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$60 (Iowa) Where a broker contracts to procure a purchaser and produces one who enters into an enforceable contract with the principal, the broker is entitled to his commissions, though the contract is afterwards canceled.Ketcham v. Axelson, 142 N. W. 62.

$ 61 (Iowa) The right of a broker to commissions is not affected by the conduct of his principal to which he has not consented subsequent to the execution of a contract of sale; and, a valid contract having been made, such right is not affected by the principal's inability to convey title.-Ketcham v. Axelson, 142 N. W. 62.

$61 (Mich.) Where a broker procured a purchaser ready, willing, and able to purchase on the terms specified, but the owner was unable to give a merchantable title, and the prospective purchaser refused to take a defective title, the broker had earned his commission.-Harger v. Watson, 142 N. W. 352.

§ 63 (Iowa) Where a broker contracted to procure a purchaser and procured one with whom the principal contracted to sell the property with an option reserved to the principal to cancel the contract, the fact that the principal subsequently elected to exercise his option did not deprive the broker of his right to commissions. -Ketcham v. Axelson, 142 N. W. 62.

V. ACTIONS FOR COMPENSATION. § 86 (Neb.) Evidence, in a broker's action for commission, held insufficient to show that the sale was made by plaintiff or by any one acting in his stead.-Starbird v. J. H. McShane Timber Co., 142 N. W. 683.

BUILDING RESTRICTIONS.

See Covenants, § 103.

See Time.

CALENDARS.

CANALS.

See Waters and Water Courses, § 230.

way company subject to reasonable regulations, did not empower the city to make any contract fixing rates of fare, so that they might not be changed by the Legislature or through the agency of the Railroad Commission; so that an ordinance fixing the fares was not a contract protected from impairment.-Milwaukee Electric Ry. & Light Co. v. Railroad Commission of Wisconsin, 142 N. W. 491.

§ 13 (Minn.) Under the statute it is the duty of common carriers to observe equality in freight rates to all shippers similarly circumstanced for the transportation of goods the same distance. Sullivan v. Minneapolis & R. R. Ky. Co., 142 N. W. 3.

II. CARRIAGE OF GOODS. (F) Loss of or Injury to Goods. § 114 (Minn.) A carrier's common-law liability as an insurer does not terminate until delivery to the consignee or, if there is no delivery, until notice to him of arrival and a sonable opportunity of removal afforded him.Rustad v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 142 N. W. 727.

rea

$136 (Minn.) Where, in an action for goods shipped destroyed by fire, the evidence showed that the fire came from the interior of the car, and that the car was destroyed, that the seals on the doors were intact, and that plaintiff's merchandise did not occupy the whole space of the car, and did not show when the seals were attached, or whether there was other merchandise in the car, the question of defendant's negligence was for the jury.-Rustad v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 142 N. W. 727.

(G) Carrier as Warehouseman.

§ 140 (Minn.) After the consignee has been given a reasonable opportunity to remove a shipment of goods, the liability of the carrier is that of a warehouseman.-Rustad v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 142 N. W. 727.

Where a shipment of goods, at the time of its destruction by fire, had been left with the defendant carrier for 53 hours after notice to the consignee of its arrival, the carrier's liability

CANCELLATION OF INSTRUMENTS. was that of a warehouseman.-id.

See Appeal and Error, § 1232; Bankruptcy, § 175: Deeds, §§ 17, 196-211; Equity, § 51; Exchange of Property. § 8; Fraudulent Conveyances, § 314; Mortgages, §§ 79, 86; Quieting Title; Reformation of Instruments; Sales, § 384; Taxation, § 689; Waters and Water Courses, § 230.

II. PROCEEDINGS AND RELIEF. § 38 (Mich.) In a suit to cancel a deed on the ground of the fraud of the grantee, a cross-bill based on breach of the covenants of warranty and against incumbrances in the deed cannot be maintained.-McKenzie v. Call, 142 N. W. 370.

§ 45 (N.D.) In an action to cancel an instrument valid upon its face for failure of consideration, the burden is on plaintiff to prove such failure.-Englert v. Dale, 142 N. W. 169.

See Arrest, § 27.

CAPIAS.

CARNAL KNOWLEDGE.

See Rape.

CARRIERS.

(H) Limitation of Liability.

§ 154 (Minn.) It is essential to the validity of a contract limiting a carrier's liability that there be a consideration and that the shipper be afforded the option of having the commonlaw obligation.-Rustad v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 142 N. W. 727.

$159 (Minn.) A limitation in a shipping bill of the carrier's liability as an insurer to 48 hours after notice to the consignee after the arrival of the freight, and a provision that the carrier's responsibility for property not removed within 48 hours after arrival shall be that of a warehouseman, held valid.-Rustad Great Northern Ry. Co., 142 N. W. 727.

V.

(K) Discrimination and Overcharge. § 199 (Minn.) Under the common law it is the duty of common carriers to observe equality in freight rates to all shippers similarly situated for the transportation of goods the same distance. Sullivan v. Minneapolis & R. R. Ry. Co., 142 N. W. 3.

8 201 (Minn.) A shipper's common-law right of action for discrimination still obtains in Minnesota, whatever may be the effect of the rate regulating statutes upon his former rem

See Commerce: Death, §§ 58, 95; Railroads, § edy for an extortion through the exaction of 229; Trial, §§ 84, 89.

I. CONTROL AND REGULATION OF
COMMON CARRIERS.

(A) In General.

2 (Wis.) St. 1911, § 1862, providing that cities might grant franchises to a street rail

unreasonable or excessive rates; no civil remedy being provided.-Sullivan v. Minneapolis & R. R. Ry. Co., 142 N. W. 3.

The measure of damages for a discrimination in freight rates is the difference between the charges exacted of plaintiff and those accepted from the most favored shipper, though the

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(D) Personal Injuries.

§ 280 (Neb.) A property owner who installs passenger elevators for the use of the public generally is subject to the same degree of care as that imposed upon common carriers.-Grimmel v. Boyd, 142 N. W. 893.

Where the owners of a building operated a passenger elevator for the accommodation of their tenants, they owed the highest degree of care possible consistent with the practical operation of the elevator.-Id.

§ 284 (Neb.) It is the duty of those in charge of a street car to protect passengers from annoying disturbances.-Sorenson v. Lincoln Traction Co., 142 N. W. 702.

§ 287 (Neb.) Where the conductor of a passenger elevator left the door of the shaft open while the elevator was not opposite the floor, and a person, intending to take the elevator, stepped into the open shaft and was killed, the conductor was guilty of actionable negligence, for which the owners of the building were liable, in the absence of contributory negligence. -Grimmel v. Boyd, 142 N. W. 893.

§ 303 (Mich.) A street railroad company should not stop a car for setting down passengers at a place known to be unsafe, and a depression in a pavement a step away from where the passengers alighted was situated near enough to the track to make it an alighting place and render the company liable if it was unsafe.Fuller v. Detroit United Ry., 142 N. W. 572.

A depression 12 inches square and of a maximum depth of 3 inches, located a step away from where a passenger would alight from a street car, was not an unsafe place for the landing of passengers.-Id.

§ 317 (Mich.) On the question of negligence in rapidly backing by a depot platform an engine without a headlight, on a dark night, whereby one on the platform to take passage was killed, the fact of the station not being lighted is a circumstance which may be considered.-Richardson v. Detroit & M. Ry. Co., 142 N. W. 832.

$347 (Mich.) Evidence in an action for the death of one who, having gone to a depot to take passage, was killed by a passing train, held, in view of the presumption that she was in the exercise of due care, to make a case for the jury on the question of contributory negligence.-Richardson v. Detroit & M. Ry. Co., 142 N. W. 832.

(F) Ejection of Passengers and Intruders. $353 (Neb.) Where a street car passenger refuses to refrain from annoying disturbances, the conductor may remove him from the car and may use such reasonable force as is necessary for that purpose.-Sorenson v. Lincoln Traction Co., 142 N. W. 702.

§ 384 (Neb.) In a street car passenger's ac tion for injuries, an instruction as to rights and duties of those in charge of the car in respect to the removal of a passenger who refuses to refrain from making a disturbance held misleading and prejudicial to defendant under the issues and evidence.-Sorenson v. Lincoln Traction Co., 142 N. W. 702.

(G) Passengers' Effects.

$ 391 (S.D.) A gun and gun case taken by a passenger on a railroad trip not shown to be in any manner connected with the purpose and object of the trip was not "baggage."-House v. Chicago & N. W. Ry. Co., 142 N. W. 736.

8 404 (Mich.) The strict liability of a common carrier of passengers for the loss of their baggage continues, after the arrival at destination, until the lapse of a reasonable time for its removal.-Wallace v. Detroit, G. H. & M. Ry. Co., 142 N. W. 558.

§ 408 (Mich.) In an action for loss of baggage, where the declaration was based upon the carrier's liability as an insurer, it was proper to admit statements by the carrier's agent concerning the removal of the baggage when the passenger presented the checks upon his arrival over an objection that they were not within the dec laration.-Wallace v. Detroit, G. H. & M. Ry. Co., 142 N. W. 558.

The rule that the specific acts of negligence relied upon must be pleaded does not apply to an action by a passenger for the destruction of her baggage before a reasonable time for its removal from the station had elapsed.-Id.

It was proper to submit to the jury the question whether a passenger had a reasonable time to remove her baggage before its destruction, where the evidence as to her opportunity was conflicting.-Id.

In an action for loss of baggage, caused by the burning of the carrier's station, the defense that the fire was caused by an act of God is by a preponderance of the evidence.—Id. an affirmative one, which the carrier must prove

CAUSA MORTIS.

See Gifts, §§ 18, 74.

CERTAINTY.

§ 320 (Mich.) Evidence in an action for the killing by a train of one who had gone to a depot to take passage held to make a question for the jury on the question of negligence in the operation of the train.-Richardson v. Detroit & M. See Charities, §§ 19, 21. Ry. Co., 142 N. W. 832.

Evidence in an action for death of one who having gone to a depot to take passage was killed by some passing train held sufficient to go to the jury on the question of her having been killed by a train run by the platform in a negligent manner.-Id.

(E) Contributory Negligence of Person Injured.

§ 328 (Neb.) A person who approaches the entrance of an elevator to enter same should exercise that degree of care which a person of ordinary prudence would exercise under like circumstances.-Grimmel v. Boyd, 142 N. W.

893.

CERTIFICATE.

See Evidence, § 383; Judgment, § 736; Municipal Corporations, § 901; Officers, § 79; Pleading, § 177.

CERTIORARI.

See Justices of the Peace, § 197.

See Jury, § 131.

See Equity.

CHALLENGE.

CHANCERY.

CHARGE.

Rate of charge, see Carriers, §§ 2, 13, 199, 201.

To jury, see Criminal Law, §§ 761-823, 922, 957; Trial, §§ 191-296.

CHARITIES.

See Perpetuities, § 8; Wills, § 13.

I. CREATION, EXISTENCE, AND VALIDITY.

§ 19 (Iowa) A devise to a trustee of land to be used as a home for poor old people, and giving the trustee power to substitute some one or more persons to take his place and to manage the property as trustee or trustees, and to provide for a trusteeship that shall be perpetual, and in case such trustee fails to designate a successor directing a third person to appoint suitable persons to manage the property, was not void for uncertainty as to the trustee.-In re Cleven's Estate, 142 N. W. 986.

§ 21 (Iowa) A devise of testator's farm to a trustee to establish and maintain a home for poor old people held not void for uncertainty as to the beneficiaries.-In re Cleven's Estate, 142 N. W. 986.

A provision which comprehends a class without limitation as to its abode, where charity is the object, will be upheld in case there is a power resting in the trustee to select from the class named.-Id.

822 (Iowa) In an attempted creation of a charitable trust, definiteness in details is not essential, but it is sufficient if the general purpose is expressed in terms indicating a clear desire; the details being delegated to the trustee. In re Cleven's Estate, 142 N. W. 986.

A devise of the residue of testator's property to a trustee to use testator's farm as a home for poor old people, etc., held not objectionable in that testator did not himself, "establish" the trust but imposed that duty on the trustee.-Id.

CHARTER.

to the property passes to him under such provision. Allison v. Teeters, 142 N. W. 340.

§ 162 (Minn.) A mortgagee has the legal title to the mortgaged chattels, and after condition broken has the legal right to the possession thereof.-Tiedt v. Boyce, 142 N. W. 195.

V. RIGHTS AND REMEDIES OF
CREDITORS.

$ 200 (S.D.) A judgment creditor of a chattel mortgagor, as to whom the mortgage was fraudulent and void, could not claim any rights in a judgment of replevin rendered in favor of the mortgagee against the receiver of the mortgagor for the chattels or the unpaid mortgage debt, nor in an appeal bond executed by such receiver.-Hundley Dry Goods Co. v. Albien, 142 N. W. 49.

VII. REMOVAL OR TRANSFER OF PROPERTY BY MORTGAGOR. (A) Rights and Liabilities of Parties. § 224 (Mich.) Where the possession of mortgaged chattels is not delivered to the mortgagee, something is required to take the place of change of possession, such as recording the mortgage, to affect creditors of and subsequent purchasers from the mortgagor without notice.— Allison v. Teeters, 142 N. W. 340.

VIII. PAYMENT OR PERFORMANCE OF CONDITION, RELEASE, AND SATISFACTION.

§ 237 (Iowa) The holder of a chattel mortgage is absolutely entitled to payment, and a purchaser of the property cannot condition his payment of the balance due upon the mortgagee's release of an attachment upon the mortgaged property.-Sheeler v. Porter Hardware Co., 142 N. W. 1019.

IX. FORECLOSURE.

§ 271 (Minn.) It is essential to the right of a junior mortgagee to foreclose, where a senior mortgagee is rightfully in possession, that he either redeem from the senior mortgage or

See Municipal Corporations, 88 45, 271-278, show that the property is sufficient in value to 911, 919.

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satisfy the senior mortgagee and leave a surplus to be applied upon the junior mortgage.Tiedt v. Boyce, 142 N. W. 195.

to sustain a finding as to the amount of par§ 278 (S.D.) In foreclosure evidence held not tial payments previously made on the note.Townsend v. Weisenburger, 142 N. W. 253.

§ 286 (S.D.) Where the chattel mortgage upon a grain elevator in which the mortgagor had a desk was foreclosed, and the desk remained after constructive seizure by the sheriff, the seizure will not give the purchaser at foreclosure any right to the desk, which was not included in the mortgage.-Dixson v. Ladd, 142 N. W. 259.

§ 290 (S.D.) In foreclosure evidence of the money the mortgagee had paid for sheriff's fees and expenses on a prior attempted statutory foreclosure, together with a receipt from the sheriff, was incompetent without proof that the charges were lawful and reasonable.-Townsend v. Weisenburger, 142 N. W. 253.

$116 (S.D.) A chattel mortgage upon a grain elevator, together with weights, scales, and appurtenances will not include a roll-top desk kept in the office, the term "appurtenances" applying only to machinery necessary to the operation of the elevator.-Dixson v. Ladd, 142 See Property. N. W. 259.

IV. RIGHTS AND LIABILITIES OF PARTIES.

CHATTELS.

CHEAT.

See Fraud.

§ 161 (Mich.) Where a chattel mortgagee did not act under a provision of the mortgage that

CHECKS.

if the note be not paid at maturity he should See Bills and Notes.

have the right to take possession of the prop

erty without legal process and the same should become his absolute property, but, instead, be

CHILDREN.

gan foreclosure, he could not claim that title See Guardian and Ward.

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COMMON LAW.

See Judgment, § 585; Officers, § 82; Rail roads, $$ 99, 307; Statutes, § 222.

COMMON SCHOOLS.

See Schools and School Districts, §§ 9-159. COMPARATIVE NEGLIGENCE.

See Negligence, § 101.

COMPENSATION.

See Brokers; Damages. § 38; Elections, § 53; Eminent Domain, §§ 82, 101; Health, § 5: Jury, 77; Officers, § 101; Waters and Water Courses, § 183.

COMPENSATORY DAMAGES.

See Damages, §§ 19-43.

COMPETENCY.

See Evidence, §§ 555, 558; Jury, 88 99, 131; Witnesses, §§ 60-219.

COMPLAINT.

See Indictment and Information; Pleading, §§ 214, 218.

COMPOSITIONS WITH CREDITORS. See Compromise and Settlement.

COMPROMISE AND SETTLEMENT. See Release.

§ 15 (Minn.) Where one of the two contracting parties jointly interested in a claim against a city compromised the claim under an agreement that it should be paid in installments, he did not thereby become obligated to pay the other party his entire share at once, but was obliged to pay such share only as the installments were actually received.-Hodgdon v. Peet, 142 N. W.

808.

§ 23 (Mich.) In an action to set aside a settlement of a suit between the complainant and defendants, where complainant's claim to property formerly belonging to her grandfather was disputed by defendants as his heirs, evidence held insufficient to show that the compromise was the result of fraud and misrepresentation.Van Syckle v. Thompson, 142 N. W. 556.

COMPUTATION.

See Limitation of Actions, §§ 44-105; Time.

CONCLUSION.

See Evidence, §§ 471-502.

CONCURRENT JURISDICTION.

See Courts, § 489.

CONDEMNATION.

See Eminent Domain.

CONDITIONAL SALES.

See Sales, §§ 427, 459-481.

CONDITIONS.

See Chattel Mortgages, § 162; Contracts, § 221; Escrows.

CONFIDENTIAL RELATIONS.

See Witnesses, § 219.

For cases in Dec. Dig. & Am. Dig. Key No. Series & Indexes see same topic and section (§) NUMBER

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CONSPIRACY.

The public policy which protects the Governor from being interfered with, except in dire emergency, does not apply with full force to subordinates acting within his authority.-Id.

(C) Executive Powers and Functions.
§ 80 (S.D.) While a "judicial power" may

See Criminal Law, § 372; Homicide, §§ 29, only be exercised by the court, a “quasi judicial 231; Torts, § 28.

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III. DISTRIBUTION OF GOVERN.
MENTAL POWERS AND
FUNCTIONS.

(A) Legislative Powers and Delegation
Thereof.

$58 (Neb.) Cobbey's Ann. St. 1911, § 4778, authorizing the chief officer of any department of the state government to employ an attorney, is not violative of Const. art. 2, § 1, in that it infringes on the powers of the Attorney General, since the constitutional provision has no reference to a distribution of power within the various divisions of the executive department. -Follmer v. State, 142 N. W. 908.

$61 (Minn.) Laws 1911, c. 207, providing for the formation and consolidation of school districts, is not unconstitutional as an attempt to confer on the courts jurisdiction to determine questions of a purely legislative character.In re School Dists. Nos. 2, 3, and 4 of Nobles County, 142 N. W. 723.

power," may be conferred upon an executive or administrative board as an incident to its duties.-Hoyt v. Hughes County, 142 N. W. 471.

VI. VESTED RIGHTS.

§ 103 (Minn.) The county is a mere governmental agency of the state in public drainage proceedings, and hence Laws 1913, c. 567, relating to drainage, does not in its retroactive aspect impair any vested rights of the county.State v. George, 142 N. W. 945.

VII. OBLIGATION OF CONTRACTS. (B) Contracts of States and Municipalities.

§ 121 (Minn.) The county is a mere govern mental agency of the state in public drainage proceedings, and hence Laws 1913, c. 567, relating to drainage, does not in its retroactive aspect impair any contract obligation.-State v. George, 142 N. W. 945.

$134 (Wis.) St. 1911, §.1862, providing that cities might grant franchises to a street railway company subject to reasonable regulations, did not empower the city to make any contract fixing rates of fare so that they might not be changed by the Legislature or through the agency of the Railroad Commission; so that an ordinance fixing the fares was not a contract protected from impairment.-Milwaukee Electric Ry. & Light Co. v. Railroad Commission of Wisconsin, 142 N. W. 491.

(C) Contracts of Individuals and Private Corporations.

§ 149 (S.D.) A statute, which modifies the law authorizing a sale under mortgage foreclosure by advertisement, so as to take away the power of sale from the person designated in the mortgage, and lodge such power only in the sheriff or his deputy, does not impair the obligation of an existing mortgage, empowering a person therein named to make a sale.-Brown v. Hall, 142 N. W. 854.

IX. PRIVILEGES OR IMMUNITIES,
AND CLASS LEGISLATION.

§ 205 (N.D.) Rev. Code 1905, §§ 4456, 4457, authorizing the giving of surety company bonds on appeal and the taxing of costs therefor, are not unconstitutional as class legislation.-Investors' Syndicate v. Pugh, 142 N. W. 919.

(B) Judicial Powers and Functions. 873 (Mich.) Under Const. art. 3, §§ 1, 2, declaring that no person belonging to one depart- § 206 (Neb.) Const. U. S. Amend. 14, providment of the government may exercise the pow- ing that no state shall abridge the privileges ers of another, the action of the Governor re- or immunities of citizens of the United States, moving from office the mayor of a city, as au- does not prevent states from classifying the thorized by Comp. Laws 1897, § 1159, is not subjects of legislation and making different regreviewable by certiorari, but the validity of the ulations as to the property of different indiaction may be determined in proceedings be-viduals differently situated.-Norris v. City of tween the mayor removed and the one claiming Lincoln, 142 N. W. 114. to act by virtue of the Governor's action.-Germaine v. Ferris, 142 N. W. 738.

$73 (Wis.) The courts are not bound to desist from enjoining a wrongful act because the wrongdoer is the Governor or a person acting

X. EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS. § 233 (Minn.) St. Paul City Charter, § 23. as amended in 1912, relative to municipal assessments for public improvements, held not vio

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