments at a counter. The prosecutor, who was a householder living within twelve hundred yards, had been in the habit of coming to the bar with several large dogs, which had been found an annoyance to other guests; and letters had passed in which the defendant had objected to the dogs being brought into the bar, and the prosecutor had asserted his right to bring them. The prosecutor subsequently, while taking a walk for pleasure, went with one large dog to the bar and claimed to be served with refreshments, which the defendant refused him. On an indictment charging the defendant, as an innkeeper, with refusing refreshment to the prosecutor: Held, that he could not be convicted, first, because the refreshment bar was not an inn; secondly, because the prosecutor was not a traveler; thirdly, because, had it been otherwise, the defendant had reasonable ground for his refusal. The Queen v. Rymer, L. R., 2 Q. B. D. (C. C. R.) 136.

MASTER AND SERVANT.

Liability for negligence: bailor and bailee: cab proprietor: employment of driver: 32 & 33 Vict., c. 115.Defendant, a cab proprietor, let a cab with the use of two horses to a driver for 16s. a day, the driver had no specified time for starting from or returning to the defendant's stables. The driver's licensed number, but no name, was on the cab. The driver, having put down his last fare one evening, was returning to the stables when, for purposes of his own, he drove a short distance beyond the stables, and on his way back he negligently drove over the plaintiff. Held, that this arrangement between defendant and his driver constituted the relation of bailor and bailee of the cab and horses, but that so far as the public were concerned, the relation was, by the Metropolitan Public Carriage Act, 1869, that of master and servant; the defendant, therefore, was liable as a master for his driver's negligence, if he caused injury when acting within his authority as bailee, and the plaintiff had a right to recover. Q. B. D., May 2, 1877. Venables v. Smith, 36 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 509.

NEGLIGENCE.

Building works: removal of hoarding: injury to person passing in street: sub-contractor: liability: evidence of negligence.-The defendants contracted to execute building works in a street. When the outside work was completed, a hoarding, put up for the protection of the public, was removed. There were then no sashes in the windows and all the interior work had still to be done. S., a sub-contractor with the defendants, undertook the plastering, and a workman employed by S., whilst moving about in the course of his work, caused a tool to fall through the window, which struck and injured the plaintiff who was passing in the street. The plaintiff brought his action for damages against the defendants. At the trial the jury found, in answer to a question left to them by the judge, that the injury to the plaintiff was caused by the negligence of the defendants in not providing some other protection for the public when the hoarding was removed. Held (on motion to enter judgment on this finding for

the plaintiff), that the defendants were not liable, as the accident not being one which might reasonably have been foreseen, there was no duty to guard against the occurrence of it, and if there was such a duty the sub-contractor, whose servant caused the injury, would be liable, and not the defendants. Ct. App., April 28, 1877. Pearson v. Cox, 36 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 495.

PRESCRIPTION.

Sea-wall: liability of frontager to maintain: sea flowing over frontager's land on to that of adjoining owners. -The plaintiff and the defendant were frontagers to the sea in respect of adjoining lands. A continuous sea-wall protected the lands of both, and each had for long been accustomed to repair that part of the wall which protected his own lands. The defendant's wall having gradually sunk, owing to want of repair, a high tide caused the sea to flow over his wall and land, and thence on to the plaintiff's land. In an action by the plaintiff for the amount of the damage thus caused, held (affirming the judgment of the Queen's Bench Division), that the defendant was not liable, as the fact that he had always repaired the wall for his own benefit did not establish a prescriptive liability on him to maintain it for the benefit of others, and that he was not bound to do so by the common law. Ct. App., April 17, 1877. Hudson v. Tabor, 36 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 492.

SHIPPING.

Charter-party: delivery short of destination: freight pro rata itineris. By charter-party between plaintiff, shipowner, and defendants, charterers, plaintiff agreed that his steamship should load a cargo of iron rails at an English port and proceed to Taganrog in the Sea of Azov, or as near thereto as she might safely get, and deliver the same. The captain on arrival in December found the Sea of Azov closed by ice, and, notwithstanding defendants' protest, landed the cargo at Kertch and left it at the custom house there, where it was subsequently taken possession of by the consignees named in the bills of lading. Kertch is 220 miles by sea and 700 by land from Taganrog, and is as near as the ship could have got before April. In an action for freight, held (affirming the judgment of the Queen's Bench Division), that plaintiff was not entitled to freight either under the charter-party or pro rata itineris. Ct. App., April 27, 1877. Metcalf v. Britannia Iron Works Co., 36 L. T. Rep. (N. S.) 451.

SLANDER.

Slander of title: special damage.-The plaintiffs, vocalists, advertised in a theatrical newspaper, as follows: "The Sisters Hartridge have great pleasure in thanking Messrs. Chappell & Co., Messrs. Metzler & Co." (music publishers), "and others, for their kind unhesitating permission to sing any morceaux from their musical publications." The defendant, who was interested as agent for the proprietors of the "stageright" of certain songs published by the firms mentioned, wrote to the proprietors of two music halls at which the plaintiffs were engaged to sing, to the effect that the advertisement, if relied upon in every particular, was calculated to lead them to incur penalties under the copyright act, inasmuch as the publishers named had in some instances no power to give the alleged permission, and insinuating that music-hall singing was not calculated to create a demand for their musical publications. Upon a motion to set aside a nonsuit, held, that, inasmuch as the letters were reasonably susceptible of a construction which would

make them libelous, the opinion of the jury ought to have been taken upon their meaning. Hart v. Wall, L. R., 2 C. P. D. 146.

STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS.

Acknowledgment of debt: implied promise to pay.— The defendant, whose debt to the plaintiff was barred by the statute of limitations, wrote to the plaintiff within six years before action the following letter: "I return to Shepperton about Easter. If you send me there the particulars of your account with vouchers, I shall have it examined and check sent to you for the amount due; but you must be under some great mistake in supposing that the amount due to you is any thing like the sum you now claim." Held, that the debt was revived, as the request to be furnished with an account with vouchers at a particular time and place did not negative the implied promise to pay arising from the admission of a balance due. Skeet v. Lindsay, L. R., 2 Ex. D. 314.

BOOK NOTICES.

NEW YORK CODE OF CIVIL PROCEdure. The New Revision of the Statutes of the State of New York. The Code of Civil Procedure (first enacted as L. 1876, ch. 448, and amended in 1877), according to the Standard Text. Prepared, certified and deposited in the office of the Secretary of State, pursuant to law, by the Commissioners to Revise the Statutes. With the New Marginal Notes and an Introduction, prepared by the Commissioners and accompanying the Standard Text; also, full Explanatory Notes by Montgomery H. Throop, one of the Commissioners; together with all the provisions of the former Code of Procedure which have not been repealed; also a Table showing the correspondence of the repealed sections of the latter to those of the present Code, and other useful matters. Albany: Weed, Parsons & Company, Printers, 1877.

ALMOST every law publisher has before this issued

an edition of the new Code, but every one of these editions has been the result of private compilation and is not the Code enacted by the legislature and on file in the office of the Secretary of State. The commissioners to whom the work of compilation was intrusted had, as it is well known, sixty days in which to complete the duty assigned to them, and although they were presumptively more familiar with the statute than any other persons in the State, it being their own handiwork, it has taken them very nearly the allotted time to properly incorporate amendments into it and arrange it as the law-making power designed it should be. This is enough to indicate how accurate and reliable the editions heretofore issued must be. We have in several instances pointed out errors which we casually chanced to meet in looking over the text of these hastily prepared volumes, but it is not merely the errors discovered that make them useless for the profession, but the fact that a person consulting one of them can never be sure that he has the law before him as it is, besides the book cannot be used as authority in the courts.

In this edition we have the official text as it was prepared and filed by the commissioners, and it is the only edition so far issued that has that merit. It is consequently the only reliable issue of the new Code as yet accessible to the profession. It has in addition to the text of such Code and that of the various acts connected with it or its operation, an appendix, the work of the commissioners, showing the material changes proposed in the existing laws; a table of corresponding sections, showing in what portions of this Code the repealed sections of the old Code are represented; the text of the portions of the Code of Civil

Procedure not expressly repealed in 1877, and explanatory notes appended to every section by Mr. Throop, who has, as we know, been one of the commissioners to revise the laws from the first organization of the commission. In respect to the character of these notes the statement made in the preface is the best explanation: "It results, from what I have said, that the following notes are not to be considered as official. But I have been a member of the commission to revise the statutes, since its creation, and in that capacity I have contributed both to the preparation of the original text and notes, and to the review of the text. And I have not hesitated in the following notes to state directly and plainly the action, plans and objects of the commissioners whenever a statement thereof would tend to elucidate the subject under discussion. To have refrained from doing so would have been to do a wrong to the profession, who are entitled to that information." The volume contains the commissioners' index, which is full and accurate, and the mechanical execution of the work is all that can be desired. In fact we can recommend it to the profession in this State, not merely as a useful volume, but as a necessary one that no practicing lawyer can do without, and one upon which he will be obliged to depend for assistance after the first of next September.

The adoption of the new Code will, doubtless, impose upon the profession much labor and some vexation, but the volume before us will do all that can be done to lighten that labor and relieve from that vexation. Whether it would have been better to retain the old practice in the old form, cannot now be discussed. We are to have the new, and this being so, it is well for the profession that they have a work within their reach which will make the transition from one dispensation to another easy and plain.

GENERAL STATUTES OF NEW YORK FOR 1877. The General Statutes of the State of New York, for the year 1877, containing all laws of a public and general nature passed at the one hundredth session of the Legislature, carefully collated with the originals in the office of the Secretary of State; also the laws relating to the city of New York. To be continued annually. Albany: Weed, Parsons & Company, 1877.

The excessive amount of statute law produced at each annual session of our legislature long since disheartened those of the profession who endeavored to include within their libraries the whole body of such law. Not to speak of the expense, which is considerable, the regular volumes of the session laws take up so much shelf room, and are so unhandy to refer to that many practitioners, when they receive a volume, usually go through it and note all the acts altering or affecting the general law upon a fly leaf, or, in some instances, on the outside of the book. This is very laborious, and, besides, it defaces the volumes. To those who keep in their libraries the full series of the session laws, a collection of the general statutes is soon felt to be necessary. The various editions of the Revised Statutes since the first are only attempts to separate the general legislation of the State from the local. The editors of some of these editions (second, third, fourth and fifth) undertook to classify this general legislation in accordance with the plan followed by the revisers in their work, but with only partial success. In fact one of the editions is a mere jumble of statutes, arranged about as well as an auctioneer would arrange a library for sale, and presents the law in a way so that it can neither be understood

nor remembered. It was not until the late Judge Edmonds undertook the task of compilation that our general law could be said to be in an accessible or a reliable form. He wisely gave the law just as the legislature left it, placing the Revised Statutes in two volumes and the enactments which were not part of those statutes in separate volumes. Since then the annual contributions made to the general laws have been issued, and now the entire general law of the State is furnished in about one-fifteenth of the space occupied by the Session Laws. This compilation has also an advantage over the Session Laws in the careful and thorough annotations made in its volumes, enabling the reader, if he wishes to do so, to make himself familiar with the judicial construction of such statutes as have been passed upon and with all legislation bearing upon the same subject-matter. The present volume contains in addition to the general laws those relating to the city of New York, that municipality embracing so large a portion of our population and doing so large a share of the business of the whole country, as to make enactments in relation to it really of general value. The full titles and dates of approval of all the acts passed are given, so that in nine cases out of ten all that the practicing lawyer wishes to know can be found here. There were 475 acts approved in 1877, somewhat more than one-fourth of which appear here. The act known as the Code of Civil Procedure is not given, as that act itself fills a large volume and is published in another form, but all the accompanying legislation in relation to the Code and its operation, including the amendatory act (chap. 416), is given. The volume is excellently indexed, and well printed and bound, and contains a number of valuable annotations and references, and will, we have no doubt, soon find its way into every law library in the State.

NOTES.

current number of the Journal du Droit InterTHE national Privé et de la Jurisprudence comparé, contains articles upon the following subjects: "De la compétence des tribuneaux français dans les contestations entre étrangers," by Ch. Demangeat, Counselor of the Court of Cassation; "Des conséquences juridiques de la naturalization au point de vue du divorce," by Ernest Lehr, Professor of Comparative Legislation in the Academy of Lausanne; "De l'effet des jugements et actes étrangers dans la principauté de Monaco," by E. De Loth, Advocate in Monaco. The number contains the usual abstracts of decisions upon international subjects and review of the progress of legislation upon the same subjects in various countries, and will well repay perusal by all interested in the progress of international law.

The meteor case, which we once before mentioned, has been decided. This case, it will be remembered, was in regard to the property right in a meteor, which dropped a fragment weighing about seventy-five ponnds on a public highway over lands belonging to the Amana society, a body owning property in common, near Homestead, Iowa Co., Ill. Soon after, Henry Maas, while passing along the highway, discovered the fragment, and carried it to the store of the society, where it was held by the society as their property. Maas commenced action in the county court to recover possession. The plaintiff claimed

title by discovery, and that there was no prior owner, at least within the jurisdiction of mundane courts. The defendants claimed title under the law of accre tion; that the stone fell on land in which they held the fee-title; that the fee in the highway was in them, subject only to the easement of public travel; that all accretions to the highway belonged to the realty as much as if made on inclosures. The court, after a long trial, decided for the owners of the land. — It is stated that of the 2,000 law students who appeared at the examination for pleaders at Allahabad, India, in January last, only thirteen have succeeded in passing for the High Court.

The Pittsburg, Penn., Court of Quarter Sessions lately disposed of a criminal case with remarkable celerity. One Keener, who had been pardoned out of State Prison for "meritorious behavior," took to his old trade of burglary, and was captured one Friday night in the commission of that offense. On Saturday morning a true bill was found against him, and on that day he was convicted and sentenced to ten years' imprisonment.

The English lawyers and law journals are very sensitive about advertising, as appears from this extract from the Solicitors' Journal of the 30th ult.: "Last week a communication relating to a change in the members of a legal partnership was inserted in the advertisement columns of this journal. We need hardly say that this was due to a pure oversight in the publishing department, and was not intended or desired either by the legal firm referred to or by the publisher of the Journal, who has invariably refused to receive any advertisement of this kind.". In the United States Circuit Court at Pittsburg, Pa., on the 7th inst., at five minutes past one o'clock in the afternoon a case was submitted to the jury, and at fifteen minutes past three the jury came into court with a verdict for the plaintiff, awarding him $128,808.41 damages.

A few weeks ago, in the Queen's Bench Division, before Mr. Justice Field, the following conversation is reported to have occurred in a case of Wright v. Trevor. Mr. Wilberforce appeared for the plaintiff. It was, he said, a demurrer to two paragraphs in the defendant's statement of defense. The action was for libel, and the statement of claim alleged that the plaintiff was formerly a member of the lodge of Freemasons of which the defendant was also a member. The statement set out a letter written and published by the defendant about the unsuccessful election to the lodge of certain persons who were proposed for members. Field, J.-Are you a mason? Wilberforce-No. Field, J.-Are you, Mr. Cave? Cave, Q. C.-Yes. Field, J.-It is contrary to the rules of Masonry to come into a court of law on such a matter. It will be much better to ask the Grand Master to interfere and decide the question. Cave-We are perfectly ready to do so. Wilberforce said the plaintiff had made application to the Grand Master, and he had said that it was a case for a court of law. Field, J.-There must be some error about it. Looking to the matter in dispute, I think it is eminently a matter for the Grand Master. Cave-I quite agree. Field, J.Let it stand over to go before the Grand Master. From what I see of it it is a case that the Grand Master will entertain.-Solicitors' Journal.